Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

61. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, January 30, 1955, 10:45 a.m.¹

Washington, January 30, 1955, 10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Evacuation of Tachen Islands

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Hoover
• Mr. Murphy
• Mr. Robertson
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mr. Bowie
• Mr. Key
• Admiral Radford
• Admiral Orem
• Admiral Anderson
• Colonel Goodpaster, White House
• Mr. Wainhouse
• Mr. McConaughy
• Mr. Phleger
• Mr. Scott

Part I—Meeting at 10:45 preliminary to meeting at 11:00 with Admiral Radford, Admiral Orem, Admiral Anderson, and Colonel Goodpaster

At the preliminary meeting Mr. Robertson expressed his feeling that Chiang had not yet received Yeh’s report on his latest conversation with the Secretary² at the time of Rankin’s conversation with Chiang reported in Taipei’s 497.³ All steps, according to Mr. Robertson, had been taken in the closest possible consultation with Foreign Minister Yeh and the Secretary had chosen to deal with Yeh rather than through Ambassador Rankin purposely. Yeh had told Mr. Robertson yesterday that Robertson was not to be too concerned regarding Chiang’s first reactions but to wait on Chiang’s receipt of the report of the latest Yeh–Dulles conversation.

After Mr. Murphy expressed some doubts as to the clarity of Yeh’s reports to Chiang Mr. Robertson stated that he was certain that Yeh was reporting accurately but that there were many doubts among the ChiNat Government on Formosa as to British influence on us and that these doubts may be coloring Chiang’s reaction. After much discussion there was obviously no clear understanding as to the exact status of our planned understanding with Chiang and the British on the question of our support for Quemoy and Matsu.

Part II—Meeting at 11:00 with Admiral Radford, Admiral Orem, Admiral Anderson, and Colonel Goodpaster

Admiral Radford and Mr. Hoover agreed that the President need not return early and Colonel Goodpaster called Mr. Hagerty at Augusta to that effect.

All participants at the meeting received and read copies of Taipei’s 497 and 496⁴ and the Department’s 416⁵ and 417⁶ to Taipei.

Mr. Robertson repeated his comment in the earlier meeting to the effect that there had been a crossing of wires and at the time of Rankin’s conversation Chiang had undoubtedly not received a report of the latest meeting with the Secretary. Foreign Minister Yeh had told him he was sure everything would be in order when this was received.

Admiral Radford determined through a series of questions to Mr. Robertson that the proposals made to the ChiNats were passed in conversation between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Yeh. In this regard Mr. Robertson read the original ChiNat request as given by Foreign Minister Yeh⁷ and pointed out that in subsequent meetings between Yeh and the Secretary this request had been greatly modified.

Through a review of memoranda of conversation and telegrams to our Embassy in Taipei the group agreed that Chiang’s misunderstanding may be a legitimate one growing out of the change in the United States position as expressed to Foreign Minister Yeh by the Secretary in their meetings of the 19th and 20th [21st].⁸ There was considerable discussion as to the real meaning behind the Secretary’s decision not to publicly announce that we would support the ChiNats against any attack on Quemoy or Matsu.

At this point Mr. Robertson received a call from Foreign Minister Yeh in New York. Yeh stated that he had just received a telegram from Chiang which emphasized more strongly than before Chiang’s concern over our seeming reversal in the commitment to announce publicly that we would help defend Quemoy and Matsu. Foreign Minister Yeh had suggested to us that Chiang go ahead with his formal request for our assistance in the withdrawal from the Tachens and include a request for our public commitment to defend Quemoy and Matsu. It was Yeh’s idea that in our reply we could clarify our reasons for not making public this commitment. After some discussion it was generally agreed that this was not a sound course to take and that it would be best to come to grips and solve this problem without having Chiang and ourselves on record as in disagreement.

Admiral Radford pointed out that we had in effect already announced our intention to support the Tachen withdrawal if requested. After discussion it was generally agreed that an announcement that we were beginning our support of the evacuation of the Tachens should be made but that this must await the receipt of a formal request from Chiang and Presidential approval of the request before it could be made.

In reply to Mr. MacArthur, Admiral Radford stated that there were a number of ChiNat ships now available for the evacuation, as well as two or three United States transports in the general area. It was his belief that once the order for evacuation was given it would take approximately twenty-four hours for the evacuation ships to approach the Tachens and it was at this time that our responsibilities for cover and support would begin. He felt that if there were no ChiCom interference the evacuation could be completed in ten to fifteen days. There were many variables in this situation though, concerning the number of civilians to be evacuated, weather conditions, the attitude of the Tachen military command, as well as the always present possibilities of ChiCom interference.

After some further discussion of the technicalities of our decision to support the ChiNats against any ChiCom invasion of Quemoy and Matsu, Mr. Hoover summed up the opinions as follows:

That we were willing to support the defense of Quemoy and Matsu against a real invasion attempt but that this is a unilateral decision on our part pending appropriate action by the United Nations and subject to change under conditions which may exist in the future.

The important point being that this was not a mutual agreement between the ChiNats and ourselves but a unilateral decision on our part. We were willing to state this privately to Chiang but we were not willing to make a public statement to this effect. Mr. Hoover felt that we could and should have Ambassador Rankin clarify this point with Chiang and that the formal request for aid in the Tachen evacuation must await this understanding.

FE was directed to:

1. Prepare a telegram to Rankin filling him in on all blind spots in his background, including a summation of the Trevelyan–Chou conversations.⁹

2. Send Rankin a copy of the agreed statement to be made by the ChiNats with the suggestion of one slight modification in the text.¹⁰ (Mr. Robertson stated that he had discussed this with Foreign Minister Yeh who had agreed to this procedure.)

3. Prepare a complete chronological record of the conversations, discussions, and decisions on this matter over the past week to ten days.¹¹

4. Prepare a recommendation to the President to be discussed at a further meeting in Mr. Hoover’s office at 5:00 this afternoon preliminary to a meeting at 6:00 with the President to include instructions to Rankin to clarify our position to Chiang.

Mr. Key was asked to arrange for Ambassador Lodge to be present at the meeting with the President so that he could be fully informed of all the technicalities and details of this problem in anticipation of his work in the Security Council Monday.¹²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/1–3055. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Scott, Director of the Executive Secretariat.
2. See Document 50.
3. Supra.
4. Document 59.
5. See footnote 2, supra.
6. Telegram 417 to Taipei, January 29, sent in reply to telegram 496 from Taipei, summarized the conversations between Robertson and Yeh on January 27 (see Document 46) and between Dulles and Yeh on January 28, noting that the reports of the conversations should reassure Chiang. (Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/1–2955)
7. Reference is apparently to the first conversation between Dulles and Yeh on January 19, see Document 16.
8. See Document 19 and 28.
9. Telegram 420 to Taipei, January 30, transmitted a summary of Trevelyan’s January 28 conversation with Chou, based on the message received from the British Embassy on January 29 (see footnote 2, Document 51). (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/1–3055) Telegram 419 to Taipei, January 30, transmitted the text of the President’s statement of January 29 (see footnote 1, Document 56).
10. See infra.
11. Two brief chronologies were prepared in CA: one, dated February 1, headed “U.S. Commitments to GRC“; and another, undated, headed “Summary of US–UK Conversations on Off-Shore Islands.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/8–2958 and 793.5/2–2955, respectively)
12. January 31.