Office of the Historian

58. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)1

Washington, 29 January 1955—12:43 p.m.

JCS 975067. Exclusive for Stump info Pride. Signed Radford. JCS called attention SecDef and President to provision in CINCPAC Op Order 51–Z–552 par 3, “will include US attack of source or base [Page 165] from which attack is launched if indicated as essential to success.”3 As a result you are directed to change this part of your order to read, “will include US attack of source or base from which the enemy attack is launched if necessary in defense of own forces engaged in the operation.”4

With foregoing modification your Op Order less Atomic Annex5 is approved by JCS; however, this message is not a directive for implementation. Directive to implement is awaiting formal request from ChiNats. When ChiNat request is received it will be considered by President who will then make final decision.

FYI President read CNO 281605Z6 to you and commented that it was an excellent presentation of his position.

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series. Top Secret; Priority. Sent to COMSEVENTHFLT for information.↩
  2. The reference is to CINCPAC OPLAN 51–Z–55, an operation plan for U.S. support of the Chinese Nationalists in the evacuation of the Tachen Islands. CINCPAC’s proposed plan was transmitted to CINCPACFLT and Chief, MAAG Formosa in telegram 230306Z from CINCPAC, January 22, and also sent to CNO for information. (JCS Records, CCS 381 (4–16–49) Sec. 7)↩
  3. Paragraph 3(2) concerns the contingency of enemy attacks on Nationalist evacuation forces or supporting U.S. forces; in addition to the provision quoted here, it states that “retaliatory action against other targets on the Chinese mainland will be taken only with the approval of CINCPAC.”↩
  4. CINCPAC OPLAN 51–Z–55 as revised on January 30, included this provision and also stated that such attacks should be made only upon authority of COMSEVENTHFLT and that retaliatory action against other targets on the Chinese mainland should be taken only with the approval of CINCPAC “as authorized by higher authority.” Further instructions and restrictions were included: unless U.S. or friendly forces engaged in the evacuation were attacked, U.S. forces were not to operate within 3 miles of the Chinese mainland, Communist forces encountered were not to be attacked unless they demonstrated hostile intent, and in case of isolated incidents such as sporadic artillery fire not interfering with the evacuation, only local counteraction might be taken. It stated, however, that in the event of an actual Communist attack on U.S. or friendly forces engaged in the evacuation, “any Communist forces encountered in Tachen area or in vicinity evacuation and covering forces shall be destroyed” and that in the event of actual engagement in combat, hot pursuit into mainland air space or territorial waters was authorized. (Enclosure to JCS 2054/90, February 14, 1955; JCS Records, CCS 381 (4–16–49) Sec. 7)↩
  5. Annex A provided for “the use of atomic weapons in the defense of U.S. Forces should such employment be authorized by highest authority.” (Filed with a copy of CINCPAC OPLAN 51–Z–55, dated January 30; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area)↩
  6. Document 49.↩