Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

267. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, June 10, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Krishna Menon on June 14

Following are FE’s views on certain aspects of the talks to be held with Krishna Menon, based on the information given Mr. Macmillan by Menon (London’s 5364),² Chou En-lai’s conversation with Trevelyan in Peiping, and Ambassador Cooper’s talks with Nehru and Menon. A paper dealing with the problem of the Chinese students in the United States, supplementing FE’s memorandum of June 3,³ is being forwarded separately (attached Tab A).⁴

Our objectives in the talks with Menon should be: (1) to obtain early release of the remaining airmen and, if possible, of the American civilians, (2) to extend as long as possible the present tacit avoidance of major hostilities in the Taiwan area and to seek to perpetuate this de facto situation, (3) to convey to Menon (and to the world generally) the sincerity of our intention to seek peaceful solutions to world trouble spots, including Taiwan, and (4) to avoid specific commitments which might limit prematurely our freedom of action in the Taiwan area and in our relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government until we have been able to consider Menon’s views carefully.

If our reports from London about Menon’s views are an accurate reflection of Chou En-lai’s remarks to him, it would appear that Peiping has, in fact, a real desire for direct negotiations with the U.S. even at the expense of an indefinite postponement of its “liberation” of Taiwan. Chou’s willingness to adopt a more flexible position for the sake of negotiations with us may indicate a shift in emphasis in his strategy against the Chinese Nationalist Government to a campaign of psychological attrition and subversion. This would be consistent with the continuing Communist objective of destroying Chinese Nationalist prestige by presenting that Government in the light of a mere defeated insurgent regime.

The London report of Chou’s remarks to Menon contains the first hint of Chinese Communist willingness to permit peaceful evacuation of the off-shore islands, with the consequent strengthening of Taiwan defenses by these garrisons and equipment. While the Chinese Communists have until recently attempted to focus attention on the status of Taiwan as the real issue for negotiations rather than a cease fire, the Chou–Menon talks suggest at least the possibility that the Chinese may be prepared to accept a continuation of the status quo with respect to Taiwan in return for some sort of normalization of their relations with us, with the prospect that time will be on their side in achieving their ultimate goal regarding Taiwan. Time may, of course, benefit the Communists through deterioration of the situation on Taiwan and through growing world sentiment for a solution which does not accord with our present views, but this need not necessarily be the case. In the present world situation we should be prepared to exploit any reasonable prospect for solving this problem peacefully and seek to make time play for us by demonstrating flexibility in our views. This is particularly necessary with respect to the off-shore islands. Because of the vulnerability of these islands to Communist military attack and because of the prevalent feeling among many of our major allies, to say nothing of the so-called neutralist countries of Asia, that the off-shore islands are not worth fighting for, it seems unlikely that the Communists will be content to extend a de facto cease-fire situation indefinitely. We should avoid being pushed into a position where we (a) either must negotiate under disadvantageous conditions or (b) face increasing Communist military activity against the off-shore islands putting us in the dilemma of allowing them to be lost or engaging ourselves in hostilities which would not have the support of our allies.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.9111/6–1055. Secret.
2. Telegram 5364 from London, June 7, summarized Menon’s position as told to Macmillan; it was similar in substance to Makins’ June 9 memorandum, summarized in footnote 2, supra.
3. Reference is apparently to a memorandum of June 2 from Robertson to Dulles commenting on statements by Menon to Cooper, reported in telegram 1889 from New Delhi, May 30. Menon had expressed the view that the release of all U.S. nationals could be secured in a framework which could dispose of the question of Chinese nationals in the United States and that the remaining airmen would be released if their relatives were permitted to go to China. (Department of State, Central Files, 791.13/5–3055) Robertson’s June 2 memorandum recommended taking steps to lift the restrictions on the two Chinese “students” still under restraining orders and telling Menon that the fliers’ release should not in any way depend on a visit by their families. (Ibid., 611.93241/6–255)
4. Not attached to the source text. Reference is apparently to a memorandum entitled “Treatment Accorded Chinese Students in the United States”, sent to Dulles with a covering memorandum of June 10 from Sebald. (Ibid., FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, January thru June)