Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

268. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 13, 1955¹

Washington, June 13, 1955

SUBJECT

• Conversation between Prime Minister Ali of Indonesia and Chou En-lai on May 27 regarding Taiwan and negotiations with the United States²

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Moekarto Notowidigdo, Indonesian Ambassador
• Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State
• Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs

Ambassador Moekarto came in on instructions from Prime Minister Ali to convey the result of the latter’s conversation with Chou En-lai as follows:

1. Chou En-lai said that several other countries had also approached his government in an effort to solve the Taiwan problem peacefully. The United Kingdom had suggested that Communist China abandon its claim to Taiwan if the United States persuaded Nationalist China to give up the off-shore islands. Chou En-lai stated that his government had refused this proposal. Burma had suggested direct negotiations with the Chinese Nationalists. Chou En-lai rejected this but had told U Nu that Communist China would be willing to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek after settlement had been reached with the United States over the international aspects of the problem.

2. Chou En-lai told Ali that there are two aspects to the problem: the international aspect, or the dispute with the United States in the area, meaning the presence of the 7th Fleet and U.S. forces in and about Taiwan; and the domestic aspect, which is the dispute with the Chinese Nationalists over Taiwan.

3. As to the means of negotiations with the U.S., Communist China had accepted the ten-power conference proposed by the USSR. However, Chou En-lai told Ali that Communist China would accept the addition of Thailand and the Philippines to discuss the Taiwan problem if the U.S. desired. Communist China would also agree to a proposal from some other for a Geneva-type conference provided it excluded Chiang. Furthermore Chou En-lai told Ali that the Chinese Communist Government would maintain its position taken at Bandung to have direct negotiations with the U.S.

4. Ali asked Chou En-lai what the agenda for direct negotiations would be. The latter replied that it involved the relaxion [relaxation] of tension in the Taiwan area. However, if the U.S. proposed another agenda the Peiping Government would consider it.

5. Ali reported that he advised Chou En-lai before starting negotiations it would be better to make a gesture of good will to the United States and to take more concrete action such as the release of prisoners. Chou replied that he had already decided on the release of four prisoners as a good will gesture and now it was the Americans’ turn to make a good will gesture toward China. Specifically, Chou proposed the lifting or the relaxation of the embargo from China.

Ambassador Moekarto then asked Mr. Murphy for the views of the United States on Chou’s suggestion for lifting the embargo and the views of the United States on the procedure for organizing a conference with Chou En-lai. These questions appeared to be part of his instructions from Ali. Mr. Murphy replied that it was very incongruous for Chou En-lai to ask for negotiations while holding Americans as hostages. There is no reason for them to be held except as political hostages. Mr. Murphy stated that the United States does not do business that way. The sooner Chou En-lai and others realized that we could not negotiate by blackmail the better off for everybody. Furthermore, Chou’s proposal shows a peculiar mentality not to see the wrongness of methods which are similar to gangster’s. The United States does not intend to accept any such position and American public opinion would find it extremely difficult to negotiate with American boys held as hostages. The Ambassador asked if this meant there would be no negotiations before all prisoners are released. Mr. Murphy replied that he did not wish to make any categoric statements since the issue of negotiations is a very large one and since the prisoners had really nothing to do with it.

As to the next steps on negotiations with the Chinese Communists, Mr. Murphy referred the Ambassador to the two public statements of the President and Secretary Dulles.³ The Ambassador asked if the U.S. would accept a proposal from a third party for negotiations. Mr. Murphy replied that we would have to examine the proposal first and that we were not making “A” priority conditions. Ambassador Moekarto again asked if there would be any conditions attached to our position. Mr. Murphy replied that the Secretary had taken a very reasonable attitude towards this matter and that in any event the U.S. is never against peaceful resolution of international problems.

Ambassador Moekarto also explained that following the talk with Prime Minister Ali, Chou En-lai had issued a public statement⁴ clarifying their joint communiqué⁵ issued in Djakarta after the Bandung Conference. Chou En-lai clarified it to indicate that it did not mean the use of force to bring about a settlement of the Taiwan problem.

Mr. Murphy asked what impressions Prime Minister Ali had gained from his trip. The Ambassador replied that the Prime Minister felt Chou En-lai was sincere in his intentions to seek peaceful ways to settle the Taiwan problem. Mr. Murphy commented that it was really up to the Chinese to show they had peaceful intentions. It was they who attacked us in Korea, not the reverse. As for trade between Indonesia and Communist China, Ambassador Moekarto stated that it was very slight at this time, although an agreement for one year was being concluded in the amount of $56 million to be paid in Swiss francs.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/6–1355. Confidential. Drafted by Young. Initialed by Murphy, indicating his approval.
2. Prime Minister Ali visited the People’s Republic of China, May 26–June 3.
3. On April 26 and 27; see Documents 222 and 231.
4. The text of the statement, issued to the press on June 10, was sent to the Department in despatch 728 from Jakarta, June 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 656D.93/6–1055)
5. Dated April 28; see footnote 2, Document 242.