266. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, June 10, 19551
[Here follows a brief discussion concerning two scheduled speeches by the President.]
I gave the President to read the memorandum which Makins had left with me, giving Macmillan’s account of his talk with Menon.2 I said that I felt that we should take a very stiff position on the 11 airmen and not allow this to get mixed up with the civilians. The President said he was not sure that we were on very strong grounds. I said we had no agreement to return the Chinese civilians here whereas we did have an agreement for the return of our POWs.3 The President said he thought that the Chinese had come here with an implied understanding that they would be allowed to go home. I said that was balanced by the implied understanding that American civilians could go home but that the POWs were an explicit undertaking. The President said we had not been able to live up to part of that ourselves, as evidenced by the release by the Koreans of many of the North Korean POWs so that they could not be returned.4 He [Page 589] said he thought we should let all of the Chinese go back. I said there were two that Defense was dubious about because they had highly classified information. The President thought that this should not be an obstacle, that perhaps the information was not as valuable as we thought. I said I would look into this matter further.5
[Here follows discussion concerning presidential appointments.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Confidential; Personal and Private.↩
- The memorandum from Ambassador Makins, dated June 9, attached to the source text together with a covering note of that date from Makins to Dulles, summarizes the proposals which Menon had given to Macmillan in London. It stated that Menon assumed that both parties wished to enter negotiations and that the Chinese would accept the removal of tension in the Formosa area as the subject of negotiations. Menon suggested the initiation of negotiations by contacts between U.S. and Chinese diplomatic representatives in London, New Delhi, or Moscow, and steps on both sides to reduce tensions. The United States, for example, could make it clear that any Chinese student who wished to return to China could do so and, in addition, could grant permission to the airmen’s relatives to visit China. A further measure, Menon suggested, would be gradual Nationalist withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu; while Chou was opposed to a formal cease-fire, he was willing to agree tacitly to a continuation of the current lull in the area while the Nationalist forces withdrew to Formosa.↩
- The Korean Armistice Agreement, signed at Panmunjom, Korea, on July 27, 1953; for text, see 4 UST 234.↩
- On June 18, 1953; for related documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xv, Part 2, pp. 1196 ff.↩
- A memorandum of June 12 by Dulles’ secretary Mildred Asbjornson records that in a telephone conversation on June 11 Dulles told Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson that the President “was in a strong mood when he saw him yesterday and indicated a ‘give them all back’ attitude”. Dulles urged that the Department of Defense should discuss the matter with the President if necessary and “try to get it in the clear” before Menon’s arrival. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) A memorandum of July 29 from Phyllis Bernau to Dulles informed him that she had checked with Goodpaster’s office to learn the outcome of this conversation and that Goodpaster’s secretary had found a Department of Defense memorandum of June 11 concerning the two Chinese “students” with a handwritten note that on June 13 Goodpaster had discussed it with the President, who had “indicated approval of the Defense decision to agree to release” them. (Ibid., Wang–Johnson Talks)↩