Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

242. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 6, 1955, 3:08 p.m.¹

Washington, May 6, 1955, 3:08 p.m.

SUBJECT

• 1) Clarification Chou En-lai Statement²
• 2) New Guinea—Irian
• 3) Offer of Good-Offices for Negotiations on Formosa
• 4) Confidential Indonesian comment on Chou En-lai’s Intentions as to Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• The Indonesian Ambassador, H.E. Mukarto Notowidigdo
• Assistant Secretary Robertson
• PSA—Mr. Philip E. Haring

1) Ambassador Mukarto reiterated Prime Minister Ali’s statement to Ambassador Cumming that his government intends to support only “the peaceful efforts” of the Peoples Republic of China in safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity.³ He expressed embarrassment that his Government had failed to spell out that its intention was limited to peaceful efforts but added he felt that everyone in the world realized that Indonesia itself had only peaceful intentions. The Secretary expressed appreciation for the clarification.

[Here follows paragraph 2, a discussion of United States policy concerning the Indonesian-Dutch dispute over West New Guinea, or West Irian.]

3) The Ambassador said that he had a personal message from Prime Minister Ali to the Secretary. He said that Prime Minister Ali felt that the Bandung Conference had created a very favorable atmosphere for the peaceful settlement of problems. Prime Minister Ali, as the unanimous choice to be Chairman of the Conference, had further extended his efforts with the other four Colombo powers, Chou En-lai, and Philippine representative General Romulo, to further peaceful settlements. In the course of a dinner with these participants, Chou En-lai advocated direct negotiations with the US on the Formosa question. Prime Minister Ali said if Chou En-lai meant this he should state it publicly, which Chou En-lai later did. The Prime Minister believes Chou En-lai is sincere, and therefore, since Ali is accepting his invitation to come to Peiping on May 23 he offers his good-offices “if the US and China wish to use his services”.

The Secretary said he was extremely grateful for the offer but could not reply at the moment as three or four other Governments have indicated that, on their own initiative, they are finding out Chou En-lai’s thinking and what information is available. He added that we are not making up our minds just now but we would appreciate being informed by Prime Minister Ali of anything he might also learn of Chou En-lai’s intentions. The Secretary said we have not asked and have not as yet decided to ask anyone to act as intermediary. We are anxious to have information which may be acquired on the initiative of other countries. We will gather the information as we can and then decide on the next step. He opined that possibly some further initiative will come from the Chinese Peoples Republic itself.

4) Ambassador Mukarto offered the following information in confidence from his Government. He said that Prime Minister Ali on the basis of private conversation with Chou En-lai found that Chou En-lai divided the problem into two parts: a) international, and b) domestic. Chou En-lai regards settlement of the issue as falling into a) direct negotiations with the US, and b) direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. The Ambassador quoted Chou En-lai as willing to meet Chiang Kai-shek and negotiate a peaceful settlement of their problem after he had negotiated with the US and the international aspects were settled. He interprets Chou En-lai’s reported statement as an intention to negotiate with the US on the Seventh Fleet and presence of American troops in Formosa but as meaning that other issues would be for negotiation only with Chiang Kai-shek. He asked that this matter be kept in confidence and the Secretary expressed appreciation for his reporting the information to us.

(On leaving the Secretary’s Office, Ambassador Mukarto added to Mr. Haring that Prime Minister Ali was additionally influenced to regard Chou En-lai as making a genuine and sincere offer in that it appeared to have been on his own initiative. He said that when Chou En-lai advocated direct negotiations Nehru “became furious” as he had felt all along that direct negotiations between the US and Chou En-lai would not be possible.)

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.56D/5–655. Secret. Drafted by Haring. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. Reference is to a joint statement issued on April 28 by Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo and Premier Chou En-lai at the conclusion of a visit by the latter to Jakarta; see Documents on International Affairs, 1955, pp. 469–470.
3. Prime Minister Ali made the statement during a conversation of May 2, when Cumming asked him to clarify the meaning of paragraph 4 of the statement cited in footnote 2 above. The conversation was reported in telegram 2113 from Jakarta, May 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5–255) In the paragraph under reference, the two Prime Ministers expressed sympathy and support “for the efforts of either of the two countries in safeguarding its own sovereignty and territorial integrity.”