Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

237. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)¹

Washington, May 4, 1955—5:31 p.m.

042231Z. Exclusive for Admiral Stump from Admiral Radford.

Robertson and I reported on Formosa trip to President yesterday.² President not surprised ChiNats desire make stand on offshore islands and actually favors it as being in line with an outpost strategy. His feeling is that perhaps their defense could be equally effective with fewer men if their defenses were properly laid out and constructed. I told him that in opinion of Army officers on the spot the number of troops was not excessive and also that I felt you were in fact giving ChiNats advice and assistance in connection with improving island defense plans. State has sent msg to Rankin with President’s approval however saying in part that “Admiral Stump will soon be conferring with him (Gimo) to discuss military ways in which such defense effort (offshore islands) can be improved”.³

President wishes us supply what is needed. He mentioned for instance a recent graduate of Ft. Benning going over basic design of defense works, increasing automatic weapons and underwater obstacles, laying antipersonnel mine field on beaches, increasing barbed wire defenses etc etc. The President also called attention to fact that our plans to station US aircraft on Formosa would release ChiNat aircraft for better defense of offshore islands.

I feel that you are doing approximately this but if there are needs that have not been met assume you will request. For instance George Anderson reports that ChiNat commander on Quemoy in answer to question as to why had not expanded underground facilities in hill stated he lacked hard rock drills. These certainly could be supplied quickly.

President’s basic theory is that ChiNats prepare put up determined defense in order make capture exceedingly costly but avoid implication of a Dien Bien Phu by perhaps withdrawing if necessary at time of own choosing. I pointed out that in my opinion feasibility of such withdrawal would depend on capabilities ChiNat Air Force and Navy at that time and cannot be predicted with accuracy.

With reference to conference with Gimo President feels that for morale purposes the sooner you go out the better.

FYI This msg will be shown to JCS and copy given to Carney but otherwise info will be closely held. No report of our trip is to be given out here and info on that also will be closely held. On Taiwan only Rankin knows details of our discussions.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area. Top Secret; Priority. A copy is also filed with Robertson’s April 27 memorandum to Dulles; see footnote 1, Document 210.

   The source text is filed with a covering note of May 4 to Goodpaster from Colonel Leroy H. Watson, USAF, Executive Officer to the JCS Chairman, asking Goodpaster to tell the President that the message had been sent to Stump as the President had directed and asking Goodpaster to let him know if the President desired that any changes in the message should be communicated to Stump. A handwritten notation by Goodpaster, May 5, states, “President indicated this was generally OK. G”

2. This meeting was recorded in a brief memorandum by Goodpaster, dated May 3, which reads in part as follows:

   “The principal points of policy significance were:

   “1. Chiang did not wish to accept the proposition of withdrawing from the offshore islands concurrently with the imposition of some kind of interdiction of the Formosa Strait sea area.

   “2. Chiang did not consider it advisable that a force of U.S. Marines be stationed on Formosa.

   “3. He did, however, appear reconciled to accepting that the offshore islands, if they were to be defended, would be defended by his forces alone.

   “4. As a next step, at the President’s direction, Admiral Stump should visit Formosa and advise Chiang as to ways in which defense preparations in the offshore islands can be improved.

   “5. Concurrently the State Department will communicate through our Ambassadors the President’s assurances of our willingness to provide logistic support for the build-up of the offshore island defense.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, ACW Diaries)

3. The quotation is from telegram 662 to Taipei, May 3, summarized in the memorandum, supra. The parenthetical insertions appear in the source text but not in telegram 662 to Taipei.