Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

236. Memorandum of a Conversation, Taipei, May 4, 1955¹

Taipei, May 4, 1955

PARTICIPANTS

• President Chiang Kai-shek
• Madame Chiang
• Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh
• Mr. Sampson Shen
• Ambassador K. L. Rankin

SUBJECT

• Situation Following Radford–Robertson Visit of April 24–27.

Note: Upon receipt this morning of the Secretary’s telegram 662 of May 3,² authorizing me to advise President Chiang that “we understand his position” with reference to the defense of the offshore islands, that Admiral Stump would shortly be conferring with him on the subject, and that he would continue to enjoy strong United States support, I immediately called on the Foreign Minister. He telephoned to me half an hour later that President Chiang would receive me at 5 p.m. today. The Foreign Minister suggested that, if I felt that I could do so, my opinion expressed to him last Friday that there had been no fundamental change in the situation might be repeated to President Chiang.

I arrived at Shihlin at 5 p.m. and, after a few pleasantries, remarked to the President that in my opinion the recent Radford-Robertson visit had produced no fundamental change in the situation as it had existed since the Korean Armistice in 1953. Prior to that date Chinese Communist strength had been very largely tied down in Korea. Subsequently they had been able to redeploy their forces and to build up the military strength in Fukien and Chekiang which now threatened the offshore islands and Taiwan. Meanwhile, the military strength of Free China had been increasing also. No one could be entirely sure of Communist intentions, except that they were always bad. It seemed to me that if a Red attack developed it would be either a probing operation primarily for psychological effect against some small island or islands, which the Nationalist forces could handle without our help, or it would be a major offensive involving not only the offshore islands but other areas as well. In the latter event, both of our governments would have to consider the whole picture anew in the light of actual developments. The defense of this or that minor island would be only incidental to the general situation and would fall into proper perspective.

Pursuing my argument, I said that since the shelling of Kinmen last September 3, I had many times expressed the opinion that there probably would be no major Communist assault in the near future. Much was being said about the five airfields under construction opposite Taiwan. I understood that they would not all be operational for several months, and that when completed would not provide for more than about 50 MIG–15s each. By that time the Nationalist Air Force would have more aircraft also, and the situation would not be so one-sided. I did not suppose that the Reds would be fully prepared for a major operation before fall—possibly in October—and very likely not until some time next year.

In brief, I considered that there had been no fundamental change and that the actual military situation was not unfavorable to Free China.

I then conveyed the substance of the Secretary’s telegram 662 to the President. He asked whether the telegram meant that President Eisenhower would actually commit United States forces to help in the defense of Kinmen and Matsu. I said that I thought not, but suggested if my previous analysis was correct, this might not make much practical difference. President Chiang emphasized the effect on morale, and I remarked that President Eisenhower also had a “morale” problem in the form of a difficult domestic political situation. By request, I then dictated to Sampson Shen a paraphrase of the Secretary’s telegram.

President Chiang next reverted to the thesis that the Communists would try to destroy his Air Force and Navy by attrition. Once the Reds had assumed local command of the air, the protection of the offshore islands would cause excessive losses to the Nationalist Air Force and Navy. Moreover, the Communists undoubtedly would attack air and naval bases on Taiwan in this connection.

In reply I repeated my belief that the military situation was by no means so one-sided, and that any air attacks on Taiwan presumably would be carried out by bombers based in the Shanghai area rather than by MIG–15s from the nearby fields in Fukien. It seemed to me that such a development would open the question of our treaty obligation to defend Taiwan.

Referring to the statement in the Secretary’s telegram regarding the early visit of Admiral Stump, President Chiang asked what this signified. I remarked that specific reference was made to the defense of the offshore islands. There were various measures which might be taken. I said that I was no military expert, but that an admiral had given me his opinion that the defensive strength of Kinmen could be doubled by the systematic use of beach obstacles. Steel was said to be lacking for this purpose. Admiral Stump might be able to help in this and other problems.

In conclusion, I repeated once more that I could not predict Communist courses of action with certainty. I had no crystal ball. But I thought we should not jump to the conclusion that the current Red build-up in Fukien was directed solely against Taiwan. It seemed to me that the five airfields were being constructed as part of a general plan to gain control of the air along the China Coast. This could serve various purposes, including the support of a supply line for new adventures in Southeast Asia now that the port of Haiphong was passing into Communist hands. The Reds knew that an attack on Taiwan would bring them into conflict with the United States. But if incidentally to the general development of their military strength in this area they could use it as a threat, thereby obtaining possession of Kinmen and Matsu with little or no actual fighting, they could be expected to do so.

President Chiang indicated agreement with much that I had said as to Communist intentions.

The President said that he would reserve comment on the Secretary’s message until he could discuss matters with Admiral Stump. He hoped that the Admiral would come to Taipei as soon as possible.

1. Source: Department of State, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83. Top Secret. Rankin sent a copy to Robertson as an enclosure to his letter of May 5, cited in footnote 1, Document 230.
2. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5–355)