Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

208. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1955, Noon¹

Washington, April 20, 1955, noon

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir Robert Scott
• The Secretary
• The Under Secretary
• Mr. Merchant

The Secretary requested the British Chargé to call at noon today. The Secretary opened the conversation by noting that Mr. Robertson and Admiral Radford had left this morning for talks on Taiwan.² They would be of a general character covering both political and military matters. It was expected that the talks would touch particularly on the dangers inherent in the intensive build-up of the airfields on the mainland opposite Taiwan. We were under considerable pressure from the Chinese Nationalists to hit by air this build-up before it assumed even larger proportions. We were reluctant to give our approval to such action but it was admittedly awkward to refuse approval without incurring some moral commitment to defend the Nationalists against a later attack which might be the consequence of the build-up. The purpose of the U.S. is to prevent or postpone the outbreak of major hostilities.

The Secretary said that he could not be specific but if the U.S. were able “to work something out”, he would hope that the UK would find it possible to make some contribution to a result which would end the danger of fighting. He noted that so far the Bandung Conference seemed to have gone rather well. The Chinese Communists might return to Peiping lacking any feeling of general Asian backing and support.

The Secretary then said that there were two points or angles which he would like to underline. The first related to the use of British registered shipping to carry supplies such as POL and other strategic materials to the Chinese Communists for their build-up opposite Taiwan.

There followed then some little discussion with Sir Robert maintaining that the British controls on the loading and transport of embargoed items at Hong Kong and elsewhere were extremely tight and firmly enforced. In the discussion it developed that we had more in mind cabotage operations whereunder small British flag ships in the coast-wise trade might carry from Hong Kong and return to Hong Kong with innocent cargoes but during the course of the voyage transship POL and such items from one Communist port to another.

In any event, the Secretary said that what would be required were more restrictive measures in the area to prevent a further buildup.

The Secretary said his second point was in connection with a possible guarantee. If the UK could give some form of guarantee or assurance covering Taiwan and the Pescadores this might be a very useful contribution at some stage. He had gathered from the Australians that there had been some talk between Canberra and London on this subject and that the British response had been favorable. Sir Robert commented that the Embassy here was not aware of the details of any such conversations.

Reverting to the question of British shipping engaged in contraband transport, Sir Robert brought up the case of a small British ship which had been sunk in Swatow Harbor by Chinese Nationalist bombing.³ The Nationalists had apologized and the British had asked U.S. support in their effort to secure compensation. He noted that the ship had entered Swatow Harbor empty and was engaged in picking up foodstuffs for Hong Kong. The Secretary stated that he had been talking only of strategic material. Sir Robert reiterated that the British controls were effective on this.

Sir Robert said that they would look into this matter immediately and meanwhile wondered if the Secretary could be more specific on the question of the U.K. guarantee.

The Secretary replied in the negative but remarked that he assumed that it would be very difficult to do anything of this nature in the pre-election period.⁴

Sir Robert said that speaking more or less personally he felt that the British Government believed that the main trouble surrounded the off-shore islands, and that they would like to help achieve their evacuation. He had the impression, however, that they would like to accomplish this in a way which avoided a reversal of the entire British Far Eastern policy of the past six years, which was fundamentally designed to achieve some sort of modus vivendi with the Chinese Communists.

In closing the conversation on this subject, the Secretary said that the results of the Bandung Conference might throw some additional light on Chinese Communist intentions. Their part at Bandung so far had appeared mild.

[Here follows discussion concerning Austria and Indochina.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4–2055. Top Secret. Drafted by Merchant.
2. The Department of State announced on April 20 that, in view of the tense situation in the Formosa area, Robertson and Radford were proceeding to Taipei for consultation under the Mutual Defense Treaty. For the substance of the announcement, see Department of State Bulletin, May 2, 1955, p. 732.
3. The Edendale sank on January 19, 1955. Documentation relating to subsequent British protests and attempts to secure compensation is in Department of State, Central Files, 941.73.
4. A British general election was scheduled for May 26.