206. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Chase) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)1
170102Z. CINCPAC excl for Adm Stump, info CNO excl for Adm Carney, info COMFORMDEFCOM(US) excl for Adm Pride. Cite mg 7060. Subj is another msg fr Min of Def Yu Ta Wei.
“Our recent intensified aerial recon has confirmed feverish enemy air bld up in Southeast China. Presence of IL-28 jets in Han Chow [Hangchow?] air fld as revealed by air photo on 14 Apr, and continuous deployment of enemy AF towards south are particularly significant. The above can have only one meaning—namely, they will soon be fully prepared and are capable of another act of aggression, aimed at Taiwan and or the off shore islands. I have recd fr Gen Chase urmsg advising us not to bomb enemy air flds at this time.2 However, I consider pres situation extremely grave, pregnant with most disastrous consequences since time, space, force and the initiative—all the elements of strategic advantage—are in hands of our enemy. It calls for immed action. I wish you would take up the matter with your Jt Chiefs. I rely on your wisdom and experience to advise me a course of action. Meanwhile presence of SeventhFlt and elements of Fifth US AF would act as psychological deterrents, I hope.”
MAAG comment: Your ans bombing rqst was given Min Yu and this is his further rqst. Within a very few months the air situation along China coast opposite Formosa will become very favorable to ChiComs and CAF air spt over the Matsu and Quemoy islands will [Page 491] be difficult. Senior ChiNats are becoming alarmed at ChiCom air causality which is building up. ChiNat announced intention is to defend Matsu and Quemoy complexes and I have rsn to believe that they are sincere. The Gimo has recently visited both. By early fall both Matsu and Quemoy will have a ChiCom airfield within 30 or 40 miles. This calls for frank reappraisal of our US position and our US strategic advice to the ChiNats. Rqst guidance.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4–1755. Top Secret; Priority. Received at the Department of Defense at 2:50 a.m. on April 17. The source text bears a note by Phyllis Bernau that it was seen by Secretary Dulles.↩
- A letter of April 14 from General Chase to Minister Yu states that Chase received a reply from CNO stating that it was U.S. policy, decided at the highest level, “that attacks on mainland airfields should not be initiated at this time.” It further stated that Chase considered it most important “that complete and detailed plans be prepared by your Air Force to neutralize all mainland airfields that threaten control of the Straits”, that this should be done on a priority basis with plans submitted to Chase’s headquarters for review, but that no attacks should be made without U.S. approval. (Department of State, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83) The message from CNO to which Chase referred is the message transmitted in telegram 132212Z from CINCPAC to COMFORM DEFCOM and Chief MAAG, Formosa; see footnote 3, Document 201.↩