201. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, April 11, 1955, Noon1
[Here follows discussion concerning a Presidential appointment.]
2. I discussed at length with the President communications received by the Defense Department from Admiral Stump and General Chase with reference to the Chinat request for authority to attack air field build ups by the Chicoms on the mainland of Fukien Province.2
The President said that he had already told Admiral Radford that he was opposed to giving such authorization at this time.3
I recalled to the President the measures which we were taking through friendly governments to try to bring pressures for peace to bear on the Chicoms at the forthcoming Bandung Conference. I referred particularly to the recent talks I had had with Romulo4 and [Page 476] Charles Malik.5 I said that these efforts would go for naught if prior to or during the Bandung Conference the Chinats should attack the mainland. Furthermore, because of our agreement with Chiang Kai-shek,6 it would be known that such attacks were made in agreement with us. I said that after the Bandung Conference we might be able to see more clearly ahead and judge either that there would be war or peace in the area. The President said he was in complete agreement. He referred to the fact that it is oftentimes necessary to take heavy liabilities from a purely military standpoint in order to avoid being in the position of being an aggressor and the initiator of war. This is a price which often has to be paid and which may have to be paid in this case.
[Here follows discussion concerning Vietnam.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private.↩
- See Document 196. Telegram 092255Z from CINCPAC to the Chief of Naval Operations, April 9, recommended approval of the request provided that “(1) the nature of the buildup is such as to indicate their early employment as bases for an attack against the off-shore islands and/or Formosa and the Pescadores, (2) expectancy of reasonable degree of ChiNat success and (3) possible ChiCom retaliatory reaction is acceptable as calculated risk”. It also commented with regard to Chase’s and Rankin’s recommendation for a blockade that the Nationalists “should be encouraged to increase their naval and air operations against unmistakably enemy naval and merchant shipping, but not to seize or attack non-belligerent ships.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4–1355) See also Document 199.↩
- Telegram 131929Z from the Chief of Naval Operations to CINCPAC, April 13, informed Admiral Stump that “governmental policy at highest level at least for time being is to avoid initiating attacks on any mainland airfields.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4–1355) Telegram 132212Z from CINCPAC to COMFORM DEFCOM and Chief MAAG, Formosa, April 13, transmitted this message to General Chase and Admiral Pride. (Ibid., Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83)↩
- See Document 195.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 193.↩
- Reference is to the notes exchanged by Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Yeh on December 10, 1954; see Document 3.↩