Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

199. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Carney)¹

Honolulu, April 8, 1955—5:59 p.m.

090359Z. Exclusive for Adm Carney from Adm Stump.

• Part 1. As I see the situation from the international and national viewpoint, it is the desire of our government to have the minimum possible combat activity between the ChiComs and ChiNats.

  Up to the present time and for some time in the past, ChiCom-ChiNat combat activities have been limited to action at sea or very close to the coastline of the mainland. Such actions have been largely supported by ChiCom water transport with very little build-up within striking distance of Taiwan nearer than the Ningpo and Canton complexes. By my 082103Z² and by other messages and other means, CNO is cognizant of a radical change in ChiCom dispositions, facilities and concentrations of war-making potentials directed toward ChiNat territory and which ChiNats are desirous of striking in the formative stages. Such a course of action if permitted represents a radical increase in tempo from previous coastal actions by ChiNat air units to actions in the interior against ChiCom potentially offensive dispositions which are near enough to strike Taiwan and supposedly have that end in view.

  As I see it our government is immediately faced with the necessity of making one of two vitally important decisions, as follows:

  a. Grant permission to ChiNats to conduct airstrikes against ChiCom airfields which are inland from the coast but near enough and in such state of completion or concentration of aircraft and supporting facilities as to constitute a direct threat against Kinmen, Matsu and even Taiwan itself or

  b. Restrain the ChiNats and permit the ChiCom build-up to continue unopposed.

• Part 2. While I do not pretend to know Communist intentions, I do not think that they will do anything that is not a cold and calculated furtherance of their long-range objective. I do not think that they will willingly enter into a major war until they are ready for it, and that when they are ready for it, it will be too late for us to do anything about it except to resist to the utmost. In other words I do not think that our resistance to ChiCom aggression will of itself bring on a general war. I also think that the non-Communist world as a whole will be more disposed to respond to strength than to weakness on our part, on which statement particularly applies to Southeast Asians. I can think of no greater stimulus to Communist aggressive action than the belief on their part that the democratic nations, and particularly the US, are afraid to risk war in order to avoid it.

• Part 3.

  a. Discussion. The ChiNat Air Force, under the present state of build-up, can be used effectively against inland airfields within easy striking distance from Taiwan. Such use against nearby mainland objectives, where transportation is slow, tedious and laborious, is bound to slow down ChiCom build-up and, therefore, reduce the effectiveness of, or postpone major ChiCom attack. If restricted to objectives and under conditions where there is a high likelihood of success and a minimum of combat losses, such action should be stimulating to the ChiNats, whereas total restriction might have a deleterious effect morale-wise. There would appear to be more chance of success utilizing conventional weapons against the ChiComs in the build-up state rather than later after the build-up has been effected. It must be realized that an increase in combat activity is more likely to involve the United States. Whether the United States-ChiNats capability or the ChiCom capability will more rapidly improve under quiet conditions during the coming weeks and months will largely depend upon decisions which you are in the process of making in Washington: i.e., additional forces, construction of facilities, etc. I would like to emphasize denial of ChiNat request for permission to strike build-ups while they watch them grow will certainly not improve morale.

• Part 4.

  b. Discussion. If the ChiComs are allowed to continue their build-up through unopposed construction of airfields, depots, with concentrations of men, materials and aircraft, I would expect them to welcome a very low tempo of combat activity until they are ready to strike. When they are ready they will then strike with such a tremendous force that a most immediate and strong American retaliatory effort will be required, the decision for which must be made in Washington without delay. Under these conditions there is a much greater likelihood that success will depend upon the immediate use of atomic weapons. While I would hope that we could limit our retaliatory action to military targets near Taiwan i.e. Luchiao, Fouchow and Swatow airfields, it may be necessary to extend the object of our attack to Ningpo Canton Nanchang air complexes.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4–955. Top Secret. Received at the Department of Defense at 11:30 a.m. on April 9. A copy is also in JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) Sec. 22.

2. Telegram 082103Z from CINCPAC to CNO, April 8, reads as follows:

   “Exclusive for Adm Carney from Adm Stump.

   “There is unmistakable evidence as to ChiCom increased build-up Luchiao and Foochow airfields. In addition, there appears new airfield construction vicinity Pai An Fou near Swatow. Minimum 42 MIG–15s at Luchiao can support ChiCom attack Matsu group. I am causing maximum surveillance on priority and continuing basis to be maintained. In addition, ChiNats have been advised to prepare plans for air attack to prevent build-up, however, authority for such attack has to be obtained from CINCPAC or higher authority. Anticipate possible early request for conduct such attack.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4–855; also JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48))