Office of the Historian

196. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Chase) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)1

Taipei, April 8, 1955—4:14 p.m.

080814Z. Exclusive for Adm Stump, Adm Carney, Adm Pride. Cite 6901. Subj is msg fr Min Yu Ta Wei:

  • “1. The vital necessity of control of strait. Our hitherto air and naval control of Taiwan Strait has made it impossible for ChiComs to touch off another war by invading this island. The maintenance of status quo depends entirely on retention and strengthening of this control.
  • 2. Significance of ChiCom air bldup. A ChiCom air bldup across strait would challenge this control. (An event I anticipated in my conv with Adms Carney and Stump, 3 Mar 55.)2 My apprehension is justified by fol air recon repts of recent ChiCom air bldup across the strait:
    a.
    About 60 MIGs in Siang Tan airfield near Nan Chang (see photos taken 17 Mar 55.)
    b.
    42 MIGs in Lu Chow airfield (see photos taken 5 Apr 55.)
    c.
    Construction of airfield in Chenhai near Swatow (see photos taken 5 Apr 55).
    d.
    Expansion of Foochow air field (see photos taken 5 Apr 55).
    e.
    Movements of enemy jet bombers fr Manchuria to Tsinan in Shantung Province and further southward movements are contemplated (fr our technical info sources).
  • 3. Conclusions from the above:
    a.
    The ChiComs are rushing their air bldup across the strait.
    b.
    POL supplies obviously must come in to these coastal fields by tankers and other coastwise shipping.
    c.
    Our control of Formosan Strait will soon be challenged and localization of war here will no longer be possible.
    d.
    The fatal mistake of acquiescing in Yalu sanctuary must not be repeated.
  • 4. Rqsts to US govt: early concurrence in: a. our bombing of enemy air bases in Swatow, Foochow and Luchow.”

[Page 466]

MAAG comment: 1. The bldup across the straits is genuine and becoming more and more threatening. ChiCom dependence for logistic spt on tankers and coastal shipping is obvious.

2. ChiNats are becoming very disturbed and restive in face of this bldup and our present US restrictions on their opns against ChiCom harbors and airfields.

3. I recommend approval of their rqst to attack these three airfields (Luchow, Foochow, and Swatow). This is justified fr a purely mil viewpnt and also fr the viewpt of psychological reaction upon East Asia.

4. Amb Rankin and I recommend a blockade of the China coast of all shipping, Swatow incl to Chekiang-Fukien boundary.

5. Amb Rankin and I feel strongly that it is time for some ChiNat counteraction to be taken and that it is not right to require the ChiNats to stay here and do nothing in the face of this obvious bldup and threat.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4–855. Top Secret; Priority. Received at the Department of Defense at 2:56 p.m. Repeated for information to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander, Formosa Defense Command. A copy is also in JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) Sec. 21.↩
  2. See Document 140.↩