Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

188. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, April 4, 1955, 3:30 p.m.¹

Washington, April 4, 1955, 3:30 p.m.

[Here follows discussion concerning Vietnam and other unrelated matters.]

5. We discussed at great length the Formosa situation and related coastal positions. The President said he was dictating a memorandum of what he thought would be a proper position which might appeal to Chiang.² I said I had done the same thing and that we might exchange our memoranda. I then gave the President a copy of my memorandum of April 4.³ The President said his was not yet typed, but that he would give it to me.

The President said he hated to see us drifting into what might be a very bad situation. I said that I was exploring every possibility and that we were working through the British, the Australians and the Canadians, and hoped to bring some pressures to bear at the Bandung Conference.

The President said that Radford had told him that I had conceded that “diplomacy had failed”. I said this did not correctly reproduce what I had said. What I had said in answer to an inquiry about the cease fire at the UN was that for the time being that particular effort was stalled, but that not for a moment did I concede that diplomacy had failed.⁴

We agreed that a major problem was to find someone who had Chiang’s confidence and who could persuade him that the coastal positions were, in the President’s words, “outposts, not citadels”. I agreed to check on Wedemeyer, and the President said he would send me a letter from Wedemeyer which had discussed the China position.⁵ I also said I would try to talk with Representative Judd if he were in Washington.⁶

JFD

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret. Drafted by Dulles.
2. See the memorandum, infra.
3. Secretary Dulles’ memorandum, headed “Preliminary Draft of Possible Statement of Position for Communication to the Republic of China, 4/4/55 (3)”, is not printed. The substance of most of the memorandum was incorporated into paragraphs 1–15, 19, 21, and 25 of the draft statement of April 8, Document 194. The concluding portion states that the United States would continue to give logistic support to Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu but would fight to defend them only if the President judged this to be required or appropriate for the defense of Taiwan. In the event that they should not be held, the United States “would expect to replace their military role by naval craft and to offset the loss in any other practicable ways”. It recommends that they should be regarded as “outposts to be held so long as there is advantage in doing so” but “subject to relinquishment if and when this will serve the major cause.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)
4. Reference is to the March 26 conversation recorded in Document 170.
5. Wedemeyer’s letter to the President of February 21 expressed support for the President’s policy in the Far East but urged that U.S. forces should not become involved in fighting for offshore islands like Quemoy and Matsu. (Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Formosan Question)
6. A memorandum of April 6 from Dulles to the President stated that he had talked that day to Judd, who was “sympathetic to the general line which you outlined in your memorandum to me” and suggested “that he might go out to Taipei perhaps with Wedemeyer to talk to the Gimo.” (Ibid., Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)