Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

150. Memorandum for the Record, by the President’s Special Assistant (Cutler)¹

Washington, March 11, 1955.

Before Meeting in Presidents Office

1. I showed to the President, and he read, the interpretation of NSC 162/2, paragraph 39b,² contained in the January 4, 1954, memorandum concerning “Policy Regarding Use of Nuclear Weapons”.³ He stated that he thought this interpretation was suited to the present situation. (Because NSC 162/2 has been superseded,⁴ a new superseding memorandum should be prepared for the President’s approval).⁵

2. I showed to the President, and he read, Section III of my memorandum of March 11, 1955.⁶ His reaction to it was that we should not ask the JCS to take on this task at this time. The decision to be taken would rest with him, on the basis of advice from JCS, Defense, and State. I said that the suggestion which I made in Section III was for the purpose of generally informing the Council Members, who were probably uncertain as to the current situation following yesterday’s Council Meeting. As my idea did not at this time appeal to the President, I did not press it further.

Meeting in President’s Office

3. At 2:30 p.m. today, a meeting was held in the President’s office, attended by J.F. Dulles, A.W. Dulles, Radford, Twining, Carney, Goodpaster, and myself.⁷ I mention below the principal points which were discussed:

a. The President said that he had called the meeting because he wanted to discuss how to avoid direct U.S. intervention in the Formosa area, at a time while the Western European Treaties were pending; to limit U.S. intervention as much as possible if it became necessary to intervene; and to discuss what action the U.S. would take if we had to intervene.

b. Radford said there was considerable Chincom mainland buildup near Quemoy and near the Matsus,—artillery positions and tunneling. Twining said it was obvious that the Chincoms were not going to attack Formosa at this time, because there had not been a sufficient build-up of mainland airfields. U.S. surface forces could not be conveniently used to defend against a Chincom attack on Quemoy, but could be conveniently used to defend against Chincom attack on Matsu. The Chinats with our help are planning to lay a cheap type of mine field in the Quemoy Channel, which would be generally effective. We have four destroyers constantly available on Formosa patrol.

c. Apparently the Chincoms are putting in some 250 guns in tunneled emplacements around Quemoy. Because Quemoy is so much tunneled for defense, there is really only one particularly sensitive enemy artillery emplacement,—i.e., the emplacement which can fire directly on the landing beaches on Quemoy which provide Quemoy’s logistic support. The Chinats do not have much offensive heavy bombing power. They do have two batteries of 155’s. If these batteries were located on the high land in Quemoy, and fired at the Chincom gun emplacement which threatens the Chinat landing beaches, it ought to be possible to wreak havoc with such enemy emplacement. Radford thought we should encourage the Chinats to take action against this enemy emplacement. The President thought 155’s were very accurate guns; and that attacking the enemy by artillery had the advantage of doing only what the enemy was doing itself. Therefore, he felt the Chinats should develop a fine counter-battery fire on this dangerous emplacement of the Chincoms. The Military thought the Chinats had sufficient ammunition for 45–60 days, and that we could give them more if needed.

d. Carney said the principal problems facing the U.S. if we had to intervene during the next 6–8 weeks would be:

1. Communications, because of language difficulties and codes.

2. The defense of the Formosan airfields against Chincom retaliation, if it were necessary to attack Chincom mainland bases.

Carney felt that all other questions, such as coordination of Naval Operations, etc., were within our capabilities (if we attack these questions vigorously and imaginatively). However, to defend Formosa from air attack, it will be necessary for the U.S. to improve fire control and warning equipment on Formosa. The Formosa airfields require local anti-aircraft defense and more skilled operating personnel. The equipment might be obtained from our stocks in Japan, but it will probably be necessary to import operating personnel from the U.S. Carney thought that to defend Formosa adequately from air attack, and to improve intelligence, training, and command direction, would require augmenting U.S. personnel on Formosa from something over 1,000, as at present, to around 11,000.

e. Secretary Dulles cautioned that atomic weapons, if possible, should not be used during the ensuing 40–60 days, and the U.S. also should do its best to avoid intervention of any kind on Quemoy and Matsu. The President agreed that we could not use atomic weapons during this period without a bad impact on the European Treaties prospects.

f. Radford thought the U.S. ought to be able to set the stage so as to defer an effective Chincom attack during the next two months. Carney thought an attack on the Matsus would be easier to handle. He felt the Chincom attack would build up slowly, and would not come as a sudden overwhelming action; that the Chinats could hold off a slow build-up and slow attack. The President said if we are going to fight with conventional weapons, Napalm was the best thing to use against landing troops.

g. The President summed up by saying that the U.S. should do every practical thing that could be done to help the Chinats to defend themselves; that if it was necessary later for the U.S. to intervene, it should do so with conventional weapons: that the U.S. should improve the air defense of the Formosa air fields, but should avoid greatly augmenting U.S. troops on Formosa; that we should give the best possible advice and training to the Chinats about how to take care of themselves; that he recognized that if we had to intervene with conventional weapons, such intervention might not be decisive; that the time might come when the U.S. might have to intervene with atomic weapons, but that should come only at the end, and we would have to advise our allies first. He said that, if we possibly could, we should avoid involvement during the next sensitive weeks, because any U.S. direct involvement might critically damage us in Europe. Radford replied that Stump understood the point of view expressed by the President.

h. Communication between Washington and the tactical forces off Formosa is relatively rapid. The order on the Tachens was received in Taipai one hour and 53 minutes after dispatch, and one hour later it was in the hands of tactical units.

i. The President complained about conflicting intelligence information coming to him. He said he wanted steps taken to centralize and centrally evaluate all intelligence. It was agreed that the NIC should be “beefed up” and put on a 24 hour basis. Secretary Dulles said there are three aspects to intelligence:

a. rapid communication of intelligence from the field

b. coordination of intelligence in Washington

c. obtaining accurate intelligence as to Chinat loyalty on Formosa.

The President said that—under emergent circumstances like the present—he wanted (1) intelligence transmitted from the field to Washington very fast; (2) a prompt evaluation of such intelligence at a central point where all interested agencies were represented, so as to obtain a commonly agreed assessment as quickly as possible; (3) in the case of something “hot”, a warning to himself and other key persons, pending such central evaluation.

A.W. Dulles felt that Chiang Ching-kuo was a key figure, and that the Generalissimo was losing stature. Radford said on his last visit he had been told by a leading Chinese General that Chinat army morale was very bad.

k. It was pointed out that there is a civilian population of 20,000⁸ on Quemoy. Radford felt they would not necessarily be killed in the fighting, but could hide in caves and holes.

l. Secretary Dulles inquired what would be the effect in Japan of U.S. intervention. He felt the Communists might try to immobilize our air power in Japan by civil disturbance. The Military felt that this danger could be coped with.

m. The President concluded by saying that a number of questions should be accurately posed to Admiral Stump:

(1) Is our assumption correct that at present the greatest danger to Quemoy was Chincom artillery fire on the landing beaches? that the Chinats by counter artillery fire could destroy this threat? how would the Chicoms react to this type of operation?

(2) How much can the U.S. help out the Chinats without becoming directly involved?

The President then said to tell Stump that we are confronted with an extremely delicate situation, because we could not afford to be isolated from our allies in the world, and that our aim should be to delay Chincom attack in strength on Quemoy and Matsu, without thereby provoking Chincom attack. It was agreed that, if possible, a competent staff officer would be sent over to examine this whole matter with Admiral Stump in Hawaii tomorrow.⁹

R.C.
Robert Cutler

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa—Visit to CINCPAC. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
2. Paragraph 39–b of NSC 162/2, “Basic National Security Policy,” October 30, 1953, reads, in part: “In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions.” For NSC 162/2, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. ii, Part 1, p. 577.
3. The memorandum under reference has not been found in Department of State files, but a memorandum of January 4, 1954, from Lay to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission indicates that the President approved the interpretation of paragraph 39–b of NSC 162/2 submitted by the Department of State. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 162 Series) A memorandum of February 2, 1954, from R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs, to Murphy states that on December 22, 1953, the President approved an interpretation of paragraph 39–b “which made it clear that the paragraph does not constitute a decision in advance that atomic weapons will in fact be used in the event of any hostilities and pointed out that the President should be in a position to consider each situation on its merits at the time.” (Ibid., S/AE Files: Lot 65 D 478) For a memorandum of December 3, 1953, from Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith to the President, which set forth the Department’s interpretation of paragraph 39–b, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. ii, Part 1, p. 607.

4. By NSC 5501, “Basic National Security Policy,” January 6, 1955; paragraph 34 reads in part as follows:

   “As the fear of nuclear war grows, the United States and its allies must never allow themselves to get into the position where they must choose between (a) not responding to local aggression and (b) applying force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider entails undue risk of nuclear devastation. However, the United States cannot afford to preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in a local situation, if such use will bring the aggression to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on a balance of political and military consideration, such use will best advance U.S. security interests. In the last analysis, if confronted by the choice of (a) acquiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking measures risking either general war or loss of allied support, the United States must be prepared to take these risks if necessary for its security.”

5. Not found in Department of State files.

6. Reference is to an unsigned memorandum for the record which summarized Secretary Dulles’ comments at the March 10 NSC meeting, quoted the sentences in NSC 5501 quoted in footnote 4 above, and stated that the interpretation of paragraph 39–b of NSC 162/2 in Lay’s memorandum of January 4, 1954, should be reviewed or reaffirmed by the President. Section III reads as follows:

   “Would it be advisable to request the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly to make a statement to the National Security Council estimating the military measures which may be involved under several alternative situations which may possibly arise in the Formosan area:

   • “a. Chincom attacks on the Quemoys and Matsus, separately or combined.
   • “b. Chincom attacks which are about to conquer the Quemoys and Matsus, separately or combined.
   • “c. Chincom attacks on Formosa and the Pescadores, either as an initial action or as a retaliatory action.
   • “d. Prolonged Chincom air and artillery attack on the Quemoys and Matsus, without actual invasion.

   “These military measures would include information as to

   • “(1) types and numbers of US forces to be used
   • “(2) US logistic requirements
   • “(3) related military matters, such as deployment of U.S. forces elsewhere in the world
   • “(4) whether U.S. air attack on a Chincom mainland buildup is essential to the defense of the offshore islands? What magnitude of a buildup? What type of US attack?
   • “(5) If it is essential for victory or security to use nuclear weapons in the above alternatives:
     • “(a) how would they be used”
     • “(b) what would be the necessary geographic range of U.S. attack”
   • “(6) If the Chincoms succeed in seizing the offshore islands, despite U.S. counteraction, what U.S. military courses of action would follow?” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa—Visit to CINCPAC)

7. A memorandum for the file by Ann Whitman, dated March 11, which refers to the meeting as “unexpected,” included an added note which reads:

   “3/14/55. President dictated following on above meeting:

   “The discussion centered around the capacity of the Chinese Nationalists to defend Formosa during the coming weeks without active intervention on our part; alternatively, if this should not prove possible, how effective could be our cooperation without the use of the atomic bomb, a.” (Ibid., DDE Diaries)

   The meeting is also recorded in unsigned notes, apparently by Goodpaster, dated March 16. (Ibid., Miscellaneous Series, Formosa—Visit to CINCPAC)

8. Goodpaster’s notes here state parenthetically that the figure should be 40,000.

9. A memorandum of March 16 by Goodpaster reads in part as follows:

   “Following the meeting, the President informed me that he would like me to accompany the senior Navy staff officer being sent out to Pearl Harbor, to observe and develop impressions in connection with the staff discussions. He was particularly interested in how fast ChiCom attacks in various forms might develop, if they develop at all, and also how long the situation can be ‘handled’ through employing ChiNat forces alone, or ChiNat forces supported through feeding in U.S. logistic assistance. Saturday morning the President added to this that while the ChiNats might ultimately see good reason for leaving Matsu and Quemoy, at the present time our concern must be in their defense. He indicated there is need for close analysis of alternatives and courses of action, and that I should observe as to these. He also indicated that he did not think he had ever met Admiral Stump (it later developed that he had, briefly), and said he would like my impressions.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa—Visit to CINCPAC)