Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

178. Letter From President Eisenhower to Lewis W. Douglas¹

[Washington,] March 29, 1955.

Dear Lew: Thank you for your most recent letter² on the tangled situation in the Formosa Straits. Incidentally, your former letter was read by Foster Dulles, and I believe that he wrote to you at some length. I am taking the liberty of sharing your second letter with him also.

Your presentation is, of course, most persuasive, but you do not tell me what to do if we lose Formosa. I feel that, after all, here is the crux of the matter, and I must say that you seem to brush off this very grave possibility far more lightly than I possibly can.

Another point: While you say that the Asian public opinion would be shocked beyond measure at the thought of the United States participating in a so-called “civil war,” yet in point of actual fact the never-ending problem we are up against is to convince these Asian nations that there is validity to our protestations of friendly support even when we urge their gradual abandonment of area after area to the greed of the Communists.

I have come to the conclusion that some of our traditional ideas of international sportsmanship are scarcely applicable in the morass in which the world now flounders.

The central fact of today’s life is that we are in a life and death struggle of ideologies. It is freedom against dictatorship; Communism against capitalism; concepts of human dignity against the materialistic dialectic. The Communists, and I mean Marx, Lenin, Stalin and now their successors and offshoots—such as Mau [Mao] and Chou—have all announced their adherence to the theory of world revolution and overthrow of all other forms of government by force and violence. They have complete contempt for any of those concepts of honor, decency and integrity which must underlie any successful practice of international law and order as we have always understood it.

I say again that I do not believe any other person occupying an important political position in this world gives more thought and more hard study than I do to ways and means of preserving and strengthening of peace. No one is more jealous of America’s good name, both as of today and in the pages of history. Yet it is quite clear that if the Communists achieve their world aims, there will be no American history as we know it. Whatever account may appear in a Communist history concerning this great land will serve only the doctrinal aims and ambitions of Communist masters.

Now I am sure you will not think for a minute that I am trying to be hysterical and emotional in the effort to avoid cold-blooded analysis and conclusions. The clear fact is that though we must fight this battle without losing our self respect or violating our concepts of duty and of right, or of breaking faith with our friends, we cannot forever permit the Communists to achieve success and expand their territories merely because we refuse to employ effective methods to defeat ruthless peoples who are for aggression and for capturing the minds and bodies of additional millions.

Truth, honor, justice, consideration for others, liberty for all—the problem is how to preserve them, nurture them and keep the peace—if this last is possible—when we are opposed by people who scorn to give any validity whatsoever to those values. I believe we can do it, but we must not confuse these values with mere procedures, even though these last may have at one time held almost the status of moral concepts.

I believe that Mr. Truman was right to oppose the invasion in South Korea, even though at that moment the Communists attempted to make it look like a “civil war.” A good many other nations thought he was right, and some fifteen of them sent at least token forces to help us on the battleground.

By no means am I saying that we must—that we should—fight for Quemoy and the Matsus. What I am asking you is this: If you became convinced that the capture of these two places by international Communism would inevitably result in the later loss of Formosa to the free world, what would you do” Beyond question the opinion in Southeast Asia is that the loss of Formosa would be catastrophic; the Philippines and Indonesia would rapidly be lost to us. Incidentally, the offshore islands do have a defensive value to Formosa. I spoke only about their lack of value in any program of attack against China proper. Defensively they practically block almost any Communist attempt to use the two available harbors immediately west of Formosa for the initiating of amphibious operations.

As you can see, I have not attempted to develop any really logical chain of thought in this letter; I have no great argument with the presentation that you submit. I merely say that I think there are important facets of this whole tangled question that you have not stared squarely in the eye and that when you do so, you will find that some of the deportment that was once an essential part of international relationships cannot be faithfully and stubbornly maintained by ourselves when the other side insists on practicing the habits of a thug.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,³

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Personal and Confidential. Douglas, chairman of the board of directors of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, had served as Ambassador to the United Kingdom, 1947–1950.

2. The letter, dated March 21, replied to a letter from the President, written in response to an earlier letter from Douglas. In that letter, dated March 3, Douglas argued that while title to Formosa and the Pescadores was “unresolved”, Quemoy and Matsu had always been Chinese territory, and U.S. defense of Nationalist forces on those islands would be “taking sides in a Chinese civil war.” (Ibid., Dulles-Herter Series) In his reply, dated March 9, Eisenhower stressed strategic considerations in the defense of Formosa. (Ibid.) In his March 21 letter, Douglas commented:

   “Still, generally speaking as a principle of international behavior, for us to deploy our military strength on one side or another in a foreign civil war would be a shock, I believe, to the sentiments of the peoples of the Orient and of our own great Atlantic community.” (Ibid., Administration Series)

3. The source text is unsigned.