168. Message From British Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State1
Winthrop Aldrich has given me your message about Oracle2 for which I thank you.
I quite recognise the force of your desire to explain the United States position before the world and you have every right to do so. But I do not think that a debate in the Security Council will make the position any clearer or better from our point of view.
Moreover, I see immediate and serious danger if we were to press ahead with Oracle in the next few days. First, attention would be focussed on Quemoy and Matsu. If the Nationalists were prepared to offer to abandon these islands once a cease-fire were agreed, that would indeed be a new element in the situation. But as things stand now a move in the Security Council would tend to look simply as though we were trying to guarantee Chiang’s position in these islands. This was always a danger in Oracle but we could risk it while Oracle was on its original basis and there was a chance of the Chinese appearing before the Security Council. As things are, however, there can be no doubt that public opinion in this country certainly, and I believe in Asia as well, would not support action that seemed designed to confirm Chiang Kai-shek in Quemoy and Matsu. Thus a further move in the Security Council now instead of focussing attention on our desire to have a cease-fire, might simply focus attention on the difference between the United States on one hand and other free nations on the other regarding the coastal islands.
There is a further point which Makins and Scott have already made to you, namely if we were to go ahead and the Russians vetoed the New Zealand Resolution, what action could we then take? To leave matters as a vetoed resolution would surely weaken the authority of the Security Council and there would be demands for further action. We agreed some time ago that action in the General Assembly might be dangerous, but what other action could be taken in the United Nations? I do not like the idea of going ahead without a clear understanding of subsequent steps. The situation might be different if I thought that Oracle could still contribute to restraining the Chinese from hostile action. But I do not think it can. Nor does your message suggest that you think it might do so. As I read your message your main object in going ahead with Oracle would be to put [Page 398] the United States position before the rest of the world in the hope of increasing support for it. But as I have already said above this is surely possible without a political move in the Security Council. I have a fear that the latter, instead of improving our position before the Afro-Asian Conference might worsen it by alienating the Indians, Burmese and others whose views may not be without influence in Peking. It also seems unlikely to me that Soviet Presidency of the Security Council would be an unsuperable bar to action in April if it became necessary.
I am sorry to go on disagreeing with you about this question of the next move. I can assure you that I have given it very serious thought and I really do not see that to proceed with Oracle at this stage would do any good and it might do much harm to the relations between our two countries and to our common cause.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Secret. A copy is also in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, China. Received with a covering note of March 25 from Scott to Dulles.↩
- See Document 162.↩