Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

164. Memorandum of Discussion of the 242d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 24, 1955¹

Washington, March 24, 1955

Present at the 242nd Council meeting were: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Items 3, 5 and 8); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (Item 8); Col. Lucius D. Clay, Jr., Lt. Col. R.W. Strong, and Maj. R.E. Shearer, Department of Defense (Item 8); Assistant Attorney General Barnes (Item 1); Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Charles E. Nelson, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 3); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Joseph M. Dodge and Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistants to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (Items 1 and 2); the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1–3, “Anti-Trust Laws Affecting Activities Outside the U.S.”, “Admission to the U.S. of Certain European Non-Official Temporary Visitors Excludable Under Existing Law”, and “The Status of Nuclear Power Programs”.]

4. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security (NIE 100–4–55)²

The Director of Central Intelligence, as the first part of his briefing, read the conclusions of NIE 100–4–55 on “Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan”.

In the course of Mr. Dulles’ reading of these conclusions, Secretary Dulles stressed the importance of an estimate of the effect on Chinese Nationalist morale of an evacuation of Quemoy and the Matsu group. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that this was rather a special problem, and he would be glad in a short time to present a special estimate on the subject for Council consideration.³

There then ensued a brief discussion of the probable timing of a Chinese Communist attack on Quemoy and the Matsus. In the course of this discussion, Secretary Humphrey inquired as to the likelihood that the Chinese Communists might eventually renounce their attempts to seize these offshore islands.

The President expressed the opinion that the Chinese Communists would in all probability not renounce such attempts, and that we should make up our minds to live with the problem. Secretary Dulles said that the situation might change after a period of perhaps ten years, when native Formosans would largely have replaced mainland Chinese in the Chinese Nationalist armies. These Formosans would be much more concerned with defending Formosa than with defending the offshore islands. The Chinese Communists, moreover, would have less fear of an attack by Formosans on the Communist mainland.

Governor Stassen asked whether it would not be desirable to have a study prepared as to ways and means of destroying the big guns and gun emplacements on the Chinese mainland opposite the offshore islands. No such attempt to destroy these gun emplacements would, of course, take place until after the ratification of the Paris agreements, and the effort would be made with conventional rather than with nuclear weapons. The President expressed the opinion that it would be next to impossible to take out these gun emplacements without resort to nuclear weapons. Admiral Radford expressed hearty agreement with the President’s opinion on this point.

Mr. Allen Dulles resumed his intelligence briefing with a brief resume of petroleum shipments to Communist China during the year 1954. Secretary Dulles inquired whether we knew with what the Chinese Communists were paying the Soviets for goods supplied to them. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that it was apparently done by a lend-lease arrangement. Admiral Radford pointed out that the Chinese paid back the Russians chiefly in raw materials.

[Here follow comments by Dulles concerning Vietnam and France.]

Mr. Cutler then called on Admiral Radford for any remarks he wished to make on the military situation in the Formosa area.

Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that the fact that we have so little operational intelligence regarding the Chinese Communist build-up for an assault on the offshore islands, should not be taken to mean that such a build-up is not going on. For example, the mainland airfields could be made ready for use in a very few days in so far as the runways are concerned. Admiral Radford thought that the Chinese Communists were moving in jet fuel and other supplies to these bases, even though such activities were not actually revealed by photo reconnaissance. Accordingly, he concluded, we must assume that the Chinese Communists are getting ready just as fast as they can.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing on the subject by the Director of Central Intelligence, with specific reference to (1) NIE 100–4–55, “Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan”; (2) petroleum shipments to Communist China; (3) General Collins’ difficulties with sects in South Vietnam; and (4) the anti-tax (Poujade) movement in France.

b. Noted an oral briefing by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the military situation in the Formosa area.⁴

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 5–9: “Official Statements Regarding Nuclear Weapons”, “Review of Policies in the Far East”, “The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning”, “Effective Bombing of Hostile Airfields”, and “NSC Status of Projects”.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on March 25.
2. Document 158.
3. Document 204.
4. The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1359. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)