165. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 24, 1955, 3:30 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Visit of Mr. Krishna Menon
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Mr. Krishna Menon
- Assistant Secretary Allen
The conversation was held at Mr. Krishna Menon’s request. The Secretary gave him full opportunity to open the discussion, but Mr. Menon failed to respond. After a considerable pause the Secretary asked Mr. Menon whether he had seen the latest statement of our Far East policy, as set forth in the Secretary’s speech at the Advertising Club in New York three days ago.2 Mr. Menon said he had seen press accounts but had not read the text. The Secretary said he had made it clear that the choice of war or peace rested with Peking. The United States had stated publicly on several occasions that it would not concur in the use of force in an aggressive manner and had obtained a commitment from Chiang Kai-shek that the latter would not undertake military operations against the mainland without American concurrence. The Secretary added that the United States had made it equally clear that military action by the Chinese Reds directed against Taiwan would be resisted. Hence peace could be had in the Orient if the Reds wished—or they could cause a war.
Mr. Menon said he recognized fully that American public opinion was not prepared for a solution of the “Formosa problem” over night. What he hoped was that talks could be started. He thought that in order to make any progress direct but informal contact would have to be established between Americans and the Chinese Reds. He commented that a third party “might be useful” in this connection.
Mr. Dulles expressed his very deep concern over the situation in the Far East because of the repeated and apparently genuine public statements by the Chinese Communists that they intended to capture [Page 393] Taiwan by force. If they carried out this threat, fighting was inevitable. He hoped very much the Chinese Reds would not do so
The discussion turned to Indochina. Mr. Menon said his Government was most anxious that conversations between Southern and Northern Viet-Nam would begin in June in preparation for the elections to be held next year. Mr. Dulles said he saw no reason why such talks should not start and agreed that they should. Mr. Menon said that Prime Minister Nehru would be most happy to learn that Mr. Dulles felt this way.
The Secretary said he believed the Chinese Reds constituted a greater danger to world peace today than the Soviet Union. He described the Soviets as chess players who calculated their moves in advance, whereas the Chinese Reds, flushed with their successes in Korea, Indochina and the offshore islands, seemed to be exhilarated and to exaggerate their own power. This might constitute the greatest danger to the world at the present time. Mr. Menon said that he and his Government felt absolutely confident that the Peking regime had no expansionist ambitions. He said the Chinese Reds considered Formosa to be an integral part of China and were certainly anxious to extend their control over that island but they regarded their fight with Chiang Kai-shek as a civil war and not aggressive or expansionist. The Secretary pointed out that Formosa had not been Chinese for the past sixty years, that the United States had conquered it from Japan, and that the Peking authorities were presumptuous in demanding that the territory which we had won from Japan should be turned over by us to a regime openly hostile to us. He said the Chinese people were generally supposed to take a long view of history whereas Americans were supposed to be impatient, but in the present instance it was Peking which was demanding an immediate settlement.
Mr. Menon mentioned the imprisoned American flyers and referred casually to the Chinese students in the United States who were said to desire to return to Red China. (In a subsequent talk with Mr. Allen he expanded on this theme, saying that one of these students had told him in New York that from 200 to 500 such students wanted to return to China but most of them did not like to say so openly because they had jobs and did not wish to be branded as pro-communist unless they were certain they would be able to return. Mr. Allen expressed great doubt that any such number wanted to go back.)
After the interview, Mr. Menon expressed to Mr. Allen his considerable satisfaction at the talk and said he felt confident that tensions in the Far East would be relaxed if “people could be brought together and start talking”.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3–2455. Confidential. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)↩
- In remarks made at the Advertising Club of New York on March 21, Secretary Dulles declared that the “aggressive fanaticism” of the Chinese Communist leaders contrasted with the “coldly calculated and deliberate” steps of Soviet expansion and that while in the long run the latter might prove more formidable, in the short run, the Chinese method might prove “more dangerous and provocative of war.” It was necessary, he said, to peacefully bring the Chinese Communists to realize that the “restraint and patience of the free nations” stemmed not from weakness or fear but from strength and resolution. For text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, April 4, 1955, pp. 551–552.↩