Office of the Historian

163. Memorandum From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Chase) to the Republic of China Defense Minister (Yu)1

Taipei, 24 March 1955.

SUBJECT

  • Recommendations Regarding Basic Defensive Policy
1.
This subject has been discussed at length recently by high U.S. officials with you and I am sure there is a common understanding of views. It is my purpose now to summarize our U.S. recommendations on the subject. Ambassador Rankin and Admirals Stump and Pride concur in the following:
2.
The next few months, or even weeks, may be most critical and I strongly feel that every effort must be given to improving the air defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, and the defensive capability of the off-shore islands. These projects should receive the highest priority in manpower, material and equipment, money and planning effort. Naturally only your best qualified troops and commanders should be entrusted with the defense of the off-shore islands. They are the advance guard of the free world against Communism, and should have the importance of their task forcefully pointed out to them. When the attack comes, it is of utmost importance that your GRC forces conduct prompt and forceful defense operations to include aggressive employment of your air and naval forces. It is my opinion that U.S. actions (which are necessarily influenced by popular opinion of the citizens of the U.S.) will depend to a large degree on the vigor with which your forces conduct their all-out defense. I regret that I cannot assure you that U.S. Forces will participate in the defense of the off-shore islands, but as you know the U.S. Pacific [Page 389] Fleet and U.S. Air Force are prepared to do so promptly, if directed by higher U.S. authority.
3.
In support of the defense it is of utmost importance that your GRC reconnaissance operations be expanded to include daily close scrutiny of Communist airfields and critical areas along the China coast, and that prompt, complete and accurate reports be passed to my Headquarters.
4.
In conclusion, I feel that it is to our mutual advantage not to change the present moderate tempo of operations but to seize the opportunity to increase our capabilities as related to those of the enemy and to increase, through reconnaissance, our knowledge of his preparations.
William C. Chase
Major General, USA
  1. Source: Department of State, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83. Top Secret. Sent via Acting Chief of General Staff General Peng Meng-chi.↩