Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

153. Memorandum From the President’s Staff Secretary (Goodpaster) to the President¹

[Washington,] March 15, 1955.

The discussions of Admiral Stump and his staff with Rear Admiral McCorkle² and me, held on Sunday, March 13, at Pearl Harbor,³ covered a wide range of specific points; the following highlights and impressions seem likely to be of greatest interest to you.

Time factor: In Admiral Stump’s opinion, at any time after about 25 March it would take an “all-out” Communist attack against Quemoy and Matsu to succeed against ChiNat opposition alone. (By “all-out” they mean a coordinated amphibious, artillery, air supported attack.) Admiral Stump is of the opinion that such an all-out attack will not occur until after at least four weeks from now in the case of Matsu, and eight weeks from now in the case of Quemoy. During the next ten days while defenses are being built by the regular division now on Matsu, a sudden ChiCom amphibious attack might be sufficient.

Admiral Stump and his staff evaluate the ChiCom artillery threat to Matsu and Quemoy as harrassing but not critical—they do not believe supply can be cut off. They do not believe that ChiNat counter battery is, or in the near future can be, effective. MTB’s in ChiCom hands could threaten supply operations, but there has been no sign of their use as yet.

In Admiral Stump’s opinion, the location and strength of ChiCom air is the key determinant of their capability, and also of the necessity for U.S. intervention. Without redeploying air forces in strength, there is a good chance that any ChiCom attack could be held by ChiNat forces alone, and Admiral Stump considers that ChiNat action supported by U.S. conventional operations would give a high degree of assurance against loss of the islands. If, however, the ChiComs move air forces in strength into the area, the U.S. would have to be prepared to employ atomic weapons before or as soon as the ChiComs employ their air against ChiNat forces or U.S. fleet elements.

Admiral Stump rates our intelligence as good concerning ChiCom air strength and location, but poor as to build up of ChiCom assault forces. It is particularly hard to evaluate whether fishing junks are assembling for an amphibious attempt or are simply following their normal pursuits.

Improvements are needed—and are going forward at varying rates—in Formosan air defense; communications; coordination and command arrangements; and intelligence. Admiral Stump believes it will be necessary to advise Chiang of U.S. intentions concerning replenishment of combat losses if the psychology essential to a vigorous and effective defense is to be created.

There is a good understanding of, and deference toward, the special time factors of the next four to six weeks on the world scene.

Goodpaster

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, ACW Diaries. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text by Goodpaster states that he orally informed the President of the substance of the document.
2. Rear Admiral Francis D. McCorkle, Director for Fleet Operations in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Operations and Readiness).
3. A memorandum for the record by Goodpaster, dated March 18, which reported the discussions in more detail and other related documentation is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa—Visit to CINCPAC.