Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

152. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 14, 1955, 8:43 a.m.¹

Washington, March 14, 1955, 8:43 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Oracle

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• The Under Secretary
• Sir Roger Makins
• Livingston T. Merchant

Sir Roger came in at his request to give the Secretary the British Government’s reaction to the latter’s explanation to Sir Roger last week² regarding our desire to move ahead with the Security Council Resolution. Sir Roger opened by saying that London was fairly unhappy over this proposal. Whereas the British agreed that the present lull was no true index of the Chinese Communists’ ultimate intentions, they believe that there is some reason to think that the present uneasy situation may suit the Communists’ purposes in that they may calculate that it places the maximum strain on US–UK relations. To disturb the lull by instituting action in the Security Council might arouse the Chinese Communists to take major military action against the off-shore islands.

Insofar as the Soviets are concerned, the Ambassador went on, somewhat the same situation may prevail as with the UK. In other words, the Soviets may feel that as long as the UK is in some contact with them on the situation, they feel in a better position to use a restraining influence on Peiping. Action in the Security Council presumably would break off the existing rather tenuous contact between the UK and Moscow on this subject. Moreover, the Ambassador said, London was in doubt as to what might be gained by Security Council action at this point and where one would go if, as seemed inevitable, the Resolution was vetoed by the Soviets. One might go to the General Assembly thereafter but it was hard to see where that would lead. Moreover, if the Resolution were put in, the British of course would vote for it and then might find themselves later in a position of being hooked to defend Chiang Kai-shek on Quemoy if there was a demand for further action. They are anxious to avoid being pushed into a position of open disagreement with us in the UN.

The Ambassador then said that his government could well understand the President’s desire to seek further action through the UN. He would like further informally to make a suggestion which seemed the least unattractive of various possibilities. This would be to have the Security Council ask three powers—the UK, India, and the Soviet Union—to explore the situation further. He felt that this would put the maximum pressure on Peiping. He asked that the Secretary give the suggestion some thought.

The Secretary replied that he would think it over but that it did not strike him favorably. For one thing an invitation to explore the matter further would run counter to the agreement among the UK, New Zealand and the United States that they would resist an extension of the area of discussion in the UN beyond the search for the cease-fire. A group of the composition suggested would almost inevitably lead to such a widened discussion. They would be in the position of intermediaries. Furthermore, all three of these governments recognized Peiping, which is not true of either the United States or the majority of the members of the UN. The Group would be loaded against Chiang Kai-shek. A narrow mandate to secure a cease-fire would be somewhat different but then there would be need for the exercise of influence over Chiang Kai-shek, which influence this suggested group obviously lacked. He would however consider the matter.

The Secretary then went on to say that on the basic issue of the necessity of defending Formosa there is no real difference between the US and the UK. We differ on Quemoy, it is true. We recognize Chiang Kai-shek as having a proper title to the off-shore islands he holds. The British, on the other hand, think the off-shore islands belong to the Peiping Government. The Secretary emphasized that our only interest in the off-shore islands is their relevance to the defense of Formosa. The President has made no final decision on this. It involves a factual judgment. He added that if there were explicit or implicit disavowal by the Chinese Communists of their currently expressed intention to take Formosa by force, then our interest in the off-shore islands would greatly change.

The Secretary then said that as a casual thought he wondered whether time would permit Security Council action after a large-scale attack was launched by the Communists. There was some brief discussion of Trevelyan’s analysis of Communists’ intentions and the Secretary then said that from many indications, including Trevelyan’s analysis and Chou En-lai’s remark to the Finnish Ambassador in Peiping, he was inclined to think that the Chinese Communists wanted a major show-down. He was concerned that this show-down might be sought in Southeast Asia rather than in Formosa.

As the Ambassador left, the Secretary asked if he could have the text of Eden’s original note to the Soviets of around February 25 or 26 which had been worked on at Bangkok. The Ambassador promised to supply a copy.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3–1555. Secret. Drafted by Merchant on March 15. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. See Document 145.
3. Reference is to Eden’s message of February 28 to Chou; see footnote 2, Document 143.