151. Letter From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
Dear Walter: At the first opportunity after my return to Taipei2 I questioned George Yeh as to what he had told you and Secretary Dulles in Washington regarding the prospective effect on morale here if the offshore islands were lost. He confirmed your impression that he had presented the matter in most pessimistic terms, apparently to the extent of indicating that his Government’s control over its own military forces would be jeopardized, and its basis of popular support among Free Chinese perhaps irreparably undermined. [Page 361] Yeh stated his case on instructions, presumably from President Chiang; he did not suggest the extent to which it represented his own views.
I return to this subject because of the evident impression it had made on you and on the Secretary, which first came to my attention during our discussion in the plane flying up from Manila to Taipei on March 3. Obviously we are dealing here with intangibles which do not lend themselves to exact measurement or prediction. I most certainly would not depreciate the psychological factors stressed by George Yeh; but while considering the possibility that he may have exaggerated their importance, I believe other factors are no less significant. Taken altogether these could well place a substantially greater value upon retaining Kinmen and Matsu than would result from giving primary emphasis to upholding morale on Taiwan.
In my brief review of the Chinese situation at the afternoon session in Manila on March 2, I expressed the view that the loss of the offshore islands would be “very serious but not necessarily disastrous”. The precise effect, of course, would depend in considerable degree upon the circumstances under which the loss occurred, and the events which might follow in its wake. Subject to this obvious condition, however, I continue to hold the opinion just quoted, which is the same that I expressed to you and the Secretary on the following morning. This is repeated here in the first instance because I believe it to be true, and secondly because the present is not a time to burn bridges. I see no adequate reason for losing Kinmen and Matsu, but if by some ill chance they should be lost, whether by defeat or default, I should not want it to serve anyone as a reason for pronouncing hopeless the cause of Free China.
I hope that you and the Secretary did not carry away the impression that I consider the retention of Kinmen and Matsu as less important than do the Chinese. If anything, the contrary is true, despite the fact that I am not inclined to subscribe fully to the case presented by George Yeh. It is not always easy to evaluate Chinese thinking, as you know, particularly when it is so largely influenced by what they think we are thinking. In terms of their actions, it may be noted that the Chinese have never undertaken to strengthen systematically and substantially the defenses of the offshore islands, other than Kinmen, except in cases where we pressed them to do so. This probably does not reflect the value which they place upon the islands so much as it does the “pawn complex” which all of our smaller and weaker allies develop in the course of time.
Probably much more serious to Free China’s morale than the loss of additional small islands would be any formal steps toward the “two Chinas” project. From the Chinese point of view, these might include the entry of the Peiping regime into the United Nations and/or [Page 362] its recognition by the United States. Any cease-fire, except possibly of definitely limited duration, would have similar implications to them. Obviously, anything which would indicate definitive United States acquiescence in the Communist conquest of the Chinese Mainland would represent irretrievable disaster in Free Chinese eyes. The loss of offshore islands as such undoubtedly would be less important to President Chiang than the danger of the two Chinas idea which he considers implicit in drawing a line down the Formosa Strait. I believe that this must have been very much in Chiang’s mind, and also in George Yeh’s, when the matter was first presented to you and to the Secretary in Washington. This may explain the forcefulness of his presentation.
Among the most important arguments for retaining Kinmen and Matsu, it seems to me, is the psychological effect on the enemy. It is almost impossible to overestimate the danger of confirming the Reds in a belief that, despite recent strong statements by the Secretary and others, we are for peace at any price. Withdrawal from the Tachens undoubtedly strengthened them in this belief. I have expressed to the Department my opinion that a military engagement may well be necessary to convince the enemy that we mean business. Such an engagement might have been risked at the Tachens or at Nanchi. Resolutely handled, it presumably would have been a localized affair, and might have given us several months of peace in this area—a prospect which we do not now enjoy after the Tachens and Nanchi have been given up and 20,000 more refugees created. We still have opportunity to prepare for positive action at Kinmen and Matsu.
On purely technical and immediate military grounds the surrender of the Tachens probably was wise. Unfortunately, however, almost as good a case could be made out for giving up Matsu and Kinmen, as Admiral Spruance3 and others, in effect, have pointed out. It is true that our Navy had planned to occupy the Amoy area, including Kinmen, as a base for operations against Taiwan in World War II. On the other hand, it has been stated recently that we would not bother with the Tachens if engaged in a full-scale war against Red China. But for somewhat similar reasons we also decided to by-pass Taiwan itself in World War II! And again, largely on technical military grounds, we withdrew from South Korea, thereby making the Korean War more or less inevitable.
All of which seems to confirm once more that major policy decisions should not be based solely or even primarily upon technical military considerations. Otherwise, in the interest of peace with all concerned—including our own less imaginative military experts—we might find in due course that the ramparts we watch in the Pacific [Page 363] had been reestablished on a meridian through Hawaii. Much more likely is that we should be at war again—on a large scale but not necessarily World War III—because we finally found ourselves compelled to make a stand somewhere west of Pearl Harbor against the aggressor whom our successive withdrawals had made increasingly bold. In the present case I believe that we should stop him at Kinmen and Matsu.
This brings us to the practical question as to how these islands can be held. I am glad to report that Matsu was reinforced last week, and that four regiments are now stationed on that island group. This action appears to have been taken as a direct result of the visits of the Secretary and of Admirals Carney and Stump. It illustrates the further point which I brought up in our discussion: the necessity of letting the Chinese Government know clearly just what we want done in military matters. Of course, they would have liked to hold all of the offshore islands, but they do not feel strong enough to take such steps without our full approval. In their view, we changed our position quite suddenly with regard to defending the Tachens. They consider that we reversed ourselves on various earlier occasions. Now, there is considerable evidence that, despite successive “stand and die” pronouncements, they will not expend any important part of their limited military assets, except for the defense of Taiwan itself, without our specific authorization and support. Hence the importance of letting them know what we want done. Leadership in military matters must be our responsibility. The pawn complex, to which I have referred, leaves us no alternative.
Perhaps of more immediate importance than the ground defenses of Kinmen and Matsu are the instructions under which the Seventh Fleet may operate in the defense of these islands. If we are to keep hostilities localized, it seems clear that Admiral Pride must have as much authority as was given him when the Tachen evacuation began. In brief, whenever the Reds attack, whether by air, by artillery bombardment or by amphibious operation, the Seventh Fleet should react at once. This might involve no more than the employment of Chinese naval and air units placed at Pride’s disposal, but he should have the authority to do on each occasion whatever is necessary to hurt the enemy more than they have just hurt our Chinese allies in the particular attack for which we are retaliating. One or two such engagements, quickly and effectively carried out on our side, should restore the relative stability which obtained along the offshore islands from July 1953 until September 1954. This is based upon the assumption that the Reds do not want a real war at the present time any more than we do; hence that they probably will not undertake any large scale offensive operations against the offshore islands if they think that the United States is likely to oppose them.
[Page 364]To the Communists the offshore islands as such do not seem to be worth a fight with the United States. If and when the enemy attacks in force, therefore, we may assume either that he does not expect us to intervene, and that the islands can be had cheaply, or that his action is a definite prelude to an assault on Taiwan regardless of consequences. Certainly if Kinmen and Matsu should fall in a manner to reveal weakness or hesitation on the part of the Chinese Nationalists and ourselves, an attack on Taiwan would seem inevitable.
The visit of the Secretary and yourself was most helpful and I enjoyed the opportunity of seeing more of you than I had before.
Best regards.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3–1355. Secret; Official–Informal.↩
- Rankin attended a conference of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in East Asia, held at Manila and Baguio March 2–5, except when he accompanied Secretary Dulles on his visit to Taipei on March 3. A record of the meeting, including remarks by Secretary Dulles at the opening session, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 434.↩
- Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (retired), Ambassador to the Philippines.↩