Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

124. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Thailand¹

Washington, February 21, 1955—6:27 p.m.

Tedul 6. Eyes only Secretary from the President. Re Dulte 2.

1. Your paragraph 1 correctly states the conclusions of the Security Council and CINCPAC has now been clearly informed that we do not intend to assist in the holding of Nanchi.²

2. Likewise your paragraph 2 expresses our intentions. We shall assist Chiang in defending those areas logistically and, should we become convinced that any attack is really a military part of a campaign against Formosa, then we would participate more directly. Any offensive military participation on our part will be only by order of the President.

3. With respect to your paragraph 3, you will recall that I mentioned the desirability of stationing some additional small elements of American forces on Taiwan. Naturally we hoped that this commitment might come about as a result of a closer understanding between Chiang and ourselves respecting the wisdom of their complete or partial withdrawal from Quemoy and the Matsus. You will recall also that you and I talked about certain other things we might do to convince him that his best course of action lay in solidifying his union with us, so as to insure preservation of Formosa and the Pescadores without risking too much of his force in the forward positions. I refer to our readiness to speed up his air development and possibly strengthen both naval and air units above presently contemplated levels.

4. You and I have shared the hope that the Chinese Nationalist government may finally conclude that their situation would be improved by withdrawing from the coastal islands and regarding themselves as a force of opportunity poised and ready to move to the attack whenever ChiCom commitments or actions elsewhere may create conditions of general conflict in that region. As you and I have agreed, any approach to Chiang along this line would have to be so skillfully conducted as to make him ostensibly the originator of the idea.

5. It may be entirely illusory to hope that Chiang will ever acknowledge the wisdom of withdrawing from his forward positions, and I agree that the need for preserving his force as a part of our security arrangements in that region should not be lost sight of in our efforts to make him see the great difficulties involved in the defense of the coastal islands. If he is adamant on this score, then I do not see how we can long continue to prevent him from using available means to interfere with the build-ups obviously designed to attack his positions. I agree that it would be wise to inform Eden that unless we soon arrive at a cease fire, we cannot much longer insist that the present policy be observed which permits major Communist build up or attacks without Chiang reaction. I believe that you should tell him that we do not intend to blackmail Chiang to compel his evacuation of Quemoy and the Matsus as long as he deems their possession vital to the spirit and morale of the Formosan garrison and population. On the contrary we expect to continue our logistic support of Chiang’s forces as long as there is no mutually agreed upon or tacit cease fire. Finally, if we are convinced that any attack against those islands is in fact an attack against Formosa, we should not hesitate to help defeat it. Possibly you should tell him too that because of the continuing build-up of ChiCom forces, we cannot tell when any of these emergencies might arise.

6. Any reaction by Chiang to a Communist build up would inevitably mean that he would suffer attrition in his air and possibly naval forces, and we would inherit the necessity of maintenance, repair and re-supply. I merely remark at the moment that in return for such things, Chiang should consider our own views sympathetically and do his utmost to go along with us so far as this is consistent with the morale and spirit of his own forces and population.

7. I understand that Admiral Stump is with you. Will you please see that he is fully acquainted with this entire line of thinking? D.D.E.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–2155. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by the President. A memorandum for the record by Goodpaster, dated March 24, reads as follows:

   “On 21 February 1955 Hoover, Murphy, Radford and Duncan met with the President in connection with a message which had come in from Secretary Dulles concerning points made by Admiral Stump. The President indicated that Secretary Dulles and he had discussed the matter of planting a seed with Chiang out of which might grow in due course the idea of a voluntary withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu.

   “After discussion, a draft message which the President had prepared was sent to Secretary Dulles with an indication that he should advise Admiral Stump.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Conferences on Formosa)

   The conversation with Secretary Dulles to which the President referred has not been identified, but see Documents 112 and 121.

2. Telegram 211759Z from CNO to CINCPAC, for Stump from Carney, February 21, advised Stump that U.S. forces would not be used in defense of Nanchi and that, while it was probably desirable from a military point of view for the Nationalists to withdraw from Nanchi, this decision was entirely the responsibility of the ROC Government. Telegram 221621Z from CNO to CINCPAC and Chief MAAG Formosa, from Carney to Stump and Chase, February 22, confirmed that it had been decided at the highest level that the United States would not assist in holding Nanchi. (Both in JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–49) Sec. 19)