Office of the Historian

123. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State1

Manila, February 21, 1955—5 p.m.

Dulte 2. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. For President. Stump gave us full briefing at Honolulu on status of Formosa Straits situation. I feel that there is need of clarifying to CINCPAC certain aspects of our policy, namely:

1.
That we will not directly assist in the holding of Nanchi Island and would prefer its evacuation unless Nationalists soberly judge that its defense under hopeless conditions will improve Nationalist morale on Taiwan.
2.
That we want to do everything feasible to enable the Nationalists themselves to hold Matsu and Quemoy islands without need for direct United States intervention.
3.
That in view of our treaty and Congressional action, we should increasingly make our presence felt in Taiwan as by the stationing there, if only on a rotating basis, of significant US military elements.

I was impressed by the Communist program of steady build-up airfields, artillery emplacements and roads which would be required to take the Matsus and Quemoy islands and by the extent to which we are restraining the ChiNats from attacks which would delay this build-up. If this build-up is to go on without interruption, then there will soon be created a situation such that the Matsus and the Quemoy islands will be indefensible in the absence of massive US intervention, perhaps with atomic weapons, and Taiwan itself will be much more vulnerable. We must, I think, consider allowing the Nationalists to attack by air this build-up, in the absence of any dependable assurance that it will not be used against Taiwan.

We have been restraining the ChiNats largely in hopes that a program of restraint would facilitate a cease-fire through the United Nations. Also, because air attacks based on Taiwan might lead to retaliatory attacks by the ChiComs against the Taiwan fields. However, I doubt that the present one-sided policy can go on indefinitely. I feel that I should be in a position to warn Eden that unless it is possible soon to arrive at a cease-fire, express or tacit, covering the Formosa Straits, we cannot justifiably continue to deny the ChiNats the opportunity to attack the build-up, which, while perhaps in the first instance directed against the coastal positions, could be a menace of much greater scope, particularly since the ChiComs continue to assert their intention to use their full force against Taiwan.

I shall appreciate guidance on this aspect of the matter.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794A.5/2–2155. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 5:11 a.m.↩