Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

334. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)¹

Saigon, June 7, 1956—3:01 p.m.

MAGCH 3874. 070701Z. Personal for Admiral Stump; General Williams sends. References: A. CINCPAC 022121Z, which passed CNO plan for defense of Vietnam.² B. CINCPAC 022122Z, which contained CINCPAC comments on plan.³ C. MAGCH 3837, DTG 040531Z, which contained my initial reactions.⁴

Following are my detailed comments on JCS plan:

A. Basic assumption that ChiCom forces will pose threat of intervention leads to conclusion that threat will also be made against Korea and ChiNats probably pinning down the only important Asiatic support which could come to the aid of Vietnam.

B. Concur whole-heartedly that fight should be won by Vietnamese backed by other Asians; however, when faced with reality the concept appears to conflict with fact that Vietnamese under the present force ceiling will be outnumbered 2 to 1 by Viet Minh and that large scale Asiatic support would not appear to be forthcoming.

C. The hard fight in the Quang Tri area against attack should be encouraged. However, the 1 Vietnam division now located north of Tourane would unquestionably be badly mauled. Initiative at the onset, terrain, and disparity of forces makes this inevitable.

D. Tourane hill mass provides excellent terrain to deter or stop forces moving southward along coastal plain. However, theory of “absolute” defense this area believed to be somewhat fallacious and dangerous. At its narrowest, the frontage along these mountains is 40 miles of rugged jungle covered terrain. The western approaches are not accessible by road and could be easily turned by infiltration tactics of Viet Minh since the wide frontage would virtually preclude any effective degree security this area. Assuming 2 to 3 field divisions of the Vietnamese Army are committed to an all-out fight in the Quang Tri–Tourane area, and if, as is very likely, they are by-passed, contained or otherwise eliminated from the southward progression of the war, then the hard core of the Vietnamese Army will be reduced to holding a beach-head at Tourane. It is difficult to visualize Viet Minh attacking south without well laid plans to rapidly infiltrate large numbers of troops along the protected jungle routes, well inland, where they could eventually debouch in the plateau area north of Kontum and thence part of their forces commence lateral movement to contain any forces committed to the defense of the Tourane hill mass. Commitment of only 1 RCT United States troops in this area would hardly alter the situation.

E. Not clear here exactly how forces contemplated in this plan will be enabled to take control of all Vietnam. With United States contributing the equivalent of 1 division of ground troops, the Vietnamese limited to present force basis and slight help to be expected from other Asiatics, the problem of initially stopping and then destroying the Viet Minh field army and then taking over all Vietnam appears somewhat academic. 6 to 8 United States divisions with proper logistic forces would be a more realistic estimate.

F. An important factor which should be remembered is the xenophobia throughout Vietnam which may bolster northern morale and somewhat weaken southern morale upon the intervention of the “Western colonialists”. Ho Chi Minh will again claim to be fighting to drive out the foreigners and Diem will be called the “puppet” of the West. Psychological factors which induce the will to fight such as his well known xenophobia will require the most careful consideration. An additional one is the effect of the proposed stationing of a Marine RLT in Saigon. This might well backfire by raising in Vietnamese minds the question as to why United States troops are positioned so far from the fighting. An implication might also be drawn that we expect the war to move rapidly to the Saigon region. On the other hand, it would be well to pass over Saigon whenever possible large numbers of aircraft as evidence of United States modern power that is being brought to bear at critical points.

G. Amongst the tasks listed, that of maintaining United States amphibious lift for 3 Vietnamese divisions in the Saigon area is not understood. The purpose of stationing such a valuable force in the Saigon River, 4 hours from the open sea via a very difficult channel and for which pilots are scarce, is not clear. Cape Saint Jacques area would be better.

H. Strongly concur in concept of selecting and training United States advisors. Language difficulty alone would appear to negate the possiblity of using Vietnamese for air and naval gunfire coordination and it is assumed that the required TACPS, and naval liaison and gunfire spotter teams would be included in 2500 specially trained United States personnel as well as personnel for a JOC.

I. Communications are and will be critical. Contact with field units will be difficult to establish. Equipment and operators will be needed so that direct communications between United States headquarters and United States advisors in the field can be maintained without going through Vietnamese channels.

Following are my comments on CINCPAC observations:

A. Agree with general principle of paragraph 1, but feel the likelihood of flanking attack through Laos somewhat greater than implied. Rainy season in mountains and on plain are in opposite seasons and one or the other will be wet. The light forces capable of moving through the jungle [garble] roads would be able to move during wet or dry weather.

B. Concur in paragraphs 2 and 3. It may be noted, however, that the Vietnamese troops are still relatively untrained for major operations so that the numbers comparison with the Viet Minh is not necessarily sound. The lack of Vietnamese training, field command structure and logistic balance in effect increases the Viet Minh superiority above the 2 to 1 ratio.

C. Reference paragraph 4, strongly concur that decisive action which strikes at the heart of the problem is highly desirable.

D. Agree that at least 2 divisions of United States troops mentioned in paragraph 5 will be required, but if rapid development in the north is expected, additional United States forces are certainly needed.

E. Agree with your paragraphs 6 thru 10 except for Marine deployment to Saigon. See paragraph 1F above.

The analysis of the problem presented by the JCS reemphasizes to me the importance of building in South Vietnam an indigenous ground force stronger than now contemplated.

1. Source: JCS Records, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) (2). Top Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to CNO. Some of the garbles in this message have been corrected by reference to a text in Naval Historical Center, CINCPACFLT Microfilm Files, Reel TS 1956 3144.
2. Document 328.
3. Document 329.
4. Document 330.