Office of the Historian

330. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)1

Saigon, June 4, 1956—1:31 p.m.

040531Z. MAGCH 3837. Reference 022121.2 While preparing detailed comments on your answer to CNO3 will give you my first and immediate reaction to CNO message to you. Will follow detailed study, soonest.

A.
The assumption made is hazardous. ChiCom reenforcement by individual or unit could be easily accomplished without our early knowledge. There are Cambodians, Laotians and Chinese in Vietnamese forces and undoubtedly in ChiCom forces. These races are difficult to distinguish at sight even by natives. I believe ChiCom volunteers will march, at least in Vietminh uniform, at first sign of American intervention to secure North Vietnam while Vietminh invaded south.
B.
Support forces to arrive in few days is most essential to success.
C.
Fight cannot be won by outnumbered Vietnamese in present state of organization, strength and training. What other Asians are counted upon? Certainly not from Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. Perhaps a regiment from the Philippines.
D.
Any attack across the 17 parallel will be coupled with infiltration through mountains to west and along both sides of the Laos border, an area very thinly populated by a mountaineer race, a border poorly marked and more poorly guarded. Such forces probably bypass or turn any defensive position long held north of Tourane. Even if Tourane line is made impregnable it can be turned by movement to west and then south with hostile debouchment into high plateau vicinity of Kontum and north thereof. A highly strategic area. East and west roads in this area are practically nonexistent and interest in them only lately aroused in Vietnamese. Terrain favors north and south movement as contrast to east and west movement to intercept.
E.
… battalion deployment at Cam Ranh Bay, Saigon and Tourane is not understood. There probably be no fighting at Saigon or Cam Ranh Bay in early stages that would present suitable targets.
F.
Agree there will be few … targets other than troops. Due to heavy growth of jungle on plateau and mountain, troop targets will be very hard to locate. However, air delivery north of 17 parallel probably profitable for road destruction. Low ceiling during certain periods and resulting poor visibility must be taken into serious consideration in all air plans.
G.
Joint Staff airlift would need be very fast, communications and logistical units also. Have only 2 or 3 MAAG officers that can work on plans due to primary duty. Vietnamese communications, military and civilian, inadequate for peace much less war.
H.
Additional advisors should speak and read Vietnamese or French as current number of interpreters barely adequate. Must come fast and win confidence of Vietnamese who have had sad combat experience with French officers.
I.
Doubt need Marines at Cam Ranh Bay. Same for Saigon unless merely to show the flag.
J.
Preparatory measures should include earmarked Chief of Staff and few key Staff Officers located Hawaii, due MAAG ceiling, to develop detailed plans, making frequent reconnaissance trips to Vietnam. Should have Washington Saigon unmistakeable agreement all Vietnamese forces come under joint operations commanders command at first shot.
K.
Heartily concur in last sentence CNO message.
  1. Source: Naval Historical Center, CINCPACFLT Microfilm Files, Reel TS 1956 3144. Top Secret; Noforn. Marked “Personal for Admiral Stump from General Williams.”↩
  2. Date-time of transmittal to MAAG in Vietnam of Document 328.↩
  3. Supra.↩