Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

333. Paper Presented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) at the 287th Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, 7 June 1956.

BROAD OUTLINE PLAN FOR U.S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THE EVENT OF VIET MINH AGGRESSION IN VIET NAM

This is a presentation of the capabilities, with or without atomic weapons, of U.S. ready military forces to deal with “local aggression in Viet Nam”. Assumption is made that aggression in this sense is overt military action by Viet Minh forces against Viet Nam. The concept that I will present will cover only those operations directed towards stopping overt Viet Minh aggression south of the 17th Parallel. I will not attempt to cover subsequent operations that might be undertaken to retake North Viet Nam. While it is recognized that stopping Viet Minh aggression south of the 17th Parallel might well expand into operations for the destruction of the Viet Minh Army and the establishment of Vietnamese control over all of Viet Nam, the nature and scope of these operations would depend on the situation at the time and our estimate of the capabilities of the Vietnamese Army. If it appeared that with U.S. Naval, Air, and limited U.S. Army (MAAG) and logistical support the Vietnamese had the capability of retaking North Viet Nam, it is my hope that we would encourage them to do so. We would not want to deploy large U.S. ground forces in this operation.

For the purpose of this presentation, certain assumptions have been made. First, it is assumed that Communist Chinese military forces will not intervene on the side of the Viet Minh, except to provide aid in the form of supplies, equipment and advisors. However, the Chinese Communist military forces will pose a threat of intervention, particularly with their air power which must be recognized in our plans. A second assumption is that the Manila Pact will be invoked and at least several SEATO nations will furnish at least token forces to aid the Vietnamese. Such aid is highly desirable for psychological reasons and should be sought vigorously, but it is not expected that at least initially the contributions from these nations will significantly affect the military situation.

Military Situation

Now I would like to outline briefly the present military situation in Viet Nam.

a. Since the armistice agreements reached at Geneva in 1954, the Viet Minh Army has undergone considerable reorganization and its firepower has greatly increased. This increase in firepower has come about as a result of large-scale shipments of arms and equipment from Communist China in violation of the Geneva Agreements. It is presently estimated that the Viet Minh Army consists of 257,000 regular troops organized into 14 combat-ready infantry divisions, 2 artillery divisions, and the necessary supporting units. In addition, there are 41,000 regional and 75,000 popular troops. As yet the Viet Minh have no Air Force or Navy.

b. The Vietnamese Army consists of 156,000 regular troops organized into 4 field divisions, 6 light divisions, 13 territorial regiments, and supporting units. In addition, there are 75,000 to 80,000 men in South Viet Nam with previous military training who are available for induction. While much progress has been made in improving the effectiveness of the Army, there are still major weaknesses in leadership and tactical control of the combat units, and in logistics. Morale in the Army is good and, with more experience and training, over-all effectiveness will improve. South Viet Nam has only a small Air Force and Navy.

c. Except for miscellaneous troops numbering less than 300, the French military forces will be completely phased out of Viet Nam by the end of this month.

d. The Viet Minh ground forces have been organized and trained for a much greater period of time than have the Vietnamese and, as a result, still maintain an advantage in per unit effectiveness and the capability of defeating the unassisted forces of South Viet Nam. However, it should be pointed out that there are great natural difficulties confronting a major invasion effort by the Viet Minh. The terrain, with very few exceptions, naturally lends itself to defense. The paucity of North/South roads, the narrowness of the path of advance, and its vulnerability from the sea, present very formidable problems for any advancing force. Without air power both for reconnaissance and direct support of ground forces, an overt Viet Minh ground offensive in strength will be most difficult.

Principles Governing Participation

An objective of our National Security Policy is to deter possible local aggressions, or in the event such aggressions take place, to intervene swiftly and decisively, in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities from expanding and broadening into general war. In the event of Viet Minh military aggression against South Viet Nam there are certain fundamental principles which will govern the United States participation. First, to check the aggression it is most important that early U.S. support be provided, that this support begin within a matter of hours—and that certain essential units be in place within a few days at most. It is equally important that support from other SEATO nations be provided quickly and that these actions taken under SEATO be clearly announced in order that news of this outside support quickly becomes common knowledge to all of South Viet Nam and other countries in Southeast Asia. The quickness of support and the attendant publicity will firm up the spirit of the Vietnamese people so that they will fight with determination and confidence. They must be made to realize early that by the positive actions being taken the United States will back them to the hilt. But even more important from a psychological viewpoint will be the support from SEATO. For political reasons, victory should be won by the Vietnamese backed as much as possible by other Asians. What we should seek and attain is an Asian victory over Asians.

Concept of Operations

I would now like to outline the general concept of operations. In these operations it is intended that the Vietnamese Army, supported primarily by U.S. Air and Naval power, will carry the main burden of the defeat of the aggression. U.S. ground forces will be provided primarily to assist in the defense of vital areas in South Viet Nam, thereby both reducing the requirements for Vietnamese troops in security roles and providing them with a feeling of confidence that the security of these vital areas will be maintained. An important aspect is that these operations will be carried out in the presence of a friendly population, as contrasted to the situation facing the French. A further important facet of these operations is to provide specially trained U.S. advisors for duty with the Vietnamese Army. These advisors will be attached to the fighting units, not just at command headquarters. Previous experience has amply demonstrated the success of such provisions.

The Viet Minh aggression will probably start with a surprise attack across the 17th Parallel. The Vietnamese Army may be expected to make a hard fight in the area of Quang Tri. If this fight is unsuccessful, the Vietnamese should fall back to the hill mass to the northwest of the Tourane, where a resolute defense of the Tourane Base would be made. A successful defense of this vital position is the key to the defense of South Viet Nam. Before the time the Vietnamese have fallen back to this vital position, U.S. support in the form of specially trained U.S. ground forces, with atomic support, should be in place at Tourane. The timely arrival of these forces is essential. In addition, other U.S. ground forces will be air and surface lifted to support the defense of Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay. U.S. Air and Naval Forces will launch attacks against Viet Minh military forces and supporting installations, and will be ready to give direct support to Vietnamese ground forces. Air operations by U.S. forces should commence within 24 hours after the start of the aggression. Once Viet Minh advance has been checked in Tourane area, preparations should be made to regain Quang Tri area and the highway to Laos.

A combined SEATO command should be organized as soon as possible, with representation by all the SEATO powers and with some responsible positions held by Vietnamese officers. (It is likely that Chief MAAG will be the Commander in Chief and our plans will include necessary augmentation of his staff.)

Force Deployments and Tasks

The U.S. and other SEATO forces to be deployed to Viet Nam and their tasks to carry out the concept of operations are as follows:

a. A U.S. Regimental Combat Team (with Honest John Missile Battalion) will be immediately airlifted … to the Tourane Airbase to assist in the defense of this vital area. A second RCT should be alerted for air movement into Tourane on short notice.

b. The U.S. Navy Fast Carrier Task Force consisting of 3 or 4 Attack Carriers, with necessary supporting combat ships, will immediately proceed from its present station in the Far East to Viet Nam to cover the landings of U.S. ground forces, to carry out attacks against Viet Minh military forces and supporting installations, to provide direct air support to the Vietnamese Army, and to be prepared to retaliate against their airbases if the Chinese Communist Air Force intervenes. Establish Naval blockade of North Viet Nam. Patrol coastal waters of North and South Viet Nam.

c. The following U.S. Air Force units will be deployed immediately … to the bases indicated:

(1) 1 Fighter Bomber Wing and 1 Interceptor Squadron to Tourane Airbase.

(2) 1 Fighter Bomber Squadron, … and 1 Interceptor Squadron to Tan Son Nhut Airbase near Saigon.

(3) 1 Jet Light Bombardment Squadron, … and 1 Interceptor Squadron to Don Muang Airbase near Bangkok.

(4) 1 Medium Troop Carrier Wing to Cap St. Jacques Airbase.

(5) SAC units from Guam will be deployed to Clark Field on standby for possible operations against Chinese Communists.

d. Two additional U.S. RLT/RCT’s will be lifted in amphibious shipping as soon as possible from Japan and/or Okinawa to Viet Nam to assist in the defense of Saigon and the Cap St. Jacques/Cam Ranh Bay areas. One or both of these RLT/RCT’s may be landed at Tourane should the military situation so require. Assault shipping will not be required for this operation. It is estimated that by using administrative lift one RLT from Okinawa could be landed in about 10 days.

e. U.S. personnel as required to enable Chief MAAG Viet Nam to function as an operational commander, to be airlifted to Viet Nam. It is visualized that the Chief MAAG, with an appropriate staff, will become the commander of a combined SEATO command.

f. Specially trained U.S. advisory personnel will be airlifted immediately to Viet Nam for assignment as advisors with combat units down to the regimental level and as technical advisors with logistics support organizations.

g. Sea-lift for selected Vietnamese forces will be kept available in the Cam Ranh Bay/Cap St. Jacques area for use in transporting Vietnamese units as may be required and as a threat to the Viet Minh. Marine units will train Vietnamese units in amphibious operations.

h. Such ground, naval, and air units provided by other SEATO nations will be assigned appropriate tasks in support of the operations.

i. The necessary administrative and service support units required to support U.S. and allied operations will be moved in by surface shipping.

Preparatory Military Steps

1. Some of the preparatory military steps that must be taken in advance in order to be able to carry out these operations are:

a. Select and train U.S. advisory personnel to be assigned to the Vietnamese Army.

b. Special training for selected Vietnamese personnel, outside of Viet Nam if necessary, in U.S. methods of employing naval and air support in ground operations, and in amphibious operations. Instruction will also be provided in the special tactics and techniques of employing atomic weapons support.

c. Conduct combined training exercises with other SEATO nations. The “Firm link” exercise conducted in February this year in Bangkok was highly successful in demonstrating possibilities along this line.

d. Make preparation for the rapid movement of tactical air control parties and ground liaison, logistics and communication personnel to Viet Nam to insure an early capability for U.S. supporting operations. Similarly, preparations can be made for early deployment of special U.S. forces to provide a capability for ground delivery of atomic weapons.

e. Road systems should be developed to meet logistic requirements in support of military operations.

f. Prepare plans for the early deployment of air units to the area to include detailed targeting for initial strikes.

Supplementary Actions

In addition to the actions that I have previously set forth, there are other supplementary actions that may be required. Since Viet Minh aggression would violate and probably nullify the Geneva Convention, we should be prepared to augment the MAAG’s and military aid programs in Laos and Cambodia. We should be prepared to occupy the Seno Airbase in Laos. The Thais should be urged to move troops to northeast border positions along the Mekong. The Philippines should be particularly urged to make a sizable ground contingent available (One RCT).

Implications

The deployment of U.S. forces from the Japan, Korea, or Okinawa–Formosa area will, of course, reduce our military capability in these areas. Depending upon the situation at the time, it may be necessary to replace the forces withdrawn from those areas. In order to provide logistic support for the forces deployed to Viet Nam in this operation, some construction may be required in Viet Nam. This construction would be largely in improved air base facilities and temporary storage facilities. Improvement in roads and some port facilities might also be required.

Summary and Conclusions

This is a broad presentation of the capabilities of the U.S. military forces to assist the defeat of aggression in Viet Nam. I would like to stress that the U.S. could intervene on the side of the Vietnamese in the manner and on the scale just outlined without serious disruption to our military posture in other areas and with good prospects of success. I would also like to point out that initially the forces required, whether or not atomic weapons are to be used, would be essentially the same since there are no known fixed military targets in North Viet Nam that could not be destroyed by conventional bombing particularly since we assume no air opposition. If concentration of Viet Minh troops provided an atomic target, the use of such a weapon might end the aggression very rapidly. If the Chinese Communists intervened openly, this would change. Our Air Forces would of necessity use atomic weapons against Chinese air and logistic bases at once.

I would close by saying that when U.S. forces are deployed rapidly in situations such as these, they must be prepared to defend themselves or to take offensive action immediately with atomic weapons. Without such an assumption, our military deployments (if they are not to be of the emergency, desperation type which characterized the Korean intervention) would of necessity be larger and much slower.

1. Source: JCS Files. Top Secret.