Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

328. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)¹

Washington, May 30, 1956—10:49 a.m.

301549Z. Chairman JCS tabled plan for defense Vietnam for consideration JCS in connection with early DOD presentation to be made to NSC on capabilities, with or without nuclear weapons, of US military forces to deal with local aggression in Vietnam. Request your comments ASAP. Plan briefed as follows.

Assumed ChiCom forces will not intervene except provide advisors and logistic support but will pose threat of intervention particularly air power.

To accomplish US objectives supporting forces from US and other SEATO nations must arrive within few days. Fight should be won by Vietnamese backed as much as possible by other Asians.

Concept. Vietminh aggression start by surprise attack across 17 parallel. Vietnamese army will make hard fight near Quang Tri but should fall back to Tourane hill mass where make resolute defense. Meanwhile specially trained US Army advisors will have arrived Tourane. US troops including … will be air and sea lifted to support defense Tourane Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay. US air and naval forces attack Vietminh forces and supporting installations. Above operations commence within few days start of aggression and will be followed by support other SEATO nations resulting destruction Vietminh army and enabling Vietnamese take control all Vietnam. Combined SEATO Command will be organized. Aside from possible large groups enemy troops there will be few if any … targets.

Tasks.

A. ChMAAG Vietnam function as joint operational commander with staff personnel airlifted to Vietnam.

B. Army Airborne RCT airlifted from … to Tourane.

C. TF 77 cover landings US troops, attack enemy forces and supporting installations, provide direct air support Vietnamese ground forces and be prepared retaliate against ChiCom air.

D. USAF units deployed immediately. 1 fighter bomber wing and 1 interceptor sqn to Tourane. 1 fighter bomber sqn … and 1 interceptor sqn to Tan Son Nhut base near Saigon. 1 jet light bomber sqn … and 1 interceptor sqn to . . . . 1 medium troop carrier wing to Cap St Jacques. These USAF units attack enemy forces and supporting installations, provide direct air support Vietnamese army, provide intra theater airlift and be prepared defend against ChiCom air and retaliate against ChiCom air bases.

E. 2500 army specially trained officers and noncoms air lifted immediately to Vietnam as advisors.

F. 2 marine RLT in amphib shipping moved to Vietnam immediately, 1 to Saigon and 1 to Cam Ranh Bay.

G. Army … bn … airlifted to Saigon or Tourane to provide visible evidence US support.

H. US amphib lift for 3 Vietnamese divisions kept available in Saigon area.

I. Other SEATO forces support opns.

Preparatory measures include selecting and training army advisors, training selected Vietnamese in exploiting air and naval support conduct combined SEATO trng exercises, prepare move tactical air control parties and prepare for early deployment US forces for ground delivery . . . .

Above will reduce capability defend Japan.

Above concept will not seriously disrupt military stature in other areas and presents good prospects success. … will not be great factor in fight against Vietminh alone. Forces required essentially the same whether or not … used. Communist conviction US intervention in event aggression best possible deterrent such aggression.

1. Source: Naval Historical Center, CINCPACFLT Microfilm Files, Reel TS 1956 3144. Top Secret. CINCPAC passed this message to the MAAG in Vietnam on June 2 (022121Z).