Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

329. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)¹

Honolulu, June 1, 1956—7:05 p.m.

020505Z. Your 301549Z May.²

1. I concur in the principle of the Vietnamese defending as far north as possible but seriously doubt their ability to make an effective defense in the Tourane area unless allied ground reinforcements can be introduced by D-plus seven. Although considerable progress is expected [illegible word] Vietnamese forces within next year, it is estimated that the Viet Minh will retain a numerical superiority on the order of at least two to one. A flanking attack through Laos is therefore a constant threat but this is not likely to be a decisive factor due to rainy season west of mountains until fall.

2. SEATO countries have yet to commit forces to the defense of this area. However, I belive it is optimistic to assume their total contribution will be more than the equivalent of one US division and minor naval and air forces and this only if the United States leads the way. Neither Laos nor Cambodia will contribute any forces except for their own defense and wouldn’t be of much help if they did. ChiNat units could be considered available only in event of ChiCom intervention.

3. Even with outside help, other than US, Viet Minh ground force superiority is estimated at four or five divisions. This could be only partially offset by US Naval and Air Force support alone. The nature of the terrain, weather and Viet Minh guerrilla tactics will limit the effectiveness of naval and air support, with or without … weapons. Effectiveness of allied ground operations will also be handicapped by the limited opportunity to employ heavy weapons and equipment including … units.

4. Concept should be enlarged to provide for destruction of Viet Minh army by decisive action north of the 17th parallel. This can be accomplished by early amphibious assault in the Vinh area by US Navy and Marine forces and rapid expansion of the lodgement to cut Viet Minh LOC, seal off enemy forces to the south and prepare for further offensive to north to seize and occupy North Vietnam. Draft plan CINCPAC OP Plan 49–56 regarding [?] this concept forwarded 31 May to CNO.³

5. I estimate that a minimum of two US divisions will be required to initiate the operations envisaged in the concept as explained in para 4 above. Depending on success of initial operations, additional US forces may be requested to completely defeat and occupy North Vietnam.

6. I am sure that all concerned recognize that the effectiveness of the initial defense will be dependent on the timely introduction of US and allied forces with appropriate logistical support in the area of operations. The immediate availability of air and surface lift will be most critical factor.

7. Consider that principal US combat effort should be made in Vinh area. Do not believe that Cam Ranh Bay should be an initial defense area except for mobile support forces, unless Tourane cannot be held.

8. Subject to foregoing remarks and specific comments to follow I concur in your 301549Z May.

Task Alpha. Consider ChMAAG Vietnam should be designated as initial US ground operational commander supported by US Air Force and Naval forces under overall direction of CINCPAC. A SEATO command should be organized earliest in which case ChMAAG Vietnam would be the logical SEATO ground command in Vietnam. In order to retain US control, consider CINCPAC most logical choice for overall SEATO commander.

Task Bravo. In considering the use of Army troops ashore, I have a feeling that Congress will not allow US Army forces to be committed in Vietnam but might permit Marine forces to be so committed. I say this because the powerful [?] political repercussion on the American people would be less with the use of Marines than it would with Army troops.

Task Elmo. In any consideration of the effectiveness of Vietnamese forces, we must realize that none of their military leaders have had any experience or training above the battalion level and relatively few even as high as company level. Therefore, I concur it will be absolutely necessary to make a great increase in military army advisers, to furnish advice and guidance from the division down through the battalion command levels and possibly, in many cases, company levels. These advisers must arrive at the earliest date. They should be ear-marked as part of US participation and be ready to proceed on short notice by air. In this concept, we should remember that the Viet Minh, on the other hand, have been organized by divisions at the time when the French were fighting on battalion level and, therefore, possess the experience and a capability not possessed by the Vietnam Army.

Task Foxtrot. Believe at least one Marine RCT should be deployed rapidly to Saigon to bolster Vietnamese morale and will to fight, ensure security of that vital area and protect US lives and property. However, Marine forces should deploy as air-ground task forces as nearly as practical. A Marine force of one division-wing size should be prepared for amphibious assault at Vinh at earliest date about D-plus thirty days. Composition of Vinh assault force would be determined by best utilization of amphibious lift in Pacific. Marine air support for landing would use Tourane and other airfields and carriers as available.

Task Hotel. All available US amphibious lift in Pacific will be required for initial deployment US forces and early assault at Vinh. Principal Vietnam Army units committed to defense of southern area of South Vietnam should be deployed there in advance. Vietnamese are not capable of large scale amphibious assault but could be used as follow up forces using administrative lift. Preparatory measures. These should include means to logistically support US and indigenous forces for sustained operations from the onset. Planning should include use of facilities in … and Guam.

9. In the event US ground forces are not made available for operations in Vietnam, US Air and Naval forces only in support of the Vietnamese would be insufficient to accomplish the stated objective “destruction of Viet Minh Army and enabling Vietnamese to take control of all Vietnam” and the defeat of the Vietnamese would probably follow. If US ground forces are committed to the defense of Vietnam they must be in numbers sufficient to ensure the early defeat of the Viet Minh and reinforcements should be prepared to be moved into the area quickly in the event of ChiCom intervention.

10. I agree completely with the last sentence of your msg. Further, I believe that in case of Viet Minh aggression the ChiComs should be told that the ChiComs may expect attack from US forces if they intervene or assist Viet Minh. While in a democratic country like the US an aroused people will force their government into war, such is not the case in a Communist country, leaders of which will permit a war to start only if they think they can win, or if they think they can consolidate their power within their own country. Therefore, an attack against Communist China by US or ChiNat forces if necessary to carry out our threat will be a “limited war” unless the ChiCom and Soviet Governments desire a general war. They would use such an attack only as a pretext for a war they otherwise desired in the first place.

1. Source: Naval Historical Center, CINCPACFLT Microfilm Files, Reel TS 1956 3144. Top Secret. Passed to the MAAG in Vietnam on June 2 (022122Z).
2. Supra.
3. Not found, but see footnote 5, Document 335.