Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

238. Letter From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt)¹

Washington, July 28, 1955.

Dear Fred: Thank you so much for your letters of July 1 and July 10.² We have now received your telegrams³ on the FEC and the force levels for Viet-Nam, both of which have been extremely useful in getting State, Defense, and ICA⁴ to thinking about these problems on the basis of your current views and recommendations. I understand that the people in Defense and ICA are also inclined to a force level of 150,000 for the Vietnamese. ICA also thinks that the funding may not require any additional money for calendar ’56.

During my week in Paris and my week in Geneva several matters came up which may be of some interest to you and the Embassy:

1. The handling of Indochinese affairs in Paris is undergoing a slow but apparently definite metamorphosis. The Ministry for Associated States is drying up on the vine. Faure and Berard handle Indo-Chinese affairs themselves, particularly Viet-Nam. They consult with Jacques Roux in the Foreign Office but apparently bypass LaForest and Risterucci. It is only a question of time before the responsibility will be turned over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to Jacques Roux, Bill Gibson and Vo Lang.⁵ If these three agree, that is probably a pretty solid prophecy. Also, LaForest and his associates seem to be reduced to a rear-guard action in collaboration with Bao Dai and his entourage against Ngo Dinh Diem. I gather, however, that both the Ministry and the entourage are pretty much “has beens”. It is just a question of time for Faure politically to develop a deal with LaForest.

2. After several talks with Jacques Roux, Berard and one or two with Tomlinson, I concluded that all of us are pretty much in time on the modalities of Vietnamese consultations and elections. There seems to have been a substantial shift in both the French and British viewpoints during the past two months. They are not insisting on a full-blown consultative conference or opening of talks on July 20th. Instead they are willing to take any small token from Diem—a declaration, a letter through any channel, a series of written exchanges on questions and conditions between the two sides. Their main concern is that some slight movement be made at a leisurely pace. They hope to avoid Viet Minh sabotage and terrorism in the South, charges against them that they are breaking their Geneva obligations, and the ultimate threat of Viet Minh attack under circumstances politically prejudicial throughout the world to Ngo Dinh Diem. They do not wish to press him into concessions nor do they insist that the two sides reach an agreement and that elections be held. I take it at the working level that the French and British are prepared as we are to see this election trail off indefinitely into the future. The problem is developing as a matter of de facto evolution springing out of the nature of things and accepted all around as the facts of life.

3. I suggested to the Department that Roux, Tomlinson and I might prepare a brief paper on these various points to put our respective views in conformity. For various reasons that did not work out. It seems to me the best place to do that is in Saigon. You and the Embassy are much closer to the scene and know the whole thing better than we do. One result of the parallel instructions to you and your individual démarches might be to work out the modalities.

4. My mission in Paris and Geneva was somewhat mythical. I was the guardian of silence on the Far East. The Russians never pressed the issue and Bulganin treated it quite perfunctorily in his opening and closing statements. If it had not been for the riots in Saigon I am quite sure nothing would have happened at all at Geneva. That ill-timed incident ignited warm discussions on the side and in the corridors. Molotov told Eden he had a letter from Nehru which he wanted to discuss. The British called a meeting of the Foreign Ministers with Faure present. I reported that in Secto 64.⁶ The French were pretty upset about the whole matter for they felt that they would be charged with negligence by the Communists and the Indians and blamed for the incident by the Vietnamese. They wanted to tell Molotov right away that the French would abide by their obligations under Article 25. Faure made no bones about his complete exasperation with Diem over this as well as over the Hoppenot business.⁷ Then the Dong letter led Faure at this moment to launch into quite a long discussion about elections and consultations. I was surprised by the sensible, practical views he expressed. He made it clear he does not expect elections to be held but felt Diem should declare views on really free elections. Faure said France would support him in this. Faure also said that Diem’s repudiation of Geneva was a great asset for us. It was really just a question of tactics in playing this matter so as not to provoke the other side. Therefore he felt Diem should make some response or make some contact with the Viet Minh. Macmillan agreed strongly and felt that the three ministers should urge Diem into consultations. The Secretary made two points, all in French. He first pointed out the internal morale problem that Diem has, as you have reported it. Both Faure and Macmillan seemed to be fully aware of this problem and acknowledged it without reservation. Secondly, the Secretary said that Diem should have assurances of support from the three of us if we were going to ask him to make any kind of response to the Viet Minh. Faure and Macmillan both agreed this was an excellent idea and Pinay strongly concurred, his only contribution to the hour’s meeting. The ministers then decided instructions should be drafted to their representatives in Saigon. Faure and Macmillan suggested a joint démarche. I suggested to the Secretary that we have been successfully proceeding with individual contacts and that it would be better for us to keep our freedom of action. Faure and Macmillan then agreed that it would be better to leave this up to the three of you in Saigon. During this meeting and in my drafting of the parallel instructions with Roux there was no discussion of the substance or of the timing of Diem’s reply to the Viet Minh. The French were greatly concerned that Diem would reject the Dong letter out of hand before the three Western powers could get to him.

5. I had no trouble at all drafting the parallel instructions—Secto 67.⁸ Roux wrote it out in French from a list of points I had made and agreed heartily on the paragraph of assurances to Diem. The ministers concurred in our draft with only one or two minor editorial changes. The Secretary added a couple of sentences about the Communists not winning elections, and off went the telegram. I was somewhat concerned about our joining with the French and British in pressing Diem to make an answer but from our point of view it seemed we should at least ask this of him. We are worried in Washington about Viet Minh capabilities of subversion and sabotage and the Vietnamese capacities for resisting. At the same time I felt this was a moment in Geneva to obtain the assurances from the French and the British as well as an understanding and sympathy for him and for his position. I hope this will help your handling of this delicate problem with Ngo Dinh Diem and his government. There must be an atmosphere of reciprocal confidence if the extremely delicate operation during the next year is to succeed.

Your telegram 428 of July 27⁹ indicates that this matter came off all right in the first instance. We hope that our present line and the formulas to develop will keep the issue of consultations and elections from getting very hot.

6. Berard talked to me in Geneva about the FEC. He indicated the French are undecided how far to cut the French forces in Viet-Nam and wondered what our thinking was. They are deliberating over two choices: 1) a reduced force of about 20,000 including air, navy, and ground, instructors and logistic support, or 2) total reduction of all French forces from Viet-Nam all except possibly instructors for the VNA. He said there was great pressure in Paris particularly in political circles to get all French forces out of Viet-Nam right away. He stated that he and Faure were inclined to the first alternative. If that were the final decision, French forces would be removed from metropolitan areas in any event. I told him that we had no high level opinion of the question but that we would be agreeable to whatever the French and Vietnamese worked out. Our main concern was to insure the retention of enough instructors to help us with the VNA training and to advise the VNA.

7. I met with the High Commissioner in Paris to assure him we were not talking about Viet-Nam or the Far East in Geneva. I also had several talks with [name deleted] in Geneva. He showed me his files on many subjects. He possesses an earnest set of eyes and ears for Ngo Dinh Diem in Paris and no doubt he sees and hears a lot. Judging by the correspondence he appears to have with Diem, he is quite a source of information.

With all the best,

Regards

Ken
Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

1. Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 58 F 125, 350 Vietnam 1950–55, Classified. Secret; Official–Informal.
2. Neither found in Department of State files.
3. Documents 226 and 227.
4. The Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) was abolished by Executive Order 10610, July 1, 1955, and replaced by the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), a semiautonomous organization within the Department of State.
5. Vo Lang was Ngo Dinh Luyen’s Chef de Cabinet.
6. Document 233.
7. The reference is to a Franco-South Vietnamese difference of opinion over whether the French representative to the State of Vietnam should be styled Ambassador (as the Vietnamese insisted) or High Commissioner (as the French preferred). The compromise worked out in the end was “Ambassador on Extraordinary Mission, High Commissioner of The French Republic to The State of Vietnam”. (Telegram 338 from Paris, July 22; Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/7–2255)
8. Printed as telegram 4 to Saigon, Document 234.
9. Not printed, but see footnote 3, ibid.