Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

227. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, July 14, 1955—3 p.m.

186. This is a joint Embassy/USOM/MAAG message. Reference: Department telegrams 5681 and 49.²

1. In our view size of recommended Vietnam military budget should be decided primarily on basis of overall military and political objectives. Since time of formulation governing US policy this question, there have been fundamental changes in situation here of which most important is virtual elimination FEC as major force to deter and resist external aggression.

In our judgement role Vietnam armed forces which was last defined as maintenance internal security should be re-examined. Consequently, we believe re-definition US objectives required before further effort made to refine cost estimates and possible budgets.

2. Following represents our thinking re overall objectives presently feasible and desirable. Because of (a) currently unpredictable future and probable early departure FEC, (b) absence any definite Manila Pact force commitments, (c) increased Viet Minh armed force strength and (d) need for Free Vietnam strength during critical year ahead, a force of 150,000 including integrated sect forces, is considered desirable by July 1, 1956 and for balance of CY 1956. (This 150,000 force strength would provide four field divisions of 8500 each, six light divisions of 5500 each and 13 light infantry regiments.)

3. It is believed that (a) initial disposition these forces would deny an invading enemy use of main transport routes and force him to utilize mountain approaches thereby substantially delaying his advance and (b) existence this blocking force would have significant deterrent effect against Viet Minh aggressive armed action.

4. While conscription and training of young replacements is desirable, we believe unwise for political and military reasons press for conscription until army through attribution [attrition] begins to reduce below agreed force level. As reserve force of trained men gradually built up, and to extent change in political and military factors permits, we believe eventual further reduction 50,000 level should be sought.

5. Corollary consideration militating in favor 150,000 force goal is problem of demobilization. Difficulties in conforming with original program are due to (a) reluctance of Vietnamese to increase tempo troop reduction because of disrupting effect on armed forces, and fear of adverse political consequences; and (b) interference with demobilization caused by military operations against sects and requirements for pacifying former Viet Minh areas.

6. We greatly appreciate increased allotment and offer following comments re specific points raised in Deptel 5681; primarily because of delay in carrying out planned construction, military expenditures are running at lower rate than previously estimated. It now appears that US allotment of $234.8 million plus expected Vietnamese contribution will cover actual military expenditures CY 1955, even if year end force level should be as high as 150,000 regular armed forces plus 10,000 sect forces. Thus, upward revision goals recommended para 2 above not precluded by financial limitations CY 1955. Recognize that main financial problem presented by this proposal will arise in CY 1956.

In this connection further study indicates that VN military costs can be reduced from approximately $2,000 per man per year to $1,843 per man per year. This reduces estimated cost of proposed military budget for 1956 from $336 million to approximately $286 million.

7. We recognize necessity for continuing effort by US elements here to reduce military costs and maximize size and effectiveness of force which can be supported with whatever funds available. Revised figures above are evidence accomplishments this respect. It would be useful to strengthen MAAG staff devoted to budget and cost control, and appropriate personnel request will be submitted by MAAG through Defense channels.

Reinhardt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/7–1455. Secret. Repeated for information to Paris where it was passed to Young; passed by the Department to the Department of Defense and CINCPAC.
2. Documents 218 and 224.