237. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- NIE 63.1–55: Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 19562
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that the immediate aim of the Communist “Democratic Republic of Vietnam” (DRV) is to consolidate its control of the area north of the 17th parallel and to gain control of South Vietnam. Although passive resistance and discontent resulting from harsh control measures and poor economic conditions may increase, the Communist regime will maintain effective control in the North. The DRV will continue its present efforts to weaken the Diem Government through subversion, intimidation, and propaganda, and to bring to power in the South men prepared to accept coalition with the DRV, either before or after nationwide elections.
While the Communists almost certainly would not agree to complex and elaborate safeguards and guarantees, they probably would agree to some form of neutral (but not UN) supervision of the elections, estimating that such supervision would work to their advantage in the South and, as manipulated, would not adversely affect their position in the north.
Even though it is capable of defeating all military forces, including the French, in South Vietnam as well as in Cambodia and Laos, the DRV is not likely to invade either South Vietnam or Laos openly during the period of this estimate. Communist concern for Western, and particularly US reaction arid general considerations arising from overall Bloc policy are deterrents to such attacks. The Communists [Page 499] now have few assets in Cambodia and will probably be unable to develop a significant internal threat to that country until they have strengthened their positions in Laos and South Vietnam.
The IAC estimates that the resumption of widespread guerrilla activities is unlikely unless the DRV should come to the conclusion that South Vietnam can be won only by force. Should the DRV decide to use force short of open invasion, it would probably attempt to undermine the Saigon government through sabotage and terror, seeking the formation of a new government amenable to Communist demands for a national coalition.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/7–2755. Secret. A marginal note on the source text by O’Connor indicates that Dulles saw this memorandum.↩
- For text of NIE 63.1–55, July 19, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 993–996; the record copy is in Department of State, INR Files.↩