234. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
4. For Ambassador from Secretary. Ref: Secto 64 sent Saigon 3 London 25 Paris 34 New Delhi 6 Ottawa 3.2 The 3 Western Delegations agreed today on common instructions regarding their views on the question of consultations and elections in Vietnam. The English text of your instructions is as follows:
“Yesterday, after having taken up the telegram from Mr. Nehru to the two co-Presidents, the Three Western Foreign Ministers discussed the question of the Viet Minh letter to the Vietnamese Government regarding consultations. They have decided to ask their representatives in Saigon to inform President Diem that their governments believe it advisable that he should not neglect replying to the message which has just been sent to him.
Please take up this subject with Diem along the following lines:
The United States Government realizes Diem’s preoccupations in this matter and understands his position regarding the Geneva accords. It also believes, as he does, that it is necessary to avoid taking any position which would compromise his authority, discourage the Vietnamese people or weaken the nationalist and democratic spirit. Moreover, the United States Government will fully support the Vietnamese Government concerning genuinely free elections, and, consequently, it has no intention of insisting that the Vietnamese Government should automatically accept anything the Viet Minh propose. It seems to us that it would greatly weaken Diem’s authority were he to seem to be fearful that the Communists would win genuinely free elections in Vietnam. You should point out this is something they have never yet done anywhere.
At the same time it is important not to furnish any motive for Communist subversion in the south, nor any pretext to the Communists to raise the question of Indo-China, particularly elections in Vietnam, at the diplomatic level under conditions which would be unfavorable for the free world. Therefore some Vietnamese response to the authorities of Hanoi is necessary. If it is desired, we of course are ready to study with the Vietnamese authorities the terms of this reply as well as the means by which it would be carried out.
[Page 496]Similar instructions are being addressed to your French and British colleagues. Please consult with them whether you should present the above position to Diem jointly or separately.”3
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 524. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Young. Repeated priority to the Department of State as Secto 67, and to London, Paris, New Delhi, and Ottawa.↩
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According to telegram 278 to Saigon, July 25, the Department of State preferred that Reinhardt make the démarche separately. Furthermore, Reinhardt was to point out to Diem that the three powers understood his position on the Geneva Accords and would insist on “genuinely free elections”; these were positive gains Diem might overlook in his first negative reaction to “being pushed”. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–225)
According to telegram 428 from Saigon, July 27, the representatives of the three powers made their presentations to Diem orally and separately on July 26. It was Reinhardt’s impression that Diem was taking the matter in reasonably good grace, although it would be difficult to get him to respond to Dong’s letter with anything more than a public declaration. (Ibid., 751G.00/7–2755)
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