Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

226. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, July 13, 1955—11 p.m.

184. Re: (1) Tedul 9 to Paris, May 9, 1955,² control no. 03251, which transmitted text JCS paper on Indo China; and (2) Saigon’s 5974 to Department, repeated Paris 1493.³

In view importance implications problem French military presence Vietnam, I have with associates reviewed JCS paper and submit following observations:

1. Problem: Problem has two major aspects, political and military. Military aspects should be broken down into those relating to internal security and those relating to defense against external military aggression.

2. Immediate Vietnamese objective: Immediate Vietnamese objective as viewed by Diem is both political and military and is to establish beyond any possible challenge full and complete independence to control and use Vietnamese armed forces within Free Vietnam. To obtain this aspect of sovereignty Diem wishes French transfer High Command to Vietnamese and desires agreement with French defining mission, status and location of FEC. He wishes furthermore to retain support of French air and navy, as well as French training and logistical elements. In addition, he would probably desire retention of certain FEC ground force combat units if they were confined to mutually agreed bases and charged with mission of contributing to defense of territory against external aggression (which is a highly improbable contingency in light of present French inclinations).

3. Strategic implications—internal security: Opposed to Vietnamese political and military desiderata are strategic implications arising out of further reduction or complete withdrawal of FEC. JCS paper now to some extent overtaken by events. This paper considered it doubtful that VNA in present state preparation and training could continue maintain internal security under prevailing conditions quasi-civil war without assistance of other forces. Successful progress to date of VNA operations against sects and its progressively growing capability contradicts this appreciation. Whether VNA together with VN security forces will be able to cope at some time in future with possible all-out Viet Minh rising in south is of course function of several unknown factors. Clearly most important of these is Viet Minh underground capability and progress which VNA and VN security forces will have been able to make by date of such rising. Least that can be said in light of current political and particularly military trends in South Vietnam is that relative power ratio is moving in favorable direction. As regards influence continued presence FEC on internal security situation, it is my view that in absence of well defined and mutually agreed understanding with Vietnamese Government FEC’s presence will do more to jeopardize than to improve internal security. To this must be added continually reiterated policy of French command here of non-involvement in internal affairs and its admission that its internal security responsibility extends only to French and other foreign colonies.

4. Strategic implications—external aggression:

a. As regards external aggression, I believe we must rely at this time on other means than FEC for ground blocking force to retard any Viet Minh military invasion. (MAAG Comment: However, present VN military planning provides for ground forces within six months which it is estimated will be capable of substantially delaying advance of Viet Minh invasion as well as constituting a significant deterrent to any Viet Minh armed aggression. These ground forces will require outside air and naval support. End MAAG Comment)

b. Although continued presence of some French forces in Vietnam would at least avoid psychological vacuum which their sudden withdrawal would presumably produce, only real deterrent in area at present is Manila Pact.

c. Issue of stationing French forces on or near 17th parallel apart from important policing and control of demarcation line does not appear to have particular strategic importance. Any considerable force deployed on this line in initial stages of any action could be easily outflanked and by-passed through Laos on the west as well as by sea on the East.

5. Manila Pact: Diem has commented on several occasions, although in vague terms, on possible application of Manila Pact to Vietnam, particularly in face of dangerous internal subversion. France is member of Manila Pact, and it would seem logical that continued presence of FEC, reduced and with clearly established responsibilities, would be useful as patent evidence active French interest in SEA to complement interests of US, UK and Free World in area. Yet belief is general among Vietnamese, not to mention French, that political climate in France would not permit FEC again to become involved with Viet Minh. It must also be admitted that such involvement would have undesirable political effect on nourishing Viet Minh propaganda and allegations that once again French were fighting Vietnamese in effort to perpetuate their presence in Indo China.

6. Problems facing French: Major problem French face here in considering reduction or withdrawal of FEC are:

a. Responsibilities under Geneva Accords for demarcation line and security ICC.

b. Area defense French naval base Saigon.

c. Protection French community Saigon.

I believe latter problem (c) could be satisfactorily handled from a nearby French base and that actual removal French forces from Saigon proper would tend reduce incidents leading to violence against individual Frenchmen or isolated French residences. Second problem (b) depends in part on willingness Vietnamese to permit French develop naval base at Cap St Jacques or retain security troops Saigon. First problem (a) is more complicated as it depends on willingness Vietnamese to accept, under Article 27 of Geneva Agreement, specific responsibilities undertaken by French High Command. In point of fact, protection ICC should require relatively small number troops if Vietnamese authorities would refrain from encouraging demonstrations against ICC and particularly Viet Minh liaison officers. So far they have shown little disposition to do so and in some instances even admit to having provoked them.

7. French intentions: We are convinced by oft-reiterated statement of French High Command here that they ignorant of Paris intentions with respect to problem retention or withdrawal FEC, and, if former, at what level and with what mission. Presumably, French Government is now studying problem from financial as well as military and political aspects. It would seem appropriate moment for Department to remind French Government of Faure’s undertaking at time of Paris talks on Indochina to discuss with US and British question of future of FEC in Vietnam.

Reinhardt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/7–1355. Top Secret. Repeated for information to Paris and London and passed to the Department of Defense and CINCPAC.
2. Document 179.
3. Document 216.