Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

790.5/6–2852: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India¹

secret

Washington, June 28, 1952—4:51 p.m.

2966. ActSecy requested Amb Sen² call Jun 27 discuss Letourneau visit. Nehru‘s comments press conference 21 Jun in which alleged Atlantic Pact widened include protection Colonial areas of Atlantic Powers, specifically with reference IC was also discussed.³

ActSecy informed Amb that North Atlantic Treaty clearly defines area within which its provisions may become effective and that Treaty obviously has no application to IC. He also made it clear that Assoc States of IC can in no sense be considered “Colonial Areas.”

ActSecy then stated desirable GOI be fully informed re recent conversations Letourneau talks, fol points wld undoubtedly interest GOI:

(a) Having been virtually non-existent in 1950, the Nat Armies of the three States now number approximately 150,000 men. State of Vietnam being by far largest, maintains the greatest proportion. During 1953 they expected be increased to approximately six infantry divisions.

(b) Over half the units of Vietnamese Nat Army officered almost entirely by Vietnamese while others still have sprinkling Fr techs whose presence will not be required for very long period. Equipment for these new forces coming primarily from Amer aid program. In approximately two years it expected Vietnamese Nat Army will have eight divisions of regulars. At present time there are about 74,000 metro Fr and about 50,000 African and Fon Legion troops in forces fighting Communists in IC, while there are 300,000 Indochinese all volunteers.

(c) In 1948 there were 7,000 Fr civil servants IC. This figure now reduced to 1,400 of whom over half not employed by Fr Govt but are in service Assoc States.

The major results of Letourneau talks were:

(a) Govts of Fr and US reiterated their common understanding that defense Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia against Commie aggression is essential part free world’s struggle against internatl Communism. The two govts were in complete agreement that major mil burden this defense, now being borne by Fr and other members of Fr Union, shld be assumed to greatest possible extent by govts of Assoc States. Ambs of Vietnam and Cambodia who participated in conversations affirmed this was eager desire their govts.

(b) Letourneau made it very clear publicly that future pol organization of Assoc States, once present hostilities terminated by cessation fon inspired and fon assisted hostilities, wld be for people of Assoc States themselves to determine. He naturally expressed hope that advantages of membership in Fr Union wld appeal to them but made it clear both in conversations with officials of this govt and in public that this decision was one for people of Assoc States themselves, once present danger eliminated.

(c) Largely as result of the successful outcome of Letourneau conversations, Govt of US decided continue and increase assistance in arms, ammunition and equipment which it contributing to support common struggle against Communist aggression in IC with particular intention that this increased assistance be especially directed to arming and equipping of Nat Armies of Assoc States.

ActSecy then went on to discuss at some length fact of independence of Assoc States govts and emphasized his strong conviction it wld be impossible for Fr attempt restore former Colonial controls, even if that were Fr policy, which it is not. Amer aid and support to Assoc States govts not directed toward maintenance of Colonial area, but to assist people of independent States preserve their freedom in face Commie aggression.

In informal conversation with Dept officers after leaving Mr. Bruce‘s office Sen remarked he believed status and problems of IC not fully understood in India and he wld welcome further clarification by Dept. Mtg arranged in which Dept wld further explain to Rep India Emb Wash Atlantic Pact with ref Nehru allegations.

In response Ambs question, Dept offs made point that while US aid and support to Nat Armies of Assoc States and Fr Union is directed toward strengthening their ability to protect IC from Commie aggression, that a necessary prerequisite to such US pol was the independence of the States themselves. Had they not achieved their independence, neither US public opinion nor Congressional authority cld have been expected to support the present US course of action. US aid is not being extended assist European powers to maintain or impose Colonial rule.

Sen remarked GOI viewed Chiefs of State in IC as something approaching puppets installed by Fr and capable being removed in same way GOI had displaced several hundred Princes. It was explained to him that Kings Cambodia and Laos as well as Bao Dai (who rules not as Emperor but as Chief State with eventual form of Govt to be determined) were representative ancient dynasties and their stabilizing influence not only desirable but probably necessary during present crises.

During discussion of sizes of Nat Armies in Assoc States and great burden placed upon resources to maintain them, Sen stated India frequently criticized for large proportion natl revenues devoted defense. In his view, even if relations between Pak and GOI were completely solved today, GOT wld continue to require defense forces at least as large as presently maintained in order to protect India’s 1500 mile exposed borders.

Foregoing is provided for ur use in conversations with Nehru and MEA. I hope you will take early opportunities convey substance US views to GOI and will look forward to your report of such conversations.

Sen’s responses to info given him was reasonable and appreciative. He requested further info re IC be made available to him and GOI.

Bruce

1. Drafted by Bonsal and Hoey of PSA and Whitman of SOA. Also sent to Saigon as telegram 2078. Repeated by airgram to London, Paris, Djakarta, Manila, Karachi, and Colombo for information.
2. Binay Ranjan Sen, Ambassador of India in the United States.
3. In a memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State, June 27, not printed, Assistant Secretary of State Allison suggested that Ambassador Sen be given an informal briefing on the existing state of affairs in Indochina. (751G.00/6–2752)