Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 111: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Department of State
[Extract]
Secto 27. Rptd info Paris 2542, Saigon 46, Pusan 9.
. . . . . . .
(B) SEA and Indochina.
Chief results today’s tripartite meeting1 on SEA and Indochina were agreement re necessity formulation political guidance for ad hoc comite and early meeting comite to enable it continue work within framework political principles decided upon. Nitze and Nash meeting with UK–Fr reps tomorrow morning to begin work drawing up political guidance paper, work to continue in Paris if, as anticipated, further discussions necessary. The Secretary made clear that these political principles would have to be submitted to respective govts for approval.2
At opening of meeting Schuman proposed (1) UK associate itself in tripartite meeting communiqué with principle set forth in Dept communiqué at conclusion Letourneau talks Washington (Fr effort Indochina integral part free world fight against Communist aggression) to show Western solidarity, (2) diplomatic approval ad hoc comite conclusions reached in Feb, and (3) creation permanent military organization for all of SEA to study military situation and suggest measures to be taken.
Re Schuman‘s first point, Eden indicated he was not now in position to associate UK with principle in question and would have to examine matter further. The Secretary said he would be glad to reaffirm US association with principle. Re Schuman‘s second point, the Secretary said while he was glad have military reps meet he would prefer look at ad hoc comite conclusions as whole rather than in part at this time. Eden merely said UK JCS had studied conclusions but did not think they represented agreements. Letourneau later returned to this subject but no decision was reached to carry out some of conclusions on which committee had unanimously agreed, as suggested by Letourneau. Re Schuman‘s third point, the Secretary said that permanent military organization should grow out of further military talks which would be preferable to creating such body before agreement on military policy.
[Page 213]Schuman also brought up question of warning to Chi Commies re aggression SEA and discussion centered around two formulas suggested by him: (1) Direct warning to Chi Communists and (2) statement by two, three or more countries (he mentioned Australia) saying none of countries joining in statement would tolerate aggression against countries concerned. The Secretary pointed out that a public statement, such as that suggested under second formula, would carry far-reaching implications and that the matter of warning should be worked out between the three govts. Schuman agreed that question should be examined again but warned that events might “outstrip us”.
While no definite date set for meeting ad hoc comite, general trend of thinking was that political guidance principles should be drawn up as soon as possible to permit early meeting of comite. Mid-July was suggested by Letourneau and Eden indicated such date might be possible.
- This telegram summarized the second meeting at London of Secretary of State Acheson, British Foreign Secretary Eden, and French Foreign Minister Schuman, June 27. For the pertinent portion of the U.S. summary minutes of the meeting, see volume xii.↩
- For documentation on subsequent tripartite conversations on the defense of Southeast Asia, see ibid.↩