Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751H.00/6–3052: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (Gullion) to the Department of State¹

secret

Saigon, June 30, 1952—8 p.m.

2637. Rptd info Paris 830, Phnom Penh unn. June 28 had interviews in [Phnom] Penh with King Norodom, Fr Comm Risterucci² and new FonMin Sondeth.³ City quiet; Algerian troops no longer deployed, but still encamped near center of town. Farewell parade for outgoing General Dio⁴ held without incident, attended by Monipong⁵ as King’s rep. King still personally directing govt with energy insisting to all interviewers he has not surrendered any control to Fr and his action taken only preserve prospects for democracy in Camb. Thanh has attacked solution as Fr-imposed, but has not attacked King personally. School year vacation has begun and students dispersed, hence little trouble from that quarter. Assy not dissolved; still refusing to take issue with King. I. Norodom delivered impassioned defense of his action to me and Corcoran, talking steadily and loudly for three-quarters of an hour, literally without interruption. He still in exalted frame of mind, but Corcoran says his excitement has subsided from pitch during crisis. He has not ventured from grounds since Coup. He launched into defense of decisions which he believes might be questioned by us:

A. Assumption of power: He had executed no coup d’etat, but merely exercised his prerogatives in order prevent internal disorder. View of aid US to Camb he thought US wld be glad see Camb take firm stand. Amb Jessup said US cld not save from Communism, countries that wld not try to save themselves.⁶

B. Constitution: King had defend constitution which he had given his people. Serious students now saw instrument defective since there no way executive cld anticipate and resolve major policy clashes. What was needed was veto system like that of Amer constitution. His effort in Camb was to guide nation toward democracy as father of people and constitution; he had to slow or speed developments, or turn them right or left. In present state of development of Camb people and institutions his personal intervention was required. This was not first time he had intervened; he cited action proroguing assembly in 1949 (on that occasion, however, action was in concert with Pres of Assy and of Council). Under constitution one party cld too easily establish dictatorship. Election system provided no rep for minority parties (King meant to praise merits of system of proportionate rep. However, year ago during Fr elections, he extolled superiority of Camb over Fr system which allowed Communists to keep wedge in Govt).

Not only was King giver of constitution, but also of elections. He pointed out that people wld not participate in elections unless they were sanctioned by him. In elections resulting in current Assy he had had to tour country to tell people it was all right for them to vote, but people had understood that he wanted them to vote for Democrats.

He knew he might be called dictator abroad; he was no dictator, but first of Camb Democrats. He had not dissolved Assy; that Assy had resolved govern with him.

I told him I believed we understood his devotion to Demo ideals and desire to adapt Demo institutions to his people, and complimented him on his success in “defending” constitution and Assy during last crisis. (Comment: King’s coup certainly gave wrench to constitution and was able keep Assy only because it abdicated its powers. Yet King sincerely devoted to idea Demo Govt and example all too rare in SEA)

C. The Democrats: King minimized Thanh defection and singled out as reason for his assumption of power the authoritarian, tyrannical action of Demo party. Pointed out that in provinces party committee actually governed. Provincial civil servants and govs, altho Democrats, chafed under party control. Demos had gone astray and Thanh had gone astray especially trusting murderous Issaraks; King as father of people had to show them the way. He pointed with pride to fact he retained two Demo counselors in his cab.

D. Son Ngoc Thanh: King minimized role and force of Thanh: said Thanh was good man and friend. Claimed he supporting and housing Thanh’s wife and she had use Govt car. Also Pak Chheoun, Thanh’s demo supporter now in Cabinet, had Govt protection and sinecure at present time. I asked whether, so far as King was concerned, Thanh was free to return to fold. “I ask nothing better”, answered King. Thanh was not now attacking monarchy of King altho he had criticized King’s assumption of power as surrender to Fr. (King’s stand on Thanh surprising since mainspring of coup and reason Fr so applauded it was prospect outlawing Thanh categorically; proximate cause for coup was supposed be connivance between Thanh and Demos. King seems be playing down this theory, at least in explanation to Amer dipls. This leaves him with alternative indictment of Demos as incompetent and authoritarian but not anti-monarchical. Under this analysis, he obliged interpret Assy’s passivity as acceptance his guidance.)

E. Relations with Fr: King had abandoned none of his theses in debate with Fr. He had plan resolved dispute on judiciary, but important thing now is fight insecurity. Debate with Fr cld continue in due course. He had promised achieve real independence for country in three years. He recalls over two years ago he had told me of his policy with respect to Fr and his intention exert steady pressure for Cambodian objectives. He cld tell me frankly, that he still expected to gain concessions from Fr. He thought people understood this.

“After all, I am a Cambodian; I am not a Frenchman. But what can I do?” asked King. “Siam wants Battambang; the Viets flow over into our country and they also have large Camb minority in their country. In Camb our econ life is paralyzed by insecurity. Of course I must rely on Fr. Thanh says to people, ‘let us beat the Fr first; and then other problems cld be taken care of “. King claimed he knew, and people cld be convinced, that this was impossible.

Fr had not forced recent change in Govt. He had kept them informed and doubtless they had liked results.

King was particularly sensitive on subj of use Fr troops. He said he told Fr Govt change imminent and that they had “telephoned” Saigon for reinforcement. (He previously told Corcoran he asked for them.) He stressed fact that under Fr High Command, Cambodians occupied key posts in def of city of Phnom Penh and internal order in Camb. I forebore from asking why, then, Camb troops were not used.

Fr still did not trust Cambodians. De Raymond⁷ had promised to turn over to him protection and pacification of Battambang. Fr and Dio had reneged on this promise. He said that with US-equipped Cambodian troops he cld more quickly pacify Battambang than Fr cld. Battambang, like many frontier provinces in other countries, was the seat of particularly fierce nationalism. Population was afraid of Siamese and detested Fr. He hoped perhaps US wld influence Fr to let him try experiment. (I made no reply. He also wanted to participate directly in programming US milit aid.)

II. Risterucci’s views: Following talk with King, I asked Risterucci two questions:

(a) Did he believe that King’s interest wld be sustained and the experiment of personal govt continued, and

(b) What wld be effect of the Coup on disaffected elements, incl Democrats?

Risterucci said Fr concerned on first point. King so far seemed to be maintaining his interest. Monipong, Nhiek Tioulong and Chheoun were there to second him. King had shown courage because risking reputation of monarchy.

On second point Risterucci thought majority of people wld continue to follow King. Number of Democrats wld take up attentiste position and some 10 percent or 15 percent might actually go into open opposition, even to joining Maquis.

“How”, I asked, “cld King cooperate with Assy in present anomalous position?” Risterucci answered that under Camb constitution King really had ample power to govern by decree if he wished. Assy probably wld be chiefly useful on fiscal matters. Risterucci expressed admiration for qualities King had displayed. Altho Risterucci was prepared to go along with preceding govt a change was clearly necessary. Recited story Fr expedition against Thanh. When company officer arrived in village, Camb auth delayed reception while he notified presence of Fr troops to Thanh group in vicinity. He then recd Fr troops correctly but made no particular secret of warning to Thanh. (Risterucci has been in this country longer than I but I doubt if change of govt will soon prevent this kind of thing.)

Comment: I believe King entirely sincere, anxious for Amer good opinion, but on defensive on points on which conscience seems to hurt him particularly with respect to use of Fr troops.

In Camb as in Vietnam the installation of an authoritarian personal govt will have to be judged by results not only short term but long term.

King certainly influenced in action by Vietnam parallel, altho he has put more at stake than Bao Dai. Altho there will be some tautening of lines of conflict in Camb, I do not believe effect on dissidence of Thanh, Issaraks or VM will be early or great.

Gullion

1. This telegram was transmitted in three parts.
2. Jean Risterucci, French Commissioner in Cambodia.
3. Norodom Sondeth.
4. French Commissioner in Cambodia, 1951–1952.
5. Sisawath Monipong, uncle of King Norodom Sihanouk.
6. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, had visited Indochina during a tour of East Asian countries, from December 1949 to March 1950. For documentation on that mission, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, pp. 1 ff. and 690 ff.
7. Former French Commissioner in Cambodia; assassinated in October 1951.