Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 111: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

London, June 27, 1952—1 a.m.

Secto 19. Dept pass Pusan. Rptd info Paris 2530, Saigon 45, Pusan 8. At third bilateral conversation with UK held June 26² on Middle East Defense Organization, Indochina and Korea, Eden, Selwyn Lloyd,³ Strang,⁴ Dixon, Makins,⁵ Bowker⁶ and Hood⁷ were present for British and Secretary, Gifford, Jessup, Nash, Perkins, Nitze, Battle, Kirk-patrick and Palmer⁸ for US.

. . . . . . .

For Far East discussion Scott⁹ joined British group and Ring-walt¹⁰ US group.

B. Indochina—Eden opened conversations by anticipating, in tripartite discussions on same subject on 27th, Schuman may take familiar line little prospect for victory but only stalemate unless general settlement reached. According UK understanding, situation is improving; there is better govt, wide representation and active Viet participation. Eden said he wld talk with Schuman along these lines in, order stimulate his morale and attempt get him away from defeatist attitude.

Secretary said he had been talking with French along lines he and Eden had taken in Paris. Only avenue to success is building of native army and assumption by Vietnam of increasing share of financial and military burden. French have been informed US will increase military assistance to IC by $150 million. US also offered assist French in military training program although French not responsive this offer. It obvious Letourneau much encouraged as result Washington visit. (Jessup read summary Letourneau visit to Washington Deptel 2014, June 18 to Saigon.)

Secretary said French warned success in IC carries certain dangers increasing possibility of large-scale Chinese Commie intervention. This in turn leads to question, “how prevent this from happening?” It wld be advisable issue some sort of warning statement, public, private, specific or otherwise. But essential have general understanding as to action to be taken if warning unheeded. Perhaps US and UK (and preferably France, Australia and New Zealand) can reach tentative agreement on political policy which wld form framework for joint military planning. Major question is: What form cld retaliation take? Action only against approaches to IC wld be ineffective. In fact first problem might be evacuation of French. Air and naval action directed against Chinese Commies in IC likewise ineffective and US has no infantry available for operation within IC. US thinking is along lines blockade of coast and air action designed upset economy of China and lessen will to continue aggression. Action wld cease when aggression ceased and this wld be made clear to all Care shld be taken avoid action in areas of acute sensitivity to USSR. We cannot exclude fact, however, Chinese Commies have formidable air force and we may have to attack it wherever it is found. Soviets unlikely enter conflict if it understood no intention attempt overthrow by force Peiping regime. If Chinese Commies do invade IC with real power it will be a threat to the vital interests of all of us.

Eden said he saw no real objection to warning and recalled he had already issued public warning (in speech at Columbia University). Whatever is decided it is helpful to have Peiping know matter is being urgently considered.

Secretary repeated need basic political guidance on which military talks cld proceed. Eden said wld need consult Cabinet on basic policy noting naval blockade involving Hong Kong serious question.

Agreed Secretary and Eden wld discuss with Schuman along above lines.

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Acheson

1. Secretary Acheson was in London from June 23 to June 28 for talks with the Foreign Ministers of France and the United Kingdom on a wide range of issues.
2. For the pertinent portion of the U.S. summary minutes of this meeting, see volume xii.
3. British Minister of State.
4. Sir William Strang, Permanent Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
5. Sir Roger Makins, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
6. Sir Robert James Bowker, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
7. Viscount Samuel Hood, Head of Western Organisation Department, British Foreign Office.
8. Joseph Palmer, 2d, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy in the United Kingdom.
9. Robert Heatlie Scott, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
10. Arthur R. Ringwalt, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy in the United Kingdom.