751G.00/4–2454: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Department of State
niact
Dulte 1. Sent Paris 100; repeated information Department Dulte 1, London 64. Please pass following message to Mr. Eden Sunday morning.1 It is text of a letter which I had delivered to Bidault just before I left Paris.2 I have promised to give Eden a copy as soon as text was approved and delivered. Please tell Mr. Eden I do not plan to make this letter public.
Verbatim text.
My Dear Monsieur le President:3
Yesterday you showed me a message from General Navarre which suggested that the only alternative to his seeking a cease-fire in Indochina would be immediate and massive air support by the United States which General Navarre estimated could save Dien Bien Phu. This would involve active United States belligerency.
As I promised you, we have given this suggestion our most urgent consideration.
I must inform you that the situation as regards the United States belligerency in the area remains as I explained it to you last week when we conferred on April 14. War action under such circumstances [Page 1399] as now prevail should be preceded by a Congressional authorization. Such Congressional authorization is in no event obtainable within a matter of hours, nor in my opinion is it obtainable at all except within the framework of a political understanding which would embrace the other nations directly and vitally interested in Southeast Asia.
Our views in this respect were expressed in the joint communiqué which you and I issued on April 14, and so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, in the communiqué which was issued by Mr. Eden and myself the day preceding in London.
My government adheres to the understandings therein expressed.
Apart from the constitutional aspect of the matter, I have taken military advice, and the information which I received is that even the massive air attack which you proposed could not at this juncture assure the lifting of the seige of Dien Bien Phu.
I should add that in the opinion of our military advisers, there is no reason why the fall of Dien Bien Phu, should it fall, should be regarded as materially and vitally altering the military position in Indochina. Already the gallant defense of the defenders of Dien Bien Phu has cost the attackers so much in casualties and exhaustion of equipment that whatever the outcome, the balance from a purely military standpoint would remain favorable to the French Union. It is our belief that on the assumption, which we believe to be reasonable, that a collective defense can quickly be organized along the lines of the communiques referred to, the position in Indochina can be held by the collective action of the free nations having vital interests in the area. It is not apparent to us from any military reason why the fall of Dien Bien Phu should require a plea for a cease-fire which under present conditions would seriously impair the defensive possibilities of the area and gravely affect the morale of the governments of the Associated States and their adherents.
The issues of the hour are of the utmost gravity. So far as we are concerned, they evoke a determination to combine ever more closely and more vigorously with our trusted allies, among which we include France as the country with which, as stated in our communiqué of last week, we have cooperated in intimacy for nearly two centuries.
We believe that it is the nature of our nations to react vigorously to temporary setbacks and to surmount them. That can be done in relation to the present situation if our nations and people have the resolution and the will. We believe that you can count upon us, and we hope that we can count upon you.
Sincerely yours, Signed John Foster Dulles.
- On Saturday evening, Apr. 24, Foreign Secretary Eden flew from Paris to London to confer with Prime Minister Churchill and the Cabinet with respect to the question of intervention in Indochina. On the evening of Apr. 25, he flew from London to Geneva, stopping off briefly at Orly airport, Paris, to inform Foreign Minister Bidault of the British Government’s decisions. For Eden’s account of his discussions at London, Apr. 24–25, see Full Circle, pp. 116–119. In the absence of Eden from Paris, the text of the message from Dulles to Bidault contained in this telegram was passed by the U.S. Embassy to British officials to be relayed to Eden at Geneva on the evening of Apr. 25. (Telegram 122 from Paris to Geneva for Secretary Dulles, repeated to Washington and London, Apr. 25, 110.11 DU/4–2554) However, the message was actually delivered in London on the morning of the 25th. Telegram 38 from Ambassador Aldrich in London to the Secretary in Geneva transmitted at noon on the 25th (repeated to Washington and Paris) read as follows: “Message contained your telegram 64 April 24 (sent Paris 100 rptd Department Dulte 1) delivered this morning. Cabinet now meeting. Eden flies Geneva this afternoon.” (751G.00/4–2554)↩
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Telegram Dulte 13 from Paris, Apr. 24, 2 p.m., contained the text of the letter which Secretary of State Dulles proposed to send to Foreign Minister Bidault. The telegram which was transmitted for Acting Secretary Smith, eyes only, asked that he present his comments on the draft as soon as possible. (751G.00/4–2454)
In telegram Tedul 8 to Paris, Apr. 24, drafted by Bonbright of EUR and Scott of S/S, the Department recommended that the last sentence of the third paragraph end with the words “Southeast Asia” and that the parenthetical phrase “and which would include a clear intention to grant independence to the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia,” which followed in the Dulte 13 draft, be deleted. It was also suggested that the final sentence of the Dulte 13 draft, which read “I suggest that you bring this letter to the attention of President Laniel,” also be deleted. (751G.00/4–2454)
The above suggestions and certain drafting changes were incorporated into the final text, which appears here.
↩ - Former Premier Bidault was currently Minister of Foreign Affairs.↩