751G.00/4–2454: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
priority
2102. Sent Paris priority 705, Geneva priority 5. DeJean asked me to see him this morning to read his latest estimate of situation which he is telegraphing Paris today. DeJean’s telegram confirms loss [Page 1400] of point 1 in “Huguette” and indicates that situation at Dien Bien Phu is desperate, although valor of garrison is such that possibly it can be held for few days or even week longer. DeJean’s recommendation to his government is that only by outside intervention can battle be won. He bases this estimate on absence of effective French air power and reinforcements of land forces.
I told DeJean that most unfortunately last night General O’Daniel could not resist outlining his tactical plan for relief of Dien Bien Phu to General Navarre and had received, as was to be expected, polite, icy negative reply. (Cf.Embtel 2096 repeated Paris 699.)1
However, I felt that despite this fact, O’Daniel’s plan had military merit, particularly since it was predicated on using forces which would not weaken Cogny’s precarious strength in Tonkin Delta. I mentioned specifically withdrawal (possibly with US aid of transport according to O’Daniel’s recommendation) of battalions now doing rear duty in lower Laos and Operation Atlante. When DeJean demurred that to remove Groupe Mobile from Pleiku might endanger Dalat with consequent unfavorable political repercussions, I said that to lose Dalat in order win Dien Bien Phu was good bargain.
DeJean said that he was seeing Navarre this afternoon and despite fact that O’Daniel had received turn-down, would urge Navarre to take closer look at his plan. He said very privately and “speaking not as Commissioner Generale of France but as friend”, Navarre is emotionally deeply wrought up over Dien Bien Phu and thus is inclined to take on over-tragic view of picture there.
Indicating that he did not know his government’s attitude on internationalization of war so far as specific details were concerned, DeJean speculated that it might be possible for French to accept responsibility for ground forces if Americans took over air and naval aspects of conflict here. He likewise said, speaking privately, that he did not exclude possible use of South Korean divisions in this theatre although his government was firmly opposed to use of either Nationalist Chinese or Japanese troops. DeJean thought, when I asked what Chinese reaction would be, that government in Peking would think twice before engaging in general war with United States in view of complete vulnerability of all Chinese centers of population to American air attack.
I told DeJean that I had no indication of what Washington thought of recent French suggestions re internationalization of war. However, I wished to point out that we had Constitutional problems in connection with declaration of war, to say nothing of very proper respect our government paid to public opinion. I thought in this latter connection [Page 1401] that somehow to put UN aegis on any contemplated action might be helpful, although no one could expect Russians would miss second opportunity to sabotage UN action which they had missed in case of Korea.