Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

JCS files, CJCS files, 091 Indochina

Memorandum for the File by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)

[Paris,] 24 April 1954.

On arrival in Paris today, I was met at the airport by General Ely and we made an arrangement to meet at 1015 on Sunday morning.¹ At about 1830 today I received a request from General Ely to meet with him as soon as possible, preferably before Mr. Dulles left for Geneva. I was unable to meet him before 2040, and of course Mr. Dulles had departed for the airport at that time.

General Ely stated that he came to me as a representative of the French Government and as a consequence of a Cabinet Meeting today. I gathered that this was at the direction of Messrs. Pleven and Bidault, and that they had decided that Ely should come to me as a military man to talk to another military man on the situation as he saw it. He stated he came to ask for American intervention, well realizing that such intervention could have no direct bearing on the situation at Dien Bien Phu, but that the point which he wanted to stress was that in his opinion, and I gathered this was also the consensus of opinion of the Cabinet, American aid should be rendered before Dien Bien Phu fell for the psychological effect not only on opinion in France but also because of its effect on public opinion in Indo-China.

His personal and private opinion of the French Cabinet was that a few members were strong, and he named Messrs. Laniel, Bidault, Pleven, and at least by inference inferred that the balance of the Cabinet was weak. He said this was no time to criticize General Navarre for what he had done or not done. In answer to a question, he assured me that General Navarre had complete freedom of action in Indo-China and further stated that he, Ely, would back him up even if Navarre were to receive a court-martial later. In other words, he had to approve Navarre’s action up to this time.

While not specific, I felt that General Ely was in effect telling me that the consequences of a refusal on the part of the U.S. to render aid at a critical time could have very severe implications in regard to relationships between France and the United States.

He discussed how long Dien Bien Phu could hold out. I mentioned my latest information when I left Washington indicated 3 to 5 days in terms of food and ammunition. He said that was probably a little better now, that they had been able to drop more supplies and ammunition within the last 24 hours. However, he could not be very optimistic as to the number of days Dien Bien Phu could hold out. I asked him if it would be possible for General Navarre to drop troops south of Dien Bien Phu and possibly in sufficient numbers to influence favorably the situation there, and he said he did not think it would be possible. He kept stressing that Operation Vulture must be carried out regardless of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu and prior to the capitulation or loss of that position. When I asked him what Operation Vulture was, he said that it was the name of the operation given to U.S. air intervention, and was surprised that I had not heard about it before. He went on further to say that this indicated a lack of close contact between the Americans and the military in Indo-China which distressed him and he thought he would have to do something about that.

1. Apr. 25.