751G.00/6–1552: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (Gullion) to the Department of State
priority
2532. Rptd info Paris 795. Hanoi’s 525, June 10 recd June 13.
- 1.
- Installation of Tam Govt was disappointment to us as it was to Hanoi but we are perhaps less apprehensive of results. Sit too tightly controlled here for any radical deterioration and Tam may even carry thru some reforms Huu cld not complete. We agree with Hanoi, how ever, “that not to go forward is to go backward” and that without “active participation of population” which Tam is poorly placed to deliver, a mil solution seems illusory.
- 2.
- Altho we knew Bao Dai had Tam in mind, one might have expected that obvious prejudice against elevating police chief wld have discouraged appointment. Bad effect of nomination not lessened by manner in which what Tam himself calls “the coup” was carried out. We agree with Hanoi that presumption still stands against Tam. Our own estimate of it called for Tri Govt of Natl Union nominally headed by Bao Dai. Instead we got bogus coalition headed by one whom many people regard as Fr hatchetman. We counted as a point in Tam‘s favor his inclusion of seven northerners in his Cabinet, and his efforts to conciliate Tonkin. Now our Consul says that his name is anathema in the north and his rule may actually speed up VM recruitments. Cabinet while ostensibly representative of diff regions and various parties is actually uneasy amalgam, in which some Ministers do not officially rep parties whose labels they bear and are in a sense hostages.
- 3.
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In spite of this we find some bright spots in gloom which may fuse and grow: Cabinet may yet be welded into responsive unit (Dai Viets may come in, altho under pressure and for mixed motives); Binh is apparently left in Tonkin with better assurances of free hand and definite budget.
Whether is sincere or not, Tam has program of land reforms and popular consultation which once instituted may escape founder’s clutches and grow into something transcending police govt. In executing his program he will not be hampered by opposition from Fr, from Bao Dai and within Cabinet as Huu was, and he can get things done. Tam has convinced a number of influential observers incl Brit Min that he knows how to fight VM.
- 4.
- Test will come when Tam meets opposition. It will then be seen whether old tiger has changed his stripes. I am not so sure that he will “last only two or three months” since he now has behind him the army, Fr and Bao Dai. I do not subscribe to theory that Bao Dai [Page 189] appointed Tam only to get rid of him. This seems to me to be apologetic for Bao Dai or wishful thinking. Nor have I encountered here any Frenchmen who decry his appointment as some have done in Tonkin.
- 5.
- It seems to me that Tam‘s rise was bound to occur in this peculiar polity in which police power paramount; Consul Sturm‘s strictures and doubts shld really lie against system. Was doubtful from outset if Tri or other outstanding anti-Commie natls wld have accepted Bao Dai‘s call while Viet position in Fr Union is as defined in 1946 and Franco—Viet relations remain what they are. Nor wld Bao Dai stake his prestige and his job on platform of any particular Cabinet.
- 6.
- Under the present Franco—Bao Dai regime it difficult for any new men to acquire reputation before public and Cabinet makers. Nevertheless, we in Saigon do not believe that Fr directly intervened to put Tam in power, altho they have long wanted to drop PM–Huu. The most plausible explanation we have heard is from Giao. He says Fr insisted Tam be retained in govt altho not necessarily as Prime Minister. Nguyen De was Fr spokesman. Tri refused to form Govt not because Tam in it, but because De insisted that key posts of Defense, Security and Interior be shared among Fr candidates Tam and Nghiem Tri.