Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/6–1452

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] June 14, 1952.

Subject:

• Briefing Paper for the Secretary’s Meeting with M. Letourneau, 9:30 a.m., Monday, June 16, 1952.²

Minister Letourneau will call on you Monday morning, June 16 at 9:30 a.m. He will be accompanied by Messrs. Bruce, Allison, Lacy and Minister Heath. After his call, which is scheduled for a maximum of one-half hour, he will proceed directly to the first of a series of talks on Indochina to be participated in by Letourneau, members of his staff, officials of the Department and other U.S. Government agencies.³

Background:

Minister Letourneau has come to Washington at the Department’s invitation in order to:

(1) Discuss the possibility of obtaining additional U.S. aid to Indochina;

(2) Lay the ground work for the tripartite politico—military conversations in connection with the possible “warning” to the Peiping regime, as proposed by you in Paris;

(3) Engage in a general review of Indochina questions with the appropriate U.S. civilian and military authorities.

French Position:

Letourneau has come prepared to make a strong plea for additional U.S. aid to enable the French to carry out their commitments in Indochina. We may expect his presentation to be forceful and well documented. It will probably include requests for additional dollar aid for the calendar year 1952 as well as calendar year 1953. He has undoubtedly come prepared to suggest a specific manner in which the aid may be provided. The questions of hard goods, soft goods, offshore procurement, troop pay, franc-piastre relationship, etc., are being studied in advance by the experts in Letourneau‘s party and the Department’s officials. Letourneau may or may not be prepared to give guarantees of increased overall military effort if the aid is provided. This would of course be primarily concerned with the development of the National Armies of the Associated States which development is largely predicated on the availability of French training cadres. He may state that unless some definite relief is promised to France she will not be able to maintain her present effort on a scale sufficiently effective to hold the line against the Viet Minh, even as presently constituted, much less in the event of a Chinese Communist invasion. In one or two preliminary conversations with Embassy Paris Letourneau indicated that he would suggest that tripartite political discussions proposed in Paris be held either in London or Paris in late June during your next trip.⁴ He will probably also suggest that the military conversations follow immediately thereafter at a place to be designated. (We have been thinking of Washington.)

Letourneau may suggest that as it is agreed that neither France nor the U.S. can provide additional ground forces for Indochina and the Associated States National Armies will not be prepared for some time to carry the burden without outside aid the possibility of bringing other allied troops, notably Australian or New Zealand, into service in Indochina be investigated.

Letourneau may suggest that the tripartite body which takes part in political talks on Indochina, presumably in London in late June, be reconvoked from time to time to review political aspects of the Indochina scene. Similarly, that a tripartite group be established to review military aspects from time to time. The military group might sit in Honolulu, Singapore, or Saigon.

There is considerable advance information on the French position to be expected in dealing with detailed questions to be covered during the Indochina political conversations with Letourneau in the Department. It is not believed that Letourneau will bring up any of these relatively minor details during the course of his preliminary call on you.

U.S. Position:

The complicated question of aid to France and the Associated States is being actively considered by the Department’s own financial specialists, Lincoln Gordon of DMS⁵ and other specialists from the Treasury and MSA. A detailed position paper on aid has been prepared by EUR and has been cleared through the Mutual Aid Advisory Committee.⁶ It is understood that whatever aid is discussed must be identified with the national armies to the largest extent possible. The French have given us to understand that they agree in this policy. The question of timing will enter in actively. We have reason to think that the French will request some aid for their calendar year 1952 in spite of the Lisbon agreements. The question of coordinating U.S. fiscal year appropriations with French calendar year needs has been taken into account.

Insofar as aid in calendar year 1952 is concerned it should be pointed out that this is a most difficult problem because it represents commitments in this French fiscal year over and above those reached at Lisbon but that the French problem in calendar 1952 will of course receive most careful consideration. The figure of $150 million is being tentatively set as maximum additional assistance figure for Indochina from 1953 funds. The exact relationship of this additional amount to overall aid for France and the make up and size thereof will be determined in connection with the NATO annual review.

Regarding the tripartite politico-military conversations, it is now proposed that you will agree to undertake the political portion of these conversations in London during your forthcoming trip and that the French will be invited to come to London for that purpose. It is also hoped that by the time the political portion of the tripartite conversations will be taking place in London we will be in a position to undertake the military portion of the conversations in Washington shortly thereafter. NSC 124 on Southeast Asia, now in draft before the Steering Committee of the Senior Staff of the NSC, deals specifically with our position on such questions as the U.S. participation in any defensive or retaliatory action to be taken following a Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia, possible action against China proper, naval blockade, etc. If, as is hoped, NSC 124 clears the senior staff in time it might be possible for you in London to agree to hold the military portion of the tripartite conversations in Washington some time during the summer This would, of course, require clearance of the JCS and Defense.⁷

For purposes of this paper there is no need to burden you with a detailed presentation of our position on the various political questions concerning Indochina to be covered during the Letourneau talks. In general the Department’s purpose is to go over outstanding questions point by point with Letourneau and his staff with a view to increasing our mutual understanding of each others views and objectives. It is the Department’s purpose to further the U.S. position in all matters as far as we dare without jeopardizing the basic consideration that the French must be encouraged to continue to carry their primary responsibility in Indochina and be dissuaded from arriving at a decision that the Indochina burden is too great for them to continue to carry and the wisest course open to them in view of their other commitments is withdrawal.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you make the following paints with Letourneau:

(1) As you stated in the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Paris the United States regards the French effort in Indochina as part of the struggle of the free world against communism and, therefore, is in the interest of the entire free world rather than in purely the French interest. The realization of this fact is shared by the American people as a whole. On the day of M. Letourneau‘s arrival in New York the “New York Times” stated editorially:

“The French are holding on in Indochina grimly and bravely … It should also be clear now to all Americans that France is holding a front-line sector of great importance to the whole free world as well as to herself … M. Letourneau can be assured of a sympathetic hearing in New York and Washington.”⁸

The United States is anxious to help as is witnessed by M. Letourneau‘s presence here. We feel that this can best be done by a full and completely frank exchange of ideas. Let us talk as allies, in full appreciation of our common burden.

(2) Financial—Technical aspects of financial aid are already under study of our respective staffs. They will be worked out during the talks. Our purpose is to identify, to the extent possible, whatever additional aid may be given with the national armies. The development of these indigenous forces represents the best possibility of a solution of the Indochina problem.

(3) Tripartite Conversations—We are agreed to holding the political portion of the tripartite talks in London the last week in June. Our answer regarding the military portion of the talks will be forthcoming in London when we hope to be able to give a definite reply. No mention should be made to Letourneau of prior US–UK talks. You should advise Letourneau that the subject of the tripartite conversations and warning to China generally should not be discussed in the meetings to be held in the Department and Pentagon.

(4) Australian Troops in Indochina—We are opposed to the suggestion that Australian or other foreign troops other than French Union troops, be brought into active service in Indochina except after a Chinese aggression and even then preferably under UN auspices.

(5) Permanent Tripartite Political and Military Committees—We will actively consider the Minister’s suggestion in this matter and be prepared to reply in London.

(6) Internal Political Questions in the Associated States—We are under increasing obligation to the U.S. Government and people to account for our relatively large participation in the Indochina struggle in all forms but manpower. The fact that the U.S. financial contribution to the Indochina struggle accounts for more than one-third of the total cost, huge as France’s contribution is, coupled with the acknowledged international aspect of the Indochina war permits us to offer suggestions which we hope will be accepted in the friendly cooperative spirit in which they are offered.

We trust furthermore that the discussions of internal political questions in the Associated States with officials of the Department will be mutually profitable. We stand ready to lend our aid not only in the form of goods and financial assistance but in actual services. We will welcome the Minister’s suggestions in such matters as how the services of our MAAG and STEM Missions in Saigon may be improved and how we might help in training the national armies.

1. Drafted by William M. Gibson, Deputy Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs.
2. Additional background and position papers drafted for the conversations with Letourneau are located in Conference files, lot 59D 95, CF 114.
3. No record of Secretary Acheson‘s brief meeting with Letourneau on the morning of June 16 has been found in Department of State files. For extracts from the summary minutes of the subsequent meetings between Letourneau and officials of the Department of State and other government agencies, June 16 and 17, see pp. 189 and 197.
4. The Secretary of State left Washington on June 22 and arrived in London on June 23 for talks with the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France on a wide range of issues. After leaving London on June 28, he proceeded to Berlin, Vienna, and Rio de Janeiro, arriving back in Washington on July 9. Acheson‘s conversations at London concerning Indochina are summarized in telegrams Secto 19 and Secto 27, June 27, pp. 210 and 212. For additional documentation on Acheson‘s trip, see volume V.
5. Assistant Director for Policy and Planning, Mutual Security Agency.
6. Reference is to position paper LET D–1/1, “Aid Aspects of Letourneau Talks,” June 14, 1952, not printed. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 114) For documentation on the operations of the interdepartmental Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee, see volume i.
7. Regarding NSC 124/2, approved on June 25, see editorial note, p. 208. For additional documentation on tripartite military conversations and the deliberations of the National Security Council with regard to the defense of Southeast Asia, see volume xii.
8. The New York Times, June 11, 1952. Ellipses in the source text.