Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 114

United States Summary Minutes of a Meeting Between Representatives of the United States and France at the Department of State, June 16, 1952, 10 a.m.¹

top secret
LET M—1a

Washington, June 16, 1952, 10 a.m. to 1:45 p.m.

Present

• Department of State
  • Mr. Allison FE
  • Minister Heath
  • Messrs. Lacy PSA
  • Bonsal PSA
  • Byington WE²
  • Stelle S/P
  • Knight WE
  • Gibson PSA
  • Price S/MSA
  • Hoey PSA
  • McBride WE
  • Beigel WE
  • Van Hollen S/S—S
• Department of Defense
  • Mr. Noyes
  • Col. Edwards
  • Major Mitchell
• Department of the Treasury
  • Mr. Wood
• Office of the Director for Mutual Security
  • Gen. Roberts³
  • Mr. Tannenwald⁴
  • Mr. Paul⁵
• Mutual Security Agency
  • Mr. Lane⁶
  • Mr. David Gordon⁷
• French
  • Mr. Letourneau
  • Ambassador Bonnet⁸
  • Messrs. Daridan, Minister-Counselor, French Embassy Washington
  • Tezenas du Montcel, General-Director Min. of Associated States
  • Raymond Offroy, Diplomatic Counselor
  • Pierre Millet, Counselor, French Embassy Washington Schweitzer, Financial Attaché, French Embassy Washington
  • Col. de Brebisson, Chief of Mil. Cab. Min. of Associated States
  • Col. Mazeau, Dir. of Mil. Affairs, Min. of Associated States
  • Col. Brohon, Standing Group

[Here follows the first portion of a general exposition by Letourneau on existing political and military conditions in Indochina. His remarks included discussion of the following subjects: recent military developments; the military operation at Hoa Binh; the status of the national armies of the Associated States; political conditions in Vietnam; the dismissal of the Tran Van Huu government; the new government of Nguyen Van Tam; the role of Bao Dai; political conditions in Laos; and political conditions in Cambodia. Letourneau then turned to general French policy.]

General French policy toward Indochina

What is the policy of France toward Indochina? We are certain that under present conditions it is impossible to arrive at a military decision with the Viet Minh since we are afraid that a pending defeat of the Viet Minh forces would bring about the intervention of the Chinese Communists, who would be certain to make every effort to prevent such a defeat. It would be a simple matter if this were only a contest between Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai. Ho Chi Minh hates the Chinese Communists and knows that as a member of a Soviet satellite, he will have less independence than if he were aligned with the Western Powers. He also realizes that he is a strong man personally and that acting alone he might be able to reach an agreement with Bao Dai. Yet, because Ho Chi Minh is not a free agent, there will be no opportunity to reach a military agreement. He is part of the Russian system, therefore, settlement will not be obtained.

The French aim is to protect the independence and the freedom of the Associated States, so it is only logical that the three states should shoulder the main burden of the fight. An indication that they are assuming increasing responsibilities is seen in the fact that whereas in 1946, 88 percent of the casualities were French and only 9 percent were native troops, to date in 1952, the French have sustained 17 percent of the casualties as against 52 percent for the native forces (other losses have been sustained by supplementary troops not considered part of either the French or native forces). The West must maintain its resistance to Communism in Indochina but, at the same time, must work to strengthen the three countries. There are two reasons for this. First, having turned over the administration to the native governments, we are unable by ourselves to bring about pacification of the country or to ensure the destruction of Viet Minh. Yet, without strong local administration we cannot guarantee that the enemy forces will not make a comeback. Secondly, when we arrive at the possibility of a peace settlement, we must on that date have strong governments since, as military support is withdrawn, the three countries left alone must be strong enough to prevent anarchy. Therefore, all our efforts, political, economic and military, are directed toward the strengthening of those governments so that when the war is over, it will be possible for them to take complete charge. When this occurs, we do not expect to retain forces in Indochina other than those of the same type which the U.S. has in the Philippines.

Difficulties are experienced in attempting to transfer power to the three governments because of the national jealousies involved. For example, Cambodia and Laos point out that by giving complete control of the trade through the port of Saigon to Vietnam, that country is placed in a position to suffocate the other two. Laos and Cambodia are small countries in terms of population and unless we intend to protect their interests, it is quite likely that they will turn toward Siam and, as a result, our problems will continue. Still, we are making efforts to provide a system which will enable the three governments to live together, and one example of our progress is seen in the national banking system recently established. It seems certain that a tripartite or quadripartite system is the most advantageous we have discovered, but we are certainly willing to adopt new plans if the present ones, upon application, seem ineffective.

As was explained to Mr. Acheson this morning, the crucial problem is French public opinion. Gen. De Lattre had stated that we are not fighting for French interests but for the Free World. Therefore, people at home ask: “Why send only French soldiers to fight in Indochina? If others are unwilling to go, why should we maintain our effort?” We have our major problem in Europe and we cannot maintain strong efforts in both areas. It would be advantageous for the French people to know the degree to which America is assisting us in Indochina. We can explain that we do not want U.S. and U.K. soldiers in Indochina under present conditions because their presence would bring in the so-called volunteers.

The U.S. [French] objective in Indochina is to bring forward the three states of Indochina to a point where they can stand alone. However, from a financial point of view, we will face difficulties with French public opinion if it is known that our commitments in Indochina do not permit us to exert ourselves fully in Europe.

Questions posed by Mr. Allison

Mr. Allison stated that he wished to reiterate what Secretary Acheson had said recently in Paris, namely, that the Indochina undertaking was a common enterprise. In the Far East there are three areas where there is shooting trouble at the present time—Korea, Indochina and Malaya, and in each of these places the U.S., the British and the French are playing a part. The U.S. has primary responsibility for the effort in Korea, the British have it in Malaya and you, of course, have it in Indochina. However, it is all recognized as one fight against Communism and the U.S. desires to play its part with you as a partner. U.S. objectives were the same as French in that we were determined to bring forward the three states to the position where they could stand alone. The problem of public opinion in the U.S. was similar to that in France since we have to convince people and our Congress that the effort they are making in both money and matériel will someday come to a successful fruition. Mr. Allison agreed that the Indochina problem cannot be solved by force of arms alone, and that we were also interested in speeding up the process of self-government. The people of the three Associated States must feel that their governments are doing something for them and that these governments are their governments. He further agreed that the most useful immediate effort would be that directed toward the buildup of the National Armies, although it was recognized that this policy was somewhat slow, one of the bottlenecks being the lack of training facilities.

Recently the Secretary of Defense of the Philippines visited the U.S. and presented a very inspiring talk about how that country had worked out the guerilla problem and the Communist problem. It would, perhaps, be possible for both France and the -U.S. to utilize his suggestions on the conduct of training for guerilla warfare. Stating that Mr. Letourneau in his foregoing discussion had already answered a number of questions which the U.S. had in mind, Mr. Allison went on to specify several points on which the U.S. desired to head the French viewpoint: (1) While the U.S. recognizes the need for quadripartite controls, we feel that the continuance of this problem keeps the fence-sitters on the fence and would, therefore, like to receive from the French their ideas regarding possible modification of the controls and, possibly, eventual decrease in French participation; (2) in this connection, some concern was felt because of the present provision requiring the High Commissioner to approve those Associated States ordinances affecting French commercial concerns; (3) the U.S. was also somewhat disturbed by the Trans-Bassac and Cambodian rice blockades; (4) finally, although we recognize that what the French were doing in Indochina was in the common interest, we questioned whether it was wholly consistent to retain the commercial benefits of French firms in Indochina, especially when the economic situation in that country might be benefited through increasing its trade with other areas in Asia, such as Japan.

Mr. Letourneau’s replys

Modification of Existing Agreements—In reply to these questions Mr. Letourneau stated that the only agreement which had been approved by the French Parliament was that of March 8, 1949, relating to Vietnam and the two similar ones relating to Cambodia and Laos. He had been reluctant to ask the French Parliament to approve all the detailed conventions which had been worked out subsequently between France and the three countries because of the practical difficulties involved in submitting such conventions to the Parliament. Through daily negotiations, it had been possible to modify many of the terms of the agreements, particularly since the general agreement of March 8 was written in broad terms which were subject to liberal interpretation. The French place an important consideration on legal textspeople often state that the French are jurists, and they are, which makes it difficult to discuss such issues with the Parliament.

The agreement of March 8, as it related to external independence provided that the states were entitled to appoint Envoys in only three foreign capitals. But as a practical matter, they are now able to send envoys wherever they wish. This is an example how the agreements have been interpreted. Undoubtedly, a number of difficulties still remain, not with regard to the general agreement itself, but rather with the detailed conventions signed afterwards, but daily effort is being made to modify the points in disagreement.

There is no parliament in Vietnam to ratify the agreement and, therefore, the French Parliament will point out that while it could ratify for France, no one would be able to ratify for the other side. For the present with French public opinion what it is, it will be hard to modify the legal text, and a simpler solution would be to accept a liberal interpretation of the agreements rather than to tamper with their legal basis. Mr. Letourneau emphasized that he had requested Bao Dai to specify those restrictions which prevented him from acting as a free agent and to give him a list of such limitations, but Bao Dai had not done so because there were no restrictions. At the present time, since modification to the March 8 agreement would face difficulty before the French Parliament, it was possible to give much greater satisfaction to the local governments through interpretation.

Approval by High Commissioners of Local Legislation—At the time the agreements were established, it was understood that there would be a separate judicial system with special courts for French and Chinese citizens. France would not permit such separate courts for the Chinese unless she, herself, received similar rights. It was acknowledged for example, that the High Commissioner’s involvement in the decisions of a local mayor to create a one-way street was quite ridiculous, but efforts were being made to find a more intelligent solution to such problems. However taxes must be watched since French taxpayers were bearing 70 percent of the tax burden in Vietnam.

Degree of French Authority—France had no authority over the internal affairs of the three governments—none over taxes, public works, police, post office affairs, etc. The only matters in which she had a direct interest were those relating to the military endeavors such as air force matters and the operation of the port of Saigon. Mr. Letourneau said he would be pleased if the Vietnamese would point out the areas of their discontent with continued French authority, and reiterated that there was nothing in the agreements with the three countries which interfered with the independence of those states except the lack of good will of the governments themselves to work together. It was very easy, but quite fallacious, for some to say that if the agreements were modified, the Indochinese would become a great people.

Trans-Bassac and Cambodian Blockades—When Mr. Letourneau was in Saigon two months ago, the Vietnam Government had been directed to cease the rice blockade but had requested that it not be called upon to do this immediately since steps had to be worked out to control the circulation of the rice. This matter was now entirely in the hands of the Vietnam Government.

Preferential French Trade Agreements—Mr. Letourneau pointed out that while it was necessary to protect the interests of French in Indochina at the same time, one had to recognize that there were certain commercial and geographic necessities which could not be avoided. Indochinese trade with Japan was a matter stressed by the U.S. and, while it was true that before the war much trade existed between Japan and Indochina, the immediate problem was that of economic instability. The agreement with Indochina states that the governments are free to negotiate with other countries and the government of France does not have the authority to prevent such trade agreements. Products like coal, phosphate, and salt need to find outlets in Japan, and France would not interfere with the normal interchange between the countries of Asia. However, if certain of the present trade agreements were broken, there would be two results in France: (1) an effect on the financing of the war effort and (2) an adverse psychological effect. When conditions become more stable, it will be possible to arrive at a compromise which will enable France to maintain her present trade relationship but, at the same time, would not make it difficult to provide trade between complementary economic interests in Asia. Vietnam knows that if Japan gains economic control, it will also gain political control and, therefore, that country will exercise prudence in an effort to gain trade but escape control. Indochina is not a game preserve.

Time of next meeting

In view of the future day’s schedule of Mr. Letourneau, it was agreed that the group would reconvene one-half hour earlier—at 9:30 a.m.—on Tuesday,⁹ in order to take up the additional questions which the U.S. delegation desired to ask Mr. Letourneau. Following this there would be the regular scheduled discussion on aid questions.

1. This record of proceedings was circulated as document LET M–1a, June 20. Verbatim minutes of this meeting are located in files 751G.00/6–1652 and 751G.00/6–2352. The session ran from 10 a.m. to 1:45 p.m. For additional information on the proceedings. including a summary of portions not covered by the extracts printed here, see telegram 2014 to Saigon, June 20, p. 204.
2. Homer M. Byloton, Jr., Director of the Office of Western European Affairs.
3. Brig. Gen. Frank N. Roberts, Military Adviser, Office of the Director for Mutual Security.
4. Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., Assistant Director and Chief of Staff, Office of the Director for Mutual Security.
5. Norman Paul, Asian, African, and Latin American Program Officer, Office of the Director for Mutual Security.
6. Clayton Lane, Director, Far East Program Division, Mutual Security Agency.
7. David L. Gordon, Director, European Program Division, Mutual Security Agency.
8. Henri Bonnet, Ambassador of France in the United States.
9. June 17.