751G.00/4–2454: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Department of State
niact
Dulte 15. Repeated information Geneva 111. Eyes only for the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. Please pass following information to the President:1
“Eden, Bidault and I met this afternoon at 4:30 with only one adviser each present. I opened discussion by saying that it was of utmost importance to know views of French Government re Indochina. In particular, should Dien Bien Phu fall, what would be position of French Government?
“Bidault replied that he and Laniel would certainly wish to continue the fight. However, loss of Dien Bien Phu would be event of tremendous symbolic importance with most adverse psychological reaction. Furthermore it would be a real military setback since while the actual number of French effectives at Dien Bien Phu was a relatively small percentage of the French Expeditionary Forces, the units engaged there were the very best available in Indochina. The French had made a calculated risk in sending their best units and reserves from the Tonkin Delta to Dien Bien Phu. The result was that the defenses of the Delta were seriously weakened. If Dien Bien Phu fell and the Viet Minh could concentrate against the Delta, the situation in the Delta would be very difficult. Furthermore, loss of Dien Bien Phu would have a very bad effect on the morale of the French Union Forces. In answer to my questions, he said he would do his best; but in all honesty and frankness he could not guarantee what position the government would take if Dien Bien Phu falls.
[Page 1392]“Bidault said that he had expected to have a very bad time at the Cabinet meeting this morning, but contrary to his expectations it went off relatively well and he at least goes to Geneva with a relatively free hand without crippling instructions.
“I referred to the message from Navarre which he showed me yesterday (Dulte 7)2 and said that Pleven had told me last night that the cease fire which Navarre envisaged in his letter covered all of Indochina and not just Dien Bien Phil. Bidault said that this interpretation was correct. He then said that morale of the Vietnamese was falling. He personally felt Dien Bien Phu had been a mistake. The French had held on to it for political reasons connected with the protection of the invasion routes to Laos and Cambodia, rather than for solid military reasons. It was always a mistake to base a military campaign on political considerations.
“I asked Bidault point blank whether there would be a cease fire before Geneva. Bidault replied emphatically that there would not be a cease fire before Geneva and said again that he goes there with his hands relatively free.
“Eden then said he wished to refer to the communiqué issued during my London visit last week.3 The UK does not feel committed by communique to intervene in Indochina war. He wanted no misunderstanding on this. He said to Bidault that if the French request the UK to take some action with respect to Indochina, that that was quite a different matter, and he would be glad to refer the request back to London, or even take it back himself if this were necessary. He was not suggesting that the French make such a request, in fact he thought it would be a mistake but if they did, he would put it immediately to the British Government.
“Bidault said France is war weary after 7 years’ effort in Indochina. US has been very helpful in providing money and matériel but if Dien Bien Phu falls the outlook is very somber. He would not say it was hopeless, but the effect of such a defeat on Parliamentary and public opinion would be very great and could lead to almost anything. Bidault made no specific reply to Eden’s suggestions and put forth no specific request against the UK. He simply said that he was not proud and that anything that could be done to assist the Expeditionary Forces in Indochina or strengthen them would be appreciated.
“I then referred again to Navarre’s message of yesterday which suggested that only alternative to a cease fire would be immediate and massive US air support. I said I had put down in the form of a draft letter to him the kind of a reply I would make. I had sent the draft to Washington but on a personal basis would like him to see it. Specifically I would like to know whether in his opinion such a letter from me would help him and strengthen his hand. It was of course still just a draft and subject to Washington’s views, and if he had suggestions for modifications, I would also be glad to entertain them.4
[Page 1393]“Bidault read the draft and said that his initial reaction was that there might be modifications in one or two of the paragraphs. He reflected further and finally said that if Washington approved the draft, he would not suggest any modification and it was quite all right to send it to him. Perhaps it would be useful at some stage.
“I then asked Bidault whether the joint communiqué we issued in Paris last week on united action5 still stood. He replied that it certainly did and he also quite understood the fact that the UK was not bound to intervene in the Indochina war as a result of the London communiqué.
“Although Bidault was obviously tired, he appeared to have regained full control of himself. As a result of the above conversation, it would also seem that we will at least enter the Geneva conference without the French Government definitely committed to some disastrous course of action. I am under no illusions that this situation could not change over night when Dien Bien Phu falls. However, I feel that Bidault has stiffened considerably and unless his present mood undergoes change, I believe he may endeavor to limit the effects of the loss of Dien Bien Phu.
“Foster Dulles.”
In telegram Dulte 11 from Paris, Apr. 24, 1 p.m., Secretary Dulles had instructed Acting Secretary Smith to inform the President that “situation here is evolving so rapidly that any considered estimate is impossible at the moment.” Dulles stated that he would be in a better position to make an assessment after learning the results of the French Cabinet meeting that morning and after his afternoon meeting with Bidault and Eden. (740.5/4–2454)
In Dulte 19 from Paris, Apr. 24, 11 p.m., Dulles informed Smith that during the afternoon meeting, Bidault had passed him a message indicating that the French Cabinet that day had ordered the garrison of Dien Bien Phu to hold out until its ammunition was exhausted, which probably meant that Apr. 26 would be the decisive day. (751G.00/4–2454)
↩- Dated Apr. 23, p. 1374.↩
- For the pertinent portion of the communiqué, see telegram Secto 2 from London, Apr. 13, p. 1321.↩
- For the text of the letter sent by Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Minister Bidault prior to the Secretary’s departure for Geneva on the evening of Apr. 24, see telegram Dulte 1 from Geneva, Apr. 24, p. 1398.↩
- For text of the communiqué, see footnote 3, p. 1336.↩