Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/4–2654

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)¹

top secret

[Paris,] 26 April 1954.

Participants:

• The Secretary of State
• Admiral Radford
• Livingston T. Merchant
• Mr. Eden
• Sir Harold Caccia²
• Mr. C. A. E. Shuckburgh

Place: Paris

Date: 24 April 1954.

Mr. Eden met with the Secretary of State by pre-arrangement at the Residence at about 3:45 this afternoon for about 35 minutes. The other participants listed above were present throughout.

The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that there appeared to be no chance of keeping the French fighting in Indochina unless they know that the British and the United States were going to be in there with them. He referred to the request made by the French for massive United States air intervention at Dien-Bien-Phu. He went on to say it was impossible constitutionally to do this under existing circumstances, and that in any event Admiral Radford doubted that it would be successful in the sense of preventing the fall of Dien-Bien-Phu.

The Secretary then read almost in toto the message we had received of Navarre’s talk with our people (Saigon’s 701 to Paris of April 24).³ It thus appeared that Dien-Bien-Phu was likely to fall within three or four days. The Secretary concluded by saying that if the British would go along with us the President was then prepared to seek Congressional approval for intervention by the United States with its Armed Forces in Indochina, but that an essential element in securing such approval would be the fact that it was firmly based on joint action.

Mr. Eden asked exactly what it was we had in mind the British doing.

Admiral Radford replied that we had in mind some prompt military contribution in Indochina.

Mr. Eden asked if by this we meant troops—to which Admiral Radford answered that probably the best immediate contribution would be RAF squadrons from Malaya or Hong Kong where at the moment he understood the British now had a carrier, which fact Mr. Eden confirmed.

Mr. Eden then inquired whether we believe that such air intervention would really help. He also said that the French had been talking to them in terms different from those which they had apparently used in talking to us. He said that the French had told him that even though the situation at Dien-Bien-Phu was bad they intended to carry on.

Admiral Radford said that he was concerned over the situation which would develop in Vietnam if Dien-Bien-Phu falls. He had in mind the serious risk of growing defections on the part of Vietnamese troops and the development of riots which would lead to the possible massacre of French civilians as well as a most serious situation for isolated French military units throughout the country.

Mr. Eden then said that they were our Allies with all that this implied; that he would consider what he had been told urgently and that he was inclined to think that he should go back to London that evening to consult with the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff. He added, however, that he did not think that air intervention would alter the situation.

Admiral Radford rejoined that naturally this could not be guaranteed. He felt, however, that it would have a very great psychological effect on the Vietnamese and would prevent their collapsing and turning on the French. He felt the very announcement of our intention to intervene would stabilize the situation. Admiral Radford added that it would be necessary, in order to restore the general situation, to have General Navarre relieved and for the United States to have a considerable voice in the conduct of the war which, however, could be exercised from behind the scenes.

Mr. Eden then inquired what our estimate was of the effect on world opinion and particularly on the Chinese Communists of military intervention.

Admiral Radford answered that he had never thought that the Chinese Communists would intervene if we went into Indochina. In any event he felt their capability for intervention was very low. He said he doubted that there were any Chinese Communist troops now in Indochina and that it would be difficult to introduce them in large numbers. He said there might be some limited air action by the Chinese Communists over Indochina but that this could be dealt with.

Mr. Eden then inquired if we believed the Vietnamese would feel better if we arrived, and the Admiral replied “definitely”.

The Secretary said that that morning Bao Dai had said that if the French quit he hoped that the United States would help and that there would be no animosity towards them. The Secretary then said that he had covered one phase of the problem that he wanted to discuss and that he would now turn to the alternatives that he and Eden had tentatively agreed on for prompt military talks in Washington designed to limit the loss of Indochina. He said that our military authorities say that if Indochina goes, the only effective deterrent measures open to us would be those directed at Communist China itself. He did not feel that local action alone would produce success but that our military were thinking in terms of a blockade of the China coast, the seizure of Hainan and other measures. It might be possible, he added, to hold at the Kra line.

Admiral Radford added that the type of attack by the Communists against the other countries of Southeast Asia would not be the type which were militarily defensible. We could expect, for example, the formation of a “free Thai” state under Communist control from the confederation of Thai tribes which would result in civil war in Siam. He said that we further could expect an intensification of the guerrilla action in Malaya. The Admiral concluded by saying that no military front would be possible, and hence, it would be necessary to go after the source by offensive action against China. Finally he said that there is a tremendous compulsion on the part of Asians to be on the winning side.

Mr. Eden observed that there was a Soviet-Chinese alliance.

Admiral Radford said that he did not think the Soviets would start a world war now. He believed that they would only go to war at a time of their own choosing and that they could not be provoked into a war. Obviously, however, he said this risk must be taken into account, but that the acceptance of risks is necessary in order to avoid being nibbled to death.

In Indochina, the Admiral said, the political aspects were confused with the military situation. A large part of the political deterioration locally arises from the loss of confidence in Vietnam in French military leadership in the field. He pointed out that the French forces are scattered all over the country and could be massacred if the native peoples rose against them. Dien-Bien-Phu, he said, has been built up by the French in public opinion as a major battle. Actually only 5% of the French Union Forces are engaged in that battle though it is true that a far higher percentage of their best forces are in the fortress.

Mr. Eden asked if we were to go in there with air power, might not the Vietnamese rise against us as well as the French.

Admiral Radford indicated that he did not think this was a serious risk. He said that he had been very close to this situation for three years; that the French leadership had been terrible and [was?] obvious to all; that the situation has been steadily sliding down hill for three years and Paris cannot escape its share of the responsibility. Mr. Eden then interjected that the situation was entirely different in Malaya and that in any event the British would fight for it.

The Admiral stated that what could be expected was no immediate overt move against Malaya but a step up in subversive operations.

At this point the Secretary noted that the Communists do not feel it necessary to do everything immediately. They have a sense of history and a confidence that time is on their side. Therefore they are willing to wait and let situations develop.

Admiral Radford observed that he had little confidence in Siam.

Mr. Eden then said that the Cabinet would want to think all this over and consult with their Chiefs. He asked if they were in Paris at the moment and Admiral Radford answered in the negative. Mr. Eden then said he wondered if he went home that afternoon and arrived in Geneva Sunday⁴ it would “hot up” the situation.

Admiral Radford mentioned that he had discussed Indochina with Whiteley⁵ but that he was anxious to talk to Harding, and Mr. Eden agreed that it would be useful for Admiral Radford to talk as soon as possible to the British Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Eden then went on to say that broadly speaking they accepted the point of view that Indochina was critical to Southeast Asia, but he didn’t know what the military views of the British Chiefs would be on intervention. Politically, he said, intervention would be “hell at home” and that he could not imagine a worse issue with the British public.

Sir Harold Caccia at this point reverted to the difficulty created by the difference in presentation of the problem to the British and to us. He said that Mr. Eden had sent Ambassador Jebb⁶ down to the Quai D’Orsay and that Jebb had been told that, of course, the French would go on fighting if Dien-Bien-Phu fell. (Later in the day it was ascertained that Jebb had actually seen and talked to Bidault on that call.)

The Secretary said that the line taken by the French certainly was different. He said that Bidault had told him that if Dien-Bien-Phu fell and the United States was not in, all was over; that if the United States was in prior to the fall of Dien-Bien-Phu, then the French would go on fighting even if Dien-Bien-Phu fell; and finally when he asked Bidault if the French would fight on after the fall of Dien-Bien-Phu before our actual intervention, but after the receipt by the French of assurances from us that we would come in within a matter of a few weeks, Bidault had replied “No”.

At this point the Secretary mentioned the letter which he proposed to send Bidault on this general subject but on which he was awaiting comments from Washington.⁷ Mr. Eden read the letter and commented that it was very good. The Secretary said that he also had in mind the importance of establishing the record clearly since the French might attempt to pin on us responsibility for their withdrawal from Indochina.

Mr. Eden replied that any such idea on the part of the French was nonsense and that they couldn’t possibly maintain it. Mr. Eden then asked if he could have a copy of the letter after it was sent, and the Secretary agreed. (A copy was subsequently given Mr. Eden after delivery to Bidault.)

The Secretary again reminded Mr. Eden that our Congressional leaders had said that they would not grant any authority to intervene in Indochina except on the basis of united action.

At this point Mr. Eden said he was very inclined to return to London that evening, and there was some further discussion of Admiral Radford’s arrangements to talk to the British Chiefs.

The Secretary then asked what Mr. Eden knew about the Prime Minister’s suggested visit to Washington.

Mr. Eden replied that he had just talked on the telephone to the Prime Minister and he had said that a reply had just come in from the President which seemed to be agreeable in principle to the suggested visit.

As the conversation broke up, the Secretary suggested that at the tripartite meeting with Bidault to which they were both then going they might ask Bidault if he still stood by the terms of the joint United States-French communiqué of April 14.⁸ He said that he had gained the impression that the French had now abandoned the agreement contained therein.

1. Secretary Dulles described this meeting in telegram Dulte 18 from Paris, Apr. 24, which read as follows:

   “Eyes only Acting Secretary. Admiral Radford and I saw Eden briefly this afternoon before tripartite meeting with Bidault.

   “I laid before Eden essentiality of prompt combined action regarding Indochina if situation was to be saved. I emphasized that for us to act, British participation was necessary and I added that I hoped we could bring with us other countries I had visualized in Ad Hoc group.

   “Admiral Radford, in reply to Eden’s question whether form of intervention contemplated use of troops, said he had in mind use of RAF units now in Hong Kong or Malaya. He acknowledged even immediate air intervention by US and UK could not save Dien Bien Phu but emphasized that public entrance of US and UK would forestall general collapse and chaos in Vietnam which, if it occurred, he believed might result in massacre of French.

   “Eden asked number of questions indicating no basic difference in our estimates of military importance of Indochina but reflecting political difficulty intervention would produce in England. He also expressed perplexity at fact French are telling him and me somewhat different stories. They have given him impression that they will fight on if Dien Bien Phu falls. We agreed we would seek from Bidault at the tripartite meeting later in the afternoon clarification on this point as well as the matter of continued French adherence to the joint US–French communiqué in Paris of April 14.

   “There was considerable talk of difficulty of suppressing by military means alone guerillas and subversion throughout southeast Asia. Radford expressed his belief only effective cure was to place pressure on source of infection and activity, i.e., Communist China.

   “Eden accepted seriousness and urgency of matter. He is considering flying back to London tonight to consult Churchill and their joint chiefs of staff, going to Geneva Sunday. I believe he is deeply impressed and certainly aware of our seriousness, but I am not hopeful of immediate and favorable Cabinet decision on principle of intervention in Indochina.” (751G.00/4–2454)

   For Eden’s account of the meeting, see Full Circle, pp. 114–115.

2. British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
3. Bent also as telegram 2098 to Washington, p. 1378.
4. Apr. 25.
5. Gen. Sir John Whiteley, Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission, Washington, and British Representative on the Standing Group of the Military Committee of NATO.
6. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, British Ambassador in France.
7. For the text of the letter sent by Secretary Dulles to Foreign Minister Bidault prior to the Secretary’s departure for Geneva on the evening of Apr. 24, see telegram Dulte 1 from Geneva, Apr. 24, p. 1398.
8. For text, see footnote 3, p. 1336.