651.51G/4–1454
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State1
Participants:
- The Secretary of State
- M. Bidault
Following the luncheon at the Quai d’Orsay today, M. Bidault and I had a private discussion. He showed me a personal letter dated March 23 which he had received from General Navarre, which is the subject of a separate memorandum.2
I said to M. Bidault that I frankly thought the French were on the wrong track in their negotiations with the Associated States. The French talked about full and complete independence and yet in the position they take, in the negotiations they appear to be giving the impression, by insisting that there could be no provisions permitting the withdrawal of the Associated States from the French Union, that in fact they wished to perpetuate their control of Indochina. I said that we all realized that as of this moment Vietnam and other Associated States were not in a position to assume, safeguard, and protect their own independence. They did not have effective and trained personnel to man the governmental machinery, they obviously were not alone capable of carrying on the war to protect their freedom, and they were not yet very experienced in self-government. I suggested the possibility that some formula could be found which would meet the point and make clear that the French would wish the Associated States to have full independence. For example, a provision might be inserted that five years after the conclusion of hostilities in Indochina the Associated States would have the right to withdraw from the French Union if they so desired.
M. Bidault said French public and parliamentary opinion would not support the continuation of the war in Indochina if the concept of the French Union were placed in any doubt whatsoever. Therefore, it was essential that the agreement with the Associated States make clear that the latter, by voluntary association, were and would continue to be a part of the French Union.
I said to M. Bidault that under certain circumstances the US Administration was prepared to ask the Congress for powers which [Page 1336] would enable us to participate in a united effort to save Southeast Asia. There were, however, two very important considerations which would have to be met if there were to be Congressional approval of the US participating in united action. The first of these considerations was that it be really united action in the sense of participation of the states that had a vital interest in the area, particularly the UK, Australia, New Zealand. The second consideration was that it would have to be clear that this was to preserve real independence for the states in the area and there could be no question that the US was participating in an action which could reasonably be construed as assisting in the perpetuation of colonialism.3
- Drafted by MacArthur from the Secretary’s verbal report of the conversation.↩
- In a memorandum of Apr. 15, not printed, MacArthur described the letter from General Navarre, French Commander in Indochina, which Bidault showed briefly to both Dulles and MacArthur. Among the points contained in the letter, as described by MacArthur, were the following: New heavy attacks on Dien Bien Phu were to be expected. The fall of Dien Bien Phu, should it occur, should not be portrayed as a great defeat, but rather as the conclusion of an operation which was worth the cost. Also, the Vietnamese were exhibiting a disturbing lack of will. It might not be wise to reach final agreements with the existing government prior to the Geneva Conference. The general recalled his views prior to the fall of Dien Bien Phu in Henri Navarre, Agonie de l’Indochine (Paris, Plon, 1956).↩
Following their conversations of Apr. 14, Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Bidault issued the following communiqué:
“For nearly two centuries it has been the practice for representatives of our two nations to meet together to discuss the grave issues which from time to time have confronted us.
“In pursuance of this custom, which we hope to continue to the benefit of ourselves and others, we have had an exchange of views on Indochina and Southeast Asia.
“Mr. Dulles expressed admiration for the gallant fight of the French Union forces, who continue with unshakeable courage and determination to repel Communist aggression.
“We deplore the fact that on the eve of the Geneva Conference this aggression has reached a new climax in Viet-Nam particularly at Dien Bien Phu and has been renewed in Laos and extended to Cambodia.
“The independence of the three Associated States within the French Union, which new agreements are soon to complete, is at stake in these battles.
“We recognize that the prolongation of the war in Indochina, which endangers the security of the countries immediately affected, also threatens the entire area of Southeast Asia and of the Western Pacific. In close association with other interested nations, we will examine the possibility of establishing, within the framework of the United Nations Charter, a collective defense to assure the peace, security and freedom of this area.
“We recognize that our basic objective at the Geneva Conference will be to seek the re-establishment of a peace in Indochina which will safeguard the freedom of its people and the independence of the Associated States. We are convinced that the possibility of obtaining this objective depends on our solidarity.”
The communiqué was issued as Department of State Press Release No. 197 of Apr. 14 and was printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 622.
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