751G.00/4–2454: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
niact
[Received 3: 26 a.m.]
2098. Sent Paris niact 701, Geneva niact 3, repeated information London 47. Geneva for Secretary. Department pass Defense for Radford. [Page 1379] Last night General Navarre told me that either war in Indochina must end by negotiated peace or else it must be internationalized with participation by US in all arms, including infantry.
He said Dien-Bien-Phu had turned out to be tragedy. Under his original strategic concept, his main effort had not been calculated to mature until October. However, fixing of Geneva conference had acted as sinister catalyst with result that enemy had now concentrated—with increasing Chinese aid—his entire battle force at Dien-Bien-Phu. Furthermore, elsewhere in Indochina balance of military force was so precariously delicate that presence on either side of two additional light divisions would mean victory or defeat.
At Pien-Bien-Phu itself situation was desperate. Navarre confirmed loss of point one in “Huguette” which signifies reduction of drop zone to almost zero. He said there are 2,600 wounded at Dien-Bien-Phu of whom 600 are gravely wounded and in underground dressing stations. Remaining 2,000 to some degree are still able to fight. However, of 9,000 effectives under De Castries’ command, only 3,000 at present time are combat worthy. This is due to battle fatigue and the extreme attrition on personnel of a fight which has gone on since March 13.
Navarre said De Castries had asked him not to send more Vietnamese reinforcements as Vietnamese troops at Dien-Bien-Phu could not stand up under artillery fire. This posed severe problem because first parachute battalion which US Air Force has flown out to Tourane, according to Navarre, is not up to full strength, having only 350 men. In consequence, this battalion must be fleshed out with troops on hand and he would have wished to use Vietnamese had that been possible.
I asked Navarre if there were any hope of sending in relief column. He said that it was militarily more advantageous in view of toll which De Castries could still exact on enemy to have garrison fight on until end. Even if relief column could reach Dien-Bien-Phu, which he doubted, the maximum survivors who might get out of Dien-BienPhu, as result would not exceed 1,500 men.
Dien-Bien-Phu, however, from pure military point of view had paid some dividends. 15,000 Viet Minh casualties had resulted from battle thus far, including 8,000 dead. Thus, when Dien-Bien-Phu was over, enemy would find himself in greatly weakened condition. It was necessary therefore to be able to strike him quickly. To wait until October would be too late. However, France of itself and with the increasingly unreliable Vietnamese National Army did not have the strength to strike that essential rapid blow.
Navarre said morale and efficiency of Vietnamese National Army had begun to go downhill ever since announcement of Geneva conference. He said likewise that similar, though less damaging effect had [Page 1380] been evident in French Union forces. Situation in National Army was so bad that day before yesterday an entire battalion near Tuy Hoa in Operation Atlante had mutinied.
At least four times during evening’s conversation General Navarre emphasized the necessity for brief conference at Geneva. He said, “If the conference lasts three months, I cannot foretell what might happen here.” Again he repeated that Indochina war would enter an immediately new phase either through some sort of negotiated peace or by international action with US participation.
I am providing General O’Daniel with copy of this message.