751G.00/4–2354: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State1
priority
[Received April 24—3: 51 a.m.]
2096. Sent Paris priority 699. I saw De Jean this evening. He was most dispirited. He said, “In all my years of service, I have never seen such a combination of military and political calamities.” We had a drink.
[Page 1378]De Jean said that he had discussed Dien-Bien-Phu with Navarre this morning. De Castries has asked urgently for more reinforcements, but if Navarre drops these troops, he will have no reserve for relief column which would try to help remnant of garrison fight rear guard retreat from Dien-Bien-Phu. Navarre told De Jean that he had not yet made up his mind to which manner to use these reserves.
I told De Jean that General O’Daniel and his staff had worked up a tactical plan for relief of Dien-Bien-Phu which General O’Daniel hesitated to give directly to Navarre because of his extremely limited terms of reference as MAAG Chief. O’Daniel had asked me, however, to outline his plan to De Jean and if latter agreed, he could submit it to Navarre as his own notion.
O’Daniel’s plan calls for armored column to move toward Dien-Bien-Phu from Hanoi. This would consist of two armored groups supported by three groupes mobiles which would be taken from Operation Atlante and central Laos. Simultaneously with attack by armored column from east O’Daniel proposes that four in Muong Say sortie toward Dien-Bien-Phu. At moment armored column would near battleground, three reserve parachute battalions now under Cogny’s command would drop on Tuangiao, which is enemy’s supply base for Dien-Bien-Phu. At same time garrison under De Castries would sortie. With sufficient aerial support, O’Daniel feels that this plan might assure victory, or at least avert defeat.
De Jean was interested in this sketch and said that he would communicate it to Navarre without any indication as to its origin. He said, however, that he felt the hour was very late and he doubted if Navarre would agree to these suggestions. De Jean also pointed to precarious balance of forces in delta, but I assured him that, according to O’Daniel, elements envisaged for use in his plan would not deprive Cogny of his units in delta other than the three battalion reserve of parachutists. I likewise added that if Navarre bought O’Daniel’s plan, latter would urgently recommend to our government that naval and possibly air transport lift be provided to bring troops from south and central Indochina to Tonkin.
- The source text indicates that Hoey of PSA was notified of this message at 6: 35 a.m., Apr. 24, and that it was passed to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 6:45 a.m.↩